Strategic Defense and Anti-satellite Weapons: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, Second Session, April 25, 1984U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984 - 361 pages |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM system ABM Treaty ABRAHAMSON agreement altitude anti-satellite anti-satellite weapons arms control ASAT assessment atmosphere Background Paper ballistic missile defense battle management boost boost-phase intercept capability CARNESALE Chairman chemical laser components concepts cost countermeasures decision decoys defense against ballistic Defensive Technologies Study deployed deployment destroy deterrence directed-energy directed-energy weapons effort electron excimer fense Fiscal goal ICBM infrared interceptors KEYWORTH launch layer limited ment midcourse military million missile defense system negotiations neutral particle beam nuclear weapons objects offensive forces optical options orbit penetration aids percent PERLE phase post-boost potential President President's problem radar reentry vehicles research and development rocket satellites Senator PELL Senator PRESSLER Senator TSONGAS sensors Soviet ICBM Soviet Union space-based Star Wars Strategic Defense Initiative Study Team surveillance talking target technical terminal threat tion tracking trajectory United verifiable vulnerability warheads x-ray laser
Fréquemment cités
Page 333 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.
Page 336 - This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 335 - For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means. of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
Page 117 - What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?
Page 336 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 335 - To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty...
Page 344 - Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.
Page 335 - To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.
Page 344 - If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme Interests could be jeopardized Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty...
Page 344 - ... of our respective strategic retaliatory forces The USSR Delegation has also Indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms.