6. The best index of locomotive safety is one not mentioned in the letter. This is the casualty rate, a statistical comparison between casualties said to have been caused by defective locomotive units and the exposure to hazard caused by operation of the units. This can be determined from the Commission's published statistics. For non-steam locomotives during the post-war period it can be summarized in the following four-year averages: DEAR CONGRESSMAN STAGGERS: Further reference is made to your letter of March 8, 1966, regarding our Section of Locomotive Inspection's Report for Fiscal Year 1965, our reply of March 14, 1966, and your recent transmittal dated March 25, 1966, wherein you enclosed a letter from National Railway Labor Conference Chairman J. E. Wolfe, dated March 18, 1966. In accordance with your suggestion, we wish to make the following comments on Mr. Wolfe's letter. First, let us point out that Mr. Wolfe has raised the issue of relationship between accident trends occasioned by the presence or absence of firemen, to which we made no reference in our Locomotive Inspection Report or in our letter to you dated March 14, 1966. Mr. Wolfe apparently overlooked your request for specific information regarding the increase in the number of defective locomotives and in train-service accidents shown in our report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965. Secondly, Mr. Wolfe extracts a partial summary from the Commission's 79th Annual Report-1965 with regard to the causes of the "major portion" of train accident increases. However, a more accurate statement is as follows: There was a 10.3 percent rise in the number of train accidents reported, with the major portion of the increase due to derailments caused primarily by faulty equipment, track conditions, and by highway-grade crossings. In the past 4 years, accidents have shown a continued increase after having been substantially reduced in the fifties. Third, the statistical tables submitted by Mr. Wolfe were extracted from testimony presented by Mr. H. E. Greer, Director of Research, National Railway Labor Conference, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce on September 24, 1965, during its hearings held on the Railroad Work Rules Dispute in connection with Public Law 88-108. I also appeared as a witness before the same committee and presented testimony on August 30, 1965, while serving as Acting Chairman in the absence of then Chairman Charles A. Webb. At that time, we advised the Committee of our activities under the authority of the Accident Reports Act, which requires that monthly reports of all railroad accidents are to be made by carriers, directs the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe the method and form of reporting, and authorizes the Commission to investigate all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting in serious injury to persons or property. The information received from the carriers is compiled, analyzed, and published to provide comprehensive information, so that maximum benefits can be derived from the reports by the Commission, railroads, labor organizations, and other parties interested in the promotion of railroad safety. The data received in the accident reports is published in four publications. They are: 1. Statement M-450-Preliminary Report of Railroad Accidents and Resulting Casualties, 2. Statement M-400-Summary of Accidents Reported, 3. Accident Bulletin, 4. Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Bulletin. The aforenamed Commission publications have been cited as sources of information in Mr. Wolfe's statistical tables. This is correct to the extent that data was taken from the aforesaid publications. The carrier accident reports submitted in accordance with current Commission reporting rules do not distinguish between accidents involving trains operating with or without firemen. Therefore, from the information available to us, we are unable to relate the rise in accidents to the absence of firemen. We are aware of and have been concerned with the annual rise in train accidents. While there are variations which probably are affected by seasonal and climatic conditions, there has been an increase in total train accidents from a monthly average of 341 in 1961 to 443 in 1964. The preliminary figures for 1965 indicate a monthly average of 483. While there has been some increase in other train accidents from 41 to 57 and collisions from 82 to 102, the greatest increase has occurred in derailments, which have increased from an average of 221 per month to 283 per month. Crew consist may have some bearing in accidents involving collisions and other train accidents. Derailments are most often the result of defects or failure of equipment or roadbed. It is impossible, without detailed knowledge of each individual case, to determine whether another pair of eyes might have detected the potential of a derailment prior to the time of its Occurrence. In the same period, railroad employment has declined, so that there are fewer train and engine service employees, but more train accidents. However, during this period the total number of hours worked by train and engine service employees has remained about constant, and locomotive and motor train miles have increased. This