PROFESSIONAL AND HONORARY SOCIETIES American Physical Society. National Academy of Sciences. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Phi Beta Kappa. Sigma Xi. Phi Kappa Phi. AWARDS AND HONORS Ernest Orlando Lawrence Memorial Award-1972-for research in Theoretical Physics (Atomic Energy Commission). University of Illinois Alumni Award for Distinguished Service in Engineering— 1973. Guggenheim Fellowship-1961-62 and 1971-72. Richtmyer Memorial Lecturer to the American Association of Physics Teachers, San Francisco, California-1978. Leo Szilard Award for Physics in the Public Interest-1980-presented by the Forum on Physics and Science of the American Physical Society. D.Sc. (Honorary), University of Illinois, Chicago Circle-1981. 1983 Honoree of the Natural Resources Defense Council for work in arms control. RECENT POSITIONS AND ACTIVITIES Spring 1984-I. I. Rabi Visiting Professor, Columbia Univ., New York. 1974-83-Member Board of Trustees, Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, New Jersey (currently emeritus). 1978-82-Consultant, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 1977-82-Consultant, Office of Science and Technology Policy. 1973-81-Consultant, National Security Council. 1969-81-Consultant, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1978-80-Member, Energy Research Advisory Board, U.S. Dept. of Energy. STATEMENT OF DR. SIDNEY D. DRELL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, STANFORD LINEAR ACCELERATOR, STANFORD, CALIF. Mr. DRELL. Senator, as far as the vulnerabilities are concerned, even if all the technical goals of the administration's and the Defense Department's Strategic Defense Initiative were achieved, it would still face its most difficult problems, which are the operational ones; namely, that the parts of the system that are in space are vulnerable to various countermeasures, the easiest of which would be space mines that could be launched and positioned in orbits near the satellites, and detonated upon command from ground. They also would be less expensive. The satellite platforms such as laser-based platforms certainly are more fragile than the ICBM's they are designed to intercept. And so the operational problem of vulnerability of space-based systems seems to me an unavoidable one for space-based systems. For the popup systems that you mentioned in your questions earlier today, you can avoid the vulnerability for the interceptors or for the directed energy weapons like the X-ray lasers, but not for the sensors that must always be in space. For popup systems, the problem, as you so clearly focused on during your earlier discussions, is one of available time. You have less than 3 to 5 minutes to have your system not only launched, but itself rise above the atmosphere, because the X-rays are absorbed by the atmosphere. At most, there are only seconds to make the decision to launch. Although there are 3 to 5 minutes for boost phase now, less than 1 minute would be required should the Soviets modify their missile force with technology available and use hot burn, so the booster finishes its burn before it reaches the top of the atmosphere-you have the unavoidable problem that with hot burn, there is no possibility of intercept during boost phase. So I think the problems of the defense-in contrast to, say, going to the Moon-are operational ones. In the case of the Moon, you knew there was one Moon, you knew where the Moon would be. We are now dealing with an offense that has countermeasures available to it, whether it is to attack the space platforms with space mines, harden the missiles against them with material to weaken the effect of the lethal rays, or by faster burn and a doctrine just to deny time totally. Even with the computers doing their best, you have a problem that the Moon shot did not have. It seems to me this operational problem is the most severe one for an effective defense that will meet the President's goal of making nuclear weapons obsolete and impotent. And there is plenty of time during any development for the relatively easier steps with space mines to keep anything in space highly vulnerable as long as we do not have an ASAT treaty. Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Carnesale. [Mr. Carnesale's biographical data follows:] BIOGRAPHICAL Data of ALBERT CARNESALE ADDRESSES Office; Harvard University, 79 Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. (617) 4951189. PRESENT POSITION 1974-present. Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Professor of Public Policy and (since 1981) Academic Dean at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Research and teaching interests are in international security and arms control, with emphasis on policies associated with nuclear weapons and strategies for their use and non-use, on international issues associated with nuclear energy, and on the impact of technological change on defense and arms control policy. PREVIOUS POSITIONS 1972-1974. North Carolina State University; Raleigh, N.C. Professor and Head, Division of University Studies, and University Coordinator for Environmental Studies. Responsible for university-wide interdisciplinary programs dealing with contemporary issues and problems. 