The implication of the way that was put is that the Soviets would have refrained from developing MIRV's if the United States had refrained from developing MIRV's. I observed in reading remarks made by Senator Pressler on the floor of the Senate, that he has described the situation in the late 1960's as one in which the United States refused to consider arms control as a way of dealing with the evolution of MIRV technology.

I wish to set the record straight on that point. Under the Nixon administration, in the early days of the SALT I negotiations, we did in fact propose a MIRV ban to the Soviet Union. The Soviets rejected our proposal because it was tied unavoidably to a requirement for onsite inspection. As we had no sure means of determining whether a missile contained one or more warheads, I think the historical record on this is clear. We made the effort, and it was unsuccessful.

I would be delighted if the Soviets did not have MIRV's today, but I fail to see how a unilateral decision by the United States not to proceed with MIRV would have produced a similar decision on the part of the Soviet Union, and indeed all of our historic experience suggests that the Soviets will deploy any weapon of which they are capable independently of the attitude of the United States. I cannot think of a better example of that than the ASAT weapon that the Soviets possess today, a weapon they deployed long before the United States even considered a program of its own, and that they have maintained operational for a number of years.

If I may make one further comment, Senator Tsongas has expressed the prediction that history will not treat this administration kindly, because, as I understood it, there has been no progress on arms control. I find that an astonishing statement in light of the fact that the failure to achieve progress on the principal arms control negotiations underway lies directly with the party that has walked out of those negotiations.

It is, after all, the Soviet Union that has walked out of the negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces. It is the Soviet Union that has walked out of the START negotiations, and it seems to me any fair evaluation of the responsibility of this administration, compared to the responsibility of what has now become three Soviet administrations during the period that we have been negotiating, would have to focus on the question of whether the proposals made by the United States at the INF talks, at the START talks, have been fair and equitable proposals that provide a reasonable basis for negotiation, because it seems to me that unless you can show that the proposals put forward by the American side have not been an adequate basis for negotiation-and we would be delighted to hear suggestions for other proposals that would bring us closer to a success-the otherwhelming fact remains that the Soviets have walked out of those negotiations and there is precious little we can do to advance toward progress on arms control when the other side won't come to the table.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state for the record that the United States has negotiated and then not ratified three separate treaties that sit before this committee-the Peaceful

Nuclear Explosion [PNE], Threshold Test Ban [TTB], and SALT II Treaties.

The current administration and Mr. Perle were instrumental in making sure SALT II was never ratified. They are also refusing to even talk about ASAT's or "Star Wars." That is the historical record. I would hope that when that is looked at objectively, the record will be viewed as not as clearcut as has been suggested. Thank you.

Senator PRESSLER. Also, let me say that I think you are referring to my statement on MIRV's that was in a Los Angeles Times op ed. I suggested that efforts to control MIRV's in the late 1960's would have better served U.S. interests. Again, at that time, we were told that this was the solution to our security problems and that this was going to give us a superiority that wouldn't be challenged. And once again, we are in a vulnerable position. Indeed, I believe the Scowcroft Commission agrees with this.

In any event, I want to get into some of my questions because I know some of my colleagues have to leave. First of all, in President Reagan's March 23 address, he called for a research and development effort to "give us the means to render these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." First, do you believe, in your professional judgment, that a complete defense against ICBM's is possible? Second, if some ICBM warheads could still get through, what value would such a defense have? Third, what would be the value of such a defense if cruise missiles and bombers could get through it anyway?

Anyone could respond to that.

General ABRAHAMSON. First of all, I think it is worthwhile to go back to the Fletcher Commission report itself. What the Fletcher Commission report outlined, again, a scientific effort to evaluate the feasibility of establishing such a system itself was a layered system. And the practicality of such a layered system does depend on a reasonable effectiveness at each element of the layer or at each layer. However, it is the sum of all of those layers that begins to offer the hope of such an effective system.

For example, if there were five layers, and each layer was only 85 percent effective, then about one one-hundredth of 1 percent of the missiles could-or the RV's-could get through.

I think the important thing is that we have before us a goal, a goal that is set out as a very difficult goal, but nonetheless one that we should keep in mind as we investigate each of these technologies. The President has done that. He has set out a clarion call, very similar, of course, to what President Kennedy set out just before Senator Glenn's initial flight, at a time when very few people believed that you could go to the moon. And, in fact, people were not even sure exactly how at that point. But, nonetheless, there was sufficient faith in the technology that America could produce, that President Kennedy set that goal for all of us and it was proven.

And I guess my experience as a technologist and as a manager with a long career in this effort is that we indeed can produce miracles. I think that is what the shuttle program has recently shown me, and I believe that American technical muscle can, over a long period of time, do precisely what has been laid out.

The immediate step, however, is to investigate what is the best way to proceed, a way that will be affordable, that certainly will increase stability at every step on the way, and one that future Presidents and future Congresses can debate and make a decision about implementation of each stage of it.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for a repetition of the example that was used about the five layers and 85 percent effectiveness? Would you repeat that for the record?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir. Five layers of a defensive system might well include such a thing as a layer that could reach out and intercept a ballistic missile shortly after it rises off the pad, when it is indeed very vulnerable, if you can project your power that far. It may also then include a layer at the point that the ballistic missile burns out, but before the time that it really separates into many MIRV'd systems and decoys that make it difficult. There could be one or two layers of midcourse and interception out of the atmosphere, and finally, a layer down near the terminal area, similar to what has been talked about before in terminal defenses, perhaps different technology involved.

If each of those layers were, as I indicated, 85 percent effective, very few warheads would be able to get through. And that is, in fact, the basis of that technology investigation.

Now, what the Fletcher Report is not is a specific suggestion of what system it is that we should build in order to achieve that goal. What it has laid out is a series of technical alternatives that need to be evaluated very carefully. Some of those, I am sure, will be effective; some, in the end, may not be effective.