trend indicates that fewer people are working about the same number of hours, resulting in extended tours of duty for the affected employees, and also indicates that in the same number of hours additional mileage is being covered. We are concerned with the continued rise in train accidents and regret that we are unable to give you more specific information as to factors responsible for this increase. Sincerely, JOHN W. BUSH, Chairman. Hon. HARLEY O. STAGGERS, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, DEAR CHAIRMAN STAGGERS: I am sending you this letter as my initial reply to your letter of May 3rd concerning the report of the Committee on Government Operations on the Interstate Commerce Commission's activities in the field of railroad safety. First of all the report starts out on the first page with the statement: Safety on our Nation's railroads is one of the prime responsibilities of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Despite a greatly increased expenditure by the Federal Government for rail safety, there has been no appreciable decline in either the number of railroad accidents or the number of deaths and injuries resulting from such accidents in the past decade. Hearings were conducted by the Government Activities Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Congressman Jack Brooks on September 15, 1964, for the purpose of determining whether the railroad safety program of the ICC might be more effective. Does the "greatly increased expenditure" refer to the I.C.C. appropriations for railroad safety? If so I think the statement is not too relevant. Our employees received certain congressionally stipulated salary increases and other statutory increases, e.g., increased travel rates, and government contributions to the retirement and insurance funds, and by comparison to the safety responsibilities of the I.C.C., a relative handful of additional employees have been added. Furthermore, the authority of the I.C.C. does not extend to maintenance of track and structures, etc. Since 11% of all the railroad accidents are due to derailments and approximately 86% due to other factors which we do not control (making a total of approximately 97% outside of our jurisdiction) and because of the vast increase in rail mileage due to the increase in the economy of our country, I repeat that I cannot so directly relate our modest dollar increase in appropriations to the fact that there has been no appreciable decline in either the number of railroad accidents or the number of deaths and injuries resulting from such accidents in the past decade." The whole report is a condemnation of the safety efforts of that section of the I.C.C. When a report does nothing but find fault with what is a good, but greatly understaffed operation it is, in my opinion, not a truly objective report. If the Bureau of the Budget and/or any committee of Congress wants statistics on the full area of safety activity the I.C.C. is charged with covering it is my opinion that they and we together could reach a realistic figure of how many inspectors it would probably take to adequately cover the whole responsibility. Then, too, according to this report, if a man is making a long (or a short) trip from A to B to check a safety matter under our jurisdiction at B another man should be on the payroll to make the same trip to see what the boxcar situation is at B. I believe it may be possible for a Department of Transportation to develop a staff of adequate size, but I doubt that the I.C.C. would be granted that kind of an increase in budget and personnel-both for railroad safety and for car service. I have not responded to the report paragraph by paragraph in this reply because I feel the immediate reply I have given is a proper and a practical one. I am having our staff make a further detailed analysis and that detailed reply will follow as soon as it is completed. I will also ask the staff to give you some information to explain the 86% figure mentioned in this letter. Sincerely, JOHN W. BUSH, Chairman. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Hon. HARLEY O. STAGGERS, Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, DEAR CHAIRMAN STAGGERS: This is in further reply to your letter of May 3, 1966, concerning the report of the Committee on Government Operations on Interstate Commerce Commission activities in the field of railroad safety. In my letter of May 9 I advised that a further detailed analysis and reply would be forthcoming. Our staff has now reviewed the report in detail and prepared its analysis, a copy of which is enclosed. Although we recognize that there is always room for improvement in our railroad safety program and are constantly striving for means to achieve improvements within the limited resources available to us, we cannot agree with the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in the Committee's report. In short, we do not believe that the report represents either a fair or accurate portrayal of the Commission's efforts in the field of railroad safety. To begin with, the report of the Committee does not acknowledge the Commission's limited jurisdiction in railroad safety operations. As our analysis indicates, approximately 97 percent of all accidents are attributable to