1969-1972. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Washington, D.C. Chief, Defensive Weapons Systems Division, and senior advisor to head of U.S. Delegation to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). 1962-1969. North Carolina State University; Raleigh, N.C. Instructor, Assistant Professor, and Associate Professor of Nuclear Engineering. 1957-1962. Martin Marietta Corporation; Baltimore, Md. Senior Engineer; Nuclear Division. OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Consultant to U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Departments of Defense, Energy and State. U.S. member of (and head of U.S. Delegation to) the Technical Coordinating Committee of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (1978-1980). EDUCATION B.M.E. (Mechanical Engineering), The Cooper Union, 1957. M.S.-(Mechanical Engineering), Drexel Institute, 1961. Ph.D. (Nuclear Engineering), North Carolina State University, 1966. A.M. (Honrary), Harvard University, 1979. RECENT PUBLICATIONS Living With Nuclear Weapons, co-author with other members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group (Harvard University Press and Bantam Books, 1983). "The Utility Director's Dilemma: The Governance of Nuclear Power," co-author with Graham Allison, in Uncertain Power, ed. Dorothy S. Zinberg (Pergamon Press, 1983), pp. 134-153. "Personal Views on Ballistic Missile Defense," in Ballistic Missile Defense, eds., Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (The Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 373380. "ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures are Worse than the Disease," co-author with Charles Glaser, International Security (Summer 1982), pp. 70-85. STATEMENT OF ALBERT CARNESALE, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY AND ACADEMIC DEAN, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS. Mr. CARNESALE. Let me try to address both of your questions. One, how the vulnerability of a strategic defensive system in space compares to the vulnerability of the missiles that it is intended to attack; and second, what that does to the propensity for a first strike. There is no fundamental physical principle that says that a missile will be more vulnerable than a satellite in space. However, every scientist or engineer whom I have asked this questionwhich side would you rather be on, the side whose job it is to shoot down the satellite, or the side whose job it is to use the satellite to shoot down the missiles?-prefers to be on the side whose job it is to shoot down the satellite. Without exception. They do not say that the outcome is absolutely certain, but their preference is clear. Any space-based defense is likely to be more vulnerable than the things it is trying to attack. As for thinking about a popup system, one must avoid the fallacy of the last move. If we have a popup system that can destroy their missiles in their boost phase, they might have something similar. Suppose they have a popup system, no matter how crude, that is forward-based, say, in their submarines. They know in advance when they are going to launch their offensive missiles and, just before they do so, they pop up a system whose sole function it is to shoot down our popup system. It is easier for them than for us, because they control the timing of events. They are not going to be surprised if they are starting a war. Senator TSONGAS. Wait a minute. Are you saying that the Soviets could deploy a popup system that could counter Mr. CARNESALE. I am saying that, if we could deploy a popup system, they could probably deploy a popup system to destroy ours. Let me put it this way: I am not going to bet my country on the certainty that they cannot. Senator TSONGAS. But you could not assure us that we could not develop an antipopup popup system? Mr. CARNESALE. It is harder for us than it is for them, because ! we would have only 3 minutes to get their boosters. All their popup system has to do is hold ours down for 3 minutes. Senator TSONGAS. Well, what about the first strike? Mr. CARNESALE. Imagine the worst situation; that is, let us assume that both sides have "Star Wars" systems in space, and let us assume even further, as long as we are on this flight of fantasy, that these systems are reasonably effective as ballistic missile defenses. If they are reasonably effective as ballistic missile defenses, the odds are they are far more effective as antisatellite weapons, because that is a much easier task. This means they are vulnerable to attack by each other. Now, think of the incentive to go first. By attacking the other fellow's "Star Wars" satellites, you accomplish two things simultaneously. First, his nation is now vulnerable to your offensive missiles, because you have destroyed his defense; and second, your nation remains invulnerable to his offensive systems, because you have retained your defense. So if these things work, I can think of nothing less stable than for both countries to have them simultaneously. Senator TSONGAS. So, as to the desirability of first strike, it is the function of how effective a system is? Mr. CARNESALE. It is a function of how effective it is, but if it is reasonably effective, as