So it is too early to firmly project and say at this point in time we know that we can do this. However, I think many of us with experience in what this country can produce do feel that that is a worthy goal to set out.

Senator TSONGAS. The number that you used was that if all five layers were 85 percent effective, what percent would get through? General ABRAHAMSON. .01 is the statistical number, sir—one onehundredth of 1 percent.

Senator PRESSLER. I shall ask just one more question, and then I will yield my time to members who have to leave.

Dr. Cooper, in September 1982, I believe you testified before this committee that proponents of space-based missile defenses "grossly underestimated" the time involved and the costs associated with these programs. Has your opinion changed?

Dr. COOPER. Not at all. As a matter of fact, I believe that over the past year, the work of the Fletcher Committee and the statements made by the President himself have shown that my judgments on that are held by a large fraction of both the technical and nontechnical community.

You have to realize that the proponents at that time were talking about having systems in space that were effective within 3 to 5 years. The President has said it may not be possible to create systems of this sort in this century. The Fletcher Committee said that we may be able to create options for ourselves to start development of systems in the 1990's. All of those statements, except for the very optimistic ones are consistent, I believe, with my testimony of last year.

Senator PRESSLER. I have some more questions, but I will yield to my colleagues. I do want to put three articles from the magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology which summarize the key conclusions of the Presidential study groups on strategic defense technology into the record. I will also place in the record two articles by Jeffrey Smith in Science which discuss the intergovernmental disputes that have arisen about the prospects and promise of strategic defense.

[The articles referred to follow:]

[From Aviation Week & Space Technology, Oct. 17, 1983]

PANEL URGES DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES

SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP ADVISES STRONG NUCLEAR MISSILE DEFENSIVE EFFORTS COUPLED WITH EARLY DEMONSTRATION PLANS

(By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.)

WASHINGTON.-An Administration senior interagency group recommended to President Reagan late last week that the U.S. embark on early demonstrations of credible ballistic missile defense technologies to its allies and the Soviet Union.

In recommending a technology development plan to the President, the group, represented by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and William P. Clark, assistant to the President for national security affairs, stressed the importance of showing the U.S. is determined to explore and has the competence to develop the required ballistic missile defense technology.

Parallel study

The interagency report melds a Defensive Technologies Study Team's report with a parallel strategy study conducted between June 1 and Oct. 1. It also presents to the President four funding levels for developing an effective ballistic missile defense system. Funding profiles from Fiscal 1985 through Fiscal 1989 range from $27 billion to $18 billion.

The Defensive Technologies Study Team was headed by James C. Fletcher, former administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The parallel strategy group, known as the Future Security Strategy Study, called FS, was headed by Fred S. Hoffman, director, Pan Heuristics, a division of Research and Development Associates.

"With vigorous technology development programs, the potential for ballistic missile defense can be demonstrated by the early 1990s," the interagency report said. It also stressed that the development program will not impinge in the near term on the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty with the USSR.

Maximum flexibility

"Early development programs are configured to provide maximum flexibility and demonstrated capability within treaties, protocols, agreements and political constraints," the interagency report said.

The report said the nation should establish the resolve for a new strategy to defend against nuclear weapons attack.

It added that an advanced technology ballistic missile defense system for the U.S. and its allies will reduce the military effectiveness of a Soviet preemptive attack with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. "By constraining or eliminating effective counterforce options, the utility of strategic and theater nuclear weapons are reduced and the threshold of nuclear war is raised. It undermines the confidence that an attack will succeed."

Early technology demonstrations planned by the interagency group include:

Underground tests at the Nevada nuclear test site leading toward the ability to scale the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's X-ray laser to full military power, to control the laser beam spread, and simultaneously drive multiple lasers from a single power source.

Acqusition and tracking of reentry vehicles using long-wavelength infrared sensors and high-altitude aircraft. This also includes a separate demonstration of intercepting warheads within the atmosphere above 50,000 ft. and nonnuclear kill devices on interceptor missiles.

Ground-based short-wavelength lasers demonstrated against spacecraft in an antisatellite role.

Generic acquisition, tracking and pointing in space against intercontinental ballistic missiles in the boost phase.

Airborne optical system sensor and a low-cost homing interceptor. These technologies are key to terminal and midcourse intercepts in a multilayered system. This demonstration would be within three to five years following optical technology demonstration on interceptor missiles.

Proof of principle to acquire Soviet ballistic missiles and to track the booster, the first step in a high-technology payoff to use directed-energy weapons for boostphase intercepts.

The plan calls for parallel early technology demonstrations in a three-pronged program-infrared chemical lasers, ground-based excimer lasers and shorter wavelength chemical lasers. Tests could be conducted within a few years to determine the effectiveness of these devices against targets such as spacecraft.

A mid-infrared chemical laser spacecraft with 25-megawatt, 15-meter-dia. optics is depicted above for long-range, space-based antisatellite/defensive satellite missions and for boost and midcourse ballistic missile defense applications. The laser platform would weigh 100,000 kg., and have a run time of 100 sec. Scaling to 1023 watts/steerradian is possible. A multilayered ballistic missile defense system designed to permit only a 10% leakage of reentry vehicles in each layer, with overall leakage of 0.1%, is depicted in artist's drawing at right. Two surveillance and battle management platforms are positioned at an orbital altitude of 100,000 km.

A technology assessment conducted by the Defensive Technologies Study Team that formed part of the interagency report called for the following:

Chemical infrared space laser with a 2-megawatt beam generator feasibility demonstration in 1987. The device is scalable almost immediately to 10 megawatts because of breakthroughs in nozzle technology. Beam control of a 4-meter (13.12-ft.)