causes over which we have no jurisdiction. The report leaves the connotation that there has been a deterioration in railroad safety as a result of our efforts since 1954. Our analysis indicates just the reverse since there has been approximately a 33 percent decline since 1954 in the number of accidents due to causes falling in the Commission's area of jurisdiction. The report also fails to recognize that railroad management is chiefly responsible for operating railroad safety programs and that the Governmental efforts to promote safety are limited by resources as well as legislative jurisdiction. In this connection, we do endeavor to make certain that the railroads are doing their job in this area. With our limited resources, spot checking is the only means by which this can be done. Even more of concern is the fact that the report condemns a number of efforts being made by the Commission to improve the Commission's railroad safety program. For example, the report criticizes the cross-use of various types of personnel and strengthened supervision over field operations, although the results show that these two programs are paying dividends in terms of increased productivity and better safety enforcement. We believe that we are doing a most commendable job of regulating safety on railroads within the availability of funds and the dictates of legislative authority. In my letter of May 9, I pointed out that I would supply you with additional information on the 86 percent of the railroad accidents, other than derailments, which are caused by factors over which we have no legislative jurisdiction. Included as Exhibit No. 2 in our attached analysis you will find a table breaking down the total number of accidents occurring during the calendar year 1964. This is the latest year for which complete figures are available. As indicated in my letter of May 9 and borne out in the above exhibit, only 1,034, or 3 percent of 32,105, accidents occurring during 1964 involved defects in equipment which is under the Commission's jurisdiction. The remaining 31,071 accidents were caused by factors outside of the Commission's jurisdiction, including 3,309, or 11 percent, by derailments; 27,762, or 86 percent by such causes as negligence of employees, malicious acts, obstructions on tracks, getting on and off locomotives or cars, accidents at public crossings, etc., as shown in the exhibit attached. I hope the enclosed detailed analysis will be helpful. I will be pleased to provide any additional information desired. Sincerely, The COMMISSIONERS, JOHN W. BUSH, Chairman. RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSOCIATION, The Interstate Commerce Commission, DEAR COMMISSIONER: President Johnson's Message on Transportation, sent to the Congress on March 2, with its severe strictures on many phases of transportation in the United States, and its explicit finding that regulation is in need of thorough review and reorganization, leads the Railway Labor Executives' Association to offer a series of suggestions to the Interstate Commerce Commission that we believe will contribute substantially and constructively to correction of the conditions causing the President's dissatisfaction with the transportation industries. In making these suggestions, the Railway Labor Executives' Association is not unaware of the magnitude of the regulatory problems facing the Interstate Commerce Commission. The world's most diverse and chaotic transportation network has been passing through a period of rapid growth and of unprecedented technological change. Quite naturally, too, the regulated industries have sought with increasing ingenuity to circumvent regulatory requirements and to avoid the submission or publication of information that would increase the effectiveness of governmental regulation. At best, the processes of that regulation, if completely flexible, would have had extreme difficulty in keeping abreast of the requirements in such a period. But we feel very strongly that the needs of the industry, of railway patrons, of employees and of the policy-making agencies of government could be much better served than is now the practice if the Commission would undertake a complete overhauling of the reporting and statistical phases of its activities. It is unnecessary to stress that all efforts to grapple with transportation problems, in the regulatory field, in that of collective bargaining, and in that of governmental policy determination depend upon the prompt availability of accurate, complete and current factual data. The overriding purpose of the collection of such data is to serve the imperative needs of these governmental and semigovernmental agencies. It has too often seemed, instead, that the major objectives of Commission practices in this area have been to reduce the clerical work and the cost of paper and typewriter supplies to the carriers, as well as to avoid any inconvenience to the progress through the Government Printing Office of the mass of government documents on subjects of less immediate use in vital governmental activities. Many governmental agencies, including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Mediation Board, and the several bureaus of the Interstate Commerce Commission itself have direct interest in the