would be exceedingly grave. However, a U.S. program capable of responding to Soviet deployment could lead to a safer world, with deterrence increasingly based on effective defenses for all sides.

Now, that is truly the objective. There is a description of the technologies of the systems, but I think that Dr. Keyworth's explanation is a superb base on which any questions you might like to ask would be available.

However, Dr. Cooper, would you like to comment on relationship to the ASAT?

[General Abrahamson's prepared statement follows:]

THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

(SDI)

INTRODUCTION

In a speech to the American people a year ago, President Reagan offered the hope of a world made safe from the threat of ballistic missiles. More specifically, he stated, "Our ultimate goal ... (is) eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles, and "our only purpose ... is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear

war."

President Reagan based this goal on recent technological advances which, he believes, offer us, for the first time in history, the opportunity to strengthen deterrence through effective defenses, rather than only through the threat of retaliation. He is determined that we exploit fully this opportunity.

I am convinced he is right.

Secretary Weinberger recently selected me to be the program's director. I began acting in this capacity on April 16, and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this committee. I would like to give you a general overview of the program, including its purpose, the funds we are requesting, and a summary description of the research and technology efforts we propose to pursue.

THE GOAL OF THE SDI

We are frequently asked whether the purpose of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is to defend people or military forces. Accomplishment of both missions is essential to the ultimate goal, which is to provide security for the people of the United States and our allies. The immediate objective is to conduct research on those technologies which might enable the development of defensive systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles after they have been launched and preventing them from hitting their targets.

Once proven, these technologies could be used for the design and development of an appropriate system of defenses. The highly effective defenses that we envision have three attributes which, we believe, would contribute to the ultimate objective. First and foremost, an effective defense against ballistic missiles would improve stability and reduce the likelihood of war by eliminating the military utility of a preemptive nuclear strike. Second, in the unlikely event--whether planned or accidental--that nuclear weapons would be used in the face of effective ballistic missile and other defenses, such defenses would save

lives and limit damage. Third, by reducing the value of offensive nuclear forces, both military and economic incentives would be created for negotiated offensive force reductions.

I want to make a special point of the fact that our research is focusing on defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges, including tactical and theater range systems as well as ICBM's and SLBM's. We are not seeking only to build defenses for the United States. As Secretary Weinberger has indicated, our concept of an "effective" defense is one which protects our Allies as well as the United States.

area.

I must underscore Soviet efforts in the ballistic missile defense The evidence of massive Soviet investments and programs is overwhelming. Were they to deploy the fruits of their programs unilaterally, the consequences to our national security would be exceedingly grave. However, a U.S. program capable of responding to Soviet deployments could lead to a safer world, with deterrence increasingly based on effective defenses for all sides.

FUNDING

We plan an aggressive, adequately funded program to pursue the relevant technologies at the maximum reasonable rate. For fiscal year 1985 we are requesting approximately $2 billion (total for DoD and DoE). We anticipate that during the fiscal year 1986-89 period, approximately $24 billion will be required.

The program is not a "new start" in the usual sense. Substantially all of the relevant technologies have been funded in previous years, but not all have been specifically related to defending against ballistic missiles. To implement the President's Strategic Defense Initiative, we have focused these previously existing related research efforts into a single program, and augmented the previously planned level of DoD funding for fiscal year 1985, $1,527 million, by $250 million, for a total request of $1,777 million. The DoD request is for 71% real growth in relevant technologies from fiscal year 84 to 85, and 16% relative to pre-SDI plans for fiscal year 1985. Part of the Initiative includes technologies involving nuclear devices, which are developed by the Department of Energy. Their work in direct support of this initiative in fiscal year 1985 is a portion of their nuclear research, development, and test funding. It is estimated at $210 million (It is not a separate, specific line item.) for a total program of $2 billion.

The DoD portion of the program has been divided into five technical areas, and a new program element has been established for each of them. These program elements are:

found in the Defense Agencies book of RDT&E descriptive summaries.

THE CONCEPT OF DEFENSE

The flight of a ballistic missile can be considered in four phases. The first is the boost phase, in which the first and second stage rocket engines of the missile are burning. They produce an intense and unique infrared signature. In the second, or post-boost phase, the bus separates from the main engines, and the multiple warheads are deployed from the bus, along with any penetration aids such as decoys and chaff. In the third, or mid-course phase, the multiple warheads and penetration aids travel on ballistic trajectories through space, above the earth's atmosphere. In the fourth, terminal phase, the warheads and penetration aids reenter the earth's atmosphere, where they are affected by atmospheric conditions.

Our program seeks to explore technologies enabling the engagement of attacking missiles in all four phases of their flight. This would require a number of capabilities, including global, full-time surveillance to warn of an attack. There is leverage in engaging the missiles in the boost phase, because the multiple warheads and penetration aids have not yet been been deployed. After deployment, we must be able to discriminate warheads from decoys, so we can target only the real threats. We must be prepared for the attacking warheads to be salvage fuzed; therefore, our terminal defenses must engage them at as high an altitude as possible. And in addition to the individual engagement capabilities, we must have a survivable battle management system capable of efficient, global control.

The technologies for the terminal defenses are also likely to be applicable to defense against the shorter range nuclear ballistic missiles, such as submarine launched ballistic missiles and theater range ballistic missiles, which may not have trajectories high enough to permit their attack with exoatmospheric systems, and which have short times-of-flight. Such technologies are important for defense of our

allies.