the proponents would have us believe, then it maximizes the incentive on both sides. Imagine what would happen if you were struck first. You would suddenly find yourself in a situation where you were vulnerable to his offensive weapons and he was not vulnerable to yours. That is a situation in which I would not like to find us. That is a situation in which the Soviets would not like to find themselves. For both sides to have space-based defenses would be the worst of all situations. It is worse than the situation you asked about: One where they were starting to deploy such a system and we felt compelled to destroy it. Senator TSONGAS. Do you want to comment on that, Dr. Drell? Mr. DRELL. I would say that I agree with Dr. Carnesale's statement. The fact is that a leaky umbrella does you more good if you are protecting yourself against a drizzle than a downpour. If you have this combination of offense and a partially effective defensewhich, by the way, is what the Defense Department is now speaking of-they don't in their plans speak of making weapons obsolete and impotent only; they give emphasis in the 5-year plan that you have received to enhance deterrence with a partially effective defense. But with a partially effective defense, you have to recognize that it will be more effective as an adjunct of a first strike, because the retaliatory force will be at a predictable time, with reduced coordination, reduced in intensity, and you will, with a leaky umbrella, be protecting yourself more against the drizzle than a down pour. That is exactly the way it was viewed in 1972, when President Nixon abandoned plans to build a nationwide ABM defense. He said we could not do it, and the effort would be destabilizing just because of this reason. I think that nothing has changed in the 15 years since then. And it is also clear that the Under Secretary of Defense, who is not here this morning, agrees with this statement because, as he has said in the New York Times, "With unconstrained proliferation, no defensive system will work." The only path, it seems to me, to better stability is by, first, through arms control, limiting the offenses and constraining the countermeasures by limiting technology in a verifiable way and reducing numbers in a verifiable way, and then one can think of perhaps improving the stability or decreasing the danger of the world, as the President called for through a mutually implemented defense initiative. Senator TSONGAS. Ambassador, I am not familiar with your technical background. Would you care to comment on those questions that I posed? STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT W. BUCHHEIM, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 1978-79 UNITED STATES-SOVIET UNION ASAT TALKS, PHOENIX, ARIZ. Ambassador BUCHHEIM. I would make just two brief remarks, Senator. One is, that in my opinion, deployment of a space-based ABM system will not take place totally and instantly, these things, whatever they are, will be put up one at a time. The incentive to shoot at them one at a time, when they are on their way, would be very high. So, it seems to me, anyone interested in space-based ABM defenses really ought to be seriously interested in the best kind of ASAT prohibitions we can get, because his system, strong as he may desire it, is going to get blown up by any ASAT system in the other guy's hands. Now, a second point is, I would like to return to Mr. Perle's comment about the difficulties of dealing with an effective ASAT prohibition because, as he said and as many people have said, getting away with having only a few clandestine ASAT systems on hand is a much more serious matter than, say, keeping a few ICBM's or keeping a few chemical weapons or whatever. Now, that statement is correct and important when you recognize that the vital U.S. satellite assets that are in operation today are very few in number, and our capacity to replace them, if they are taken out, is almost zero in terms of doing anything in an interesting timespan. On the other hand, the argument about the importance of being able to keep to the side a few ASAT contraptions is not vital when you play it against the kind of numbers of things in orbit that would be fundamental to any effective space-based ABM system. So if the Soviets could hide-what-three or five ASAT interceptors like that, that is a very serious problem for our present space assets. It's a trivial matter against the number of objects that would be put into orbit as part of an ABM system. So the problem is really different. Senator TSONGAS. I promised I would let you get out of here in time to have lunch. I have just one other question. Where did this idea come from? I mean, it just appeared on the scene, and obviously there were discussions on technologies for years, but in terms of concept it suddenly becomes American national policy within the scientific and technical community. What, as far as you know, preceded the President's announcement of March 23 or whatever that date was of last year? Ambassador BUCHHEIM. I think I could cast a little light on that. It was way back in the 1950's when studies were undertaken within the Air Force, and by some of the contractors, on what was 1 |