availability of data on railway finances and operations. No session of Congress ever convenes without finding before it proposals for dealing with the railway industry, and the staffs of the several committees to which such proposals are referred are in need of dependable information on railway condi tions. State regulatory commissions must depend on data from the Federal government. To give opportunity to representatives of these various agencies, and to railway employees whose lives are literally being constantly affected by the information issued from the Interstate Commerce Commission, we respectfully suggest that the Commission undertake an investigation into its own reporting and statistical activities, prefaced by a public hearing, open to railway patrons, employees, and managements, as well as to governmental agencies. If such an investigation is launched, through the public hearing proposed, it will be the purpose of the Railway Labor Executives' Association to call attention to the following, among other, shortcomings of the practices now being followed : REPORTING OF ACCIDENTS, CASUALTIES, AND EQUIPMENT DEFECTS AND FAILURES Railroads subject to the Interstate Commerce Act are not reporting accidents in accordance with regulations. Reports are delayed, and serious accidents in many cases are not reported for months after their occurrence, if at all. There is good reason to believe that these delays are growing greater, and carrier negligence more serious. Delays in carrier reports either cause or are followed by delays in reports by the Commission, with serious defects and changes in the modes of report from the Commission bureaus. Illustrative evidence has been offered to the Commission on carrier failures to report serious accidents. Delays are sufficiently attested by the dates of issuance of Commission monthly accident reports. Those reports are made in two forms, a preliminary numbered M-450, and a "final" numbered M-400. From 1954 to 1961, M-400 reports for the months of January were issued not later than June 9th of the same year; in five of the eight years, January reports were received before May 21st. The January, 1965 M-400 was not received until December, 1965. From 1954 to 1961, the M-400 for the month of March was received never later than August 14 of the same year, and in three of the years in July. The March, 1965 M-400 report has not been released as of March 15, 1966. Beginning in 1961, these accident reports have been used regularly by employee representatives in one or another part of the collective bargaining procedures relative to the hazards involved in changes in the rules governing railway operating employees. It is a startling fact that the lengthening of delay in publication of this important report began in January, 1962; in each of the last four months of that year, the delay was two months greater than in 1961. The Commerce Committee of the United States Senate held hearings, in September, 1965, into the effect on safety of the changes in the rules governing railway operating employees. Experience under these rules, as it affected the safety of railway operations, was of the greatest importance. The latest M-400 data available at the time of that September hearing were only for December, 1964. By contrast, in September, 1961, the May M-400 would have been available. The 1961 time-lag was four months; in 1965, that lag had lengthened to ten months. This long and increasing delay in issuance of the M-400 accident report is aggravated by another publication practice of the Commission. The M-450 accident report is a preliminary and very incomplete statement of train and trainservice accidents and casualties. It is usually issued within two months of the period it covers. The practice now is to make every M-450 report a comparison of the current month covered, with the corresponding month of the previous year. But the data for the preceding year are from the final M-400 report, making a direct comparison between the total accidents and casualties finally reported for the earlier period with the incomplete current data, and giving an inaccurate impression of the accident trend. The Commission issues an annual report on the results of locomotive inspection, and of accidents due to locomotive defects. Employee representatives used this report, too, in 1961 to shed light on matters relative to the safety factor in manning of locomotives. The report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1961 was transmitted on October 3 of that year; reports for preceding years had been transmitted in late August, in September, or early October. The reports for fiscal years 1962, 1963, and 1964 were transmitted in December of each year, and the 1965 report--which would have been of great value in the Senate hearings last September-was not released until March 7, 1966. These reports until 1961 had regularly indicated those locomotive accidents which had resulted from locomotive defects, reported to the carrier but not corrected. On one railroad there were seven accidents in fiscal 1960 caused by locomotive defects; six of the seven resulted from defects that had been previously reported but had not been corrected. Such information was tabulated and presented by employee representa |