of these involves the last, that he who denies Christ denies God. This will be proved, if it can be shown, that to deny Christianity is to sweep away the only sure evidence upon which our belief in the existence of the Supreme Being rests. And in order to make out this, nothing more seems to be necessary than the establishment of three facts. The first of these facts is, that previous to the preaching of Christ and his apostles, the existence of God was not known. Of this most important truth the multitude were profoundly ignorant. A philosopher had sometimes made a conjecture approaching toward the truth; but it was only conjecture. It was one guess among many, says Paley, I believe; but a guess is not a discovery. He discovers who proves. The second fact is, that this ignorance was not owing to any want of either ability or diligence in the search. The works of antiquity that yet remain abundantly prove this. To omit many others, he who has ever read Cicero, "De natura Deorum," will admit that finer abilities have not since been applied to the subject. The third fact is, that IMMEDIATELY after the publication of the gospel, the existence of God was as firmly believed, and his nature as well known as it is at this day. Philosophy has not added one iota to the knowledge communicated by the sacred writers-has not discovered one feature in the character of the Supreme Being which they have not revealed. In the various departments of nature philosophy has discovered many fine and striking illustrations of the divine attributes, but has not added one to their number. Now if these three facts be admitted, is it not a legitimate, an inevitable conclusion from them, that we owe our knowledge of the existence of God to the gospel alone? He, consequently, who denies Christ denies the Father also; for he deprives us of the only ground uponwhich our belief in his existence is founded, and sends us back to the days of Greek and Roman philosophy, when this article might oc-: cur as a conjecture, but could not be relied upon as supported by full and satisfactory evidence. And what has the Deist to say to this testimony? Will he deny the facts? He may as well deny Adthat the sun shines at noon. mitting the facts, can the conclusion be denied? It is impossible. But, admitting both the facts and the inference, he will say he has saidthat still the position of the apostle is not proved; for though Christ was the first who clearly and unequivocally taught the existence, and revealed the character of God, yet his existence is so clearly demonstrated by his works, that, though Christ had never come, men must have discovered it; and therefore allowing all that has been said to be correct, the highest praise that can be given to him is, that he first announced a discovery which sooner or later must have been made. And he has quoted the first chapter of Romans, to show that this was the opinion of Paul, who maintains that the eternal power and Godhead of the Supreme Being are not only manifest in his works, but so manifest, that men were without excuse for not having discovered it. But though all this were correct, it can have little power to invalidate my position. It is not however correct. The apostle does not maintain that men were without excuse for not having learned from creation the eternal power and Godhead of the Creator. But he maintains, what must be readily admitted, that after God had revealed himself to men, they could have no excuse for forgetting this im portant truth, and adopting idolatry, especially when, independent of its importance, they were constantly reminded of it by the works of nature, and referring, I suppose, to the deluge and other similar instances of God's judgments by the revelation of his wrath against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. It is admitted, that when the existence of God is once known, we can draw striking illustrations and strong proofs of it from his works. But this by no means infers the possibility of deriving from these works the first discovery of his existence. For every one knows, that to discover a truth, and to prove it after it has been discovered, are very different things, and require very different abilities. Every mathematician can now demonstrate the truth of the Pythagorean theorem, or of the Newtonian system; but this by no means proves that every mathematician is a Pythagoras or a Newton. A man may be without excuse for having forgotten a truth which he could never have incurred censure for not having discovered. Having escaped, as I hope I have fairly done, the authority of Paul, which would have effectually silenced me upon the subject, I go farther, and deny that the existence of God, though it may be proved, can ever be discovered from the works of nature. If the Deist maintain that it can, it is incumbent upon him to point out at least one instance in which the discovery has been made. The world is now nearly six thousand years old. There has been time enough for the inquiry. How then does it happen that the knowledge of this truth is, even at this moment, limited to those lands that have been illuminated with the light of the gospel? Can the Deist deny this fact? He cannot. Can he account for it without admitting that the being of God is not the discovery of reason, but the instruction of revelation? It is impossible. If a complete view of the works of nature were laid open to the inspection of a being of unperverted intellect, I do not deny that he would, even in the absence of all previous information, acquire the most perfect conviction of the pow er and wisdom of the Creator. But would this view communicate even to such a being all that knowledge of the character of God which the deist now possesses, or lead him to ascribe to the divinity all those attributes which the deist admits, that it would be absurd to deny him? By no means. Of the moral attributes of the Creator, he would see only obscure intimations,―certainly nothing like irresistible demonstration. Could he determine whether the Creator of the world is the Supreme God, or only an infe rior agent? No: for the works of nature afford no data by which this proposition can be determined; and even since the promulgation of the Gospel, there have been men by whoin the latter alternative has been adopted. He could infer with certainty, that the Creator possessed much wisdom and much power, but that his power and wisdom are infinite,-that he is, besides, adorned with every moral perfection in the highest degree, that he is One, self-existent and independent, are assertions which he would feel, that the works of nature can give him no title to advance, because it can furnish him with no grounds to support. And if even, under the favourable circumstances which I have supposed, the knowledge derived from a view of the works of God with regard to his nature would be so small, what great effect can we hope for from the application of a fallible understanding to an extremely li mited view of these works? He who maintains that the being and -attributes of God can be demonstrated from his works by the light of reason, without the aid of revelation, maintains that that can be done, which at least never has been done. And even if it should be admitted, what I know of no reason for admitting, that perhaps one individual in an age might by this means arrive at a belief in the being, and even some knowledge of the nature of God; yet still the great mass of mankind must remain totally unacquainted with a truth, the knowledge of which is alike essential to all. I am aware, that in this assertion, I am opposing high authorities. But I know of no authority superior to that of unquestionable fact and common sense; and their authority is, I think, undeniably on my side of the question. I am well acquainted with the often quoted sentence of Lord Chesterfield, in which he so very summarily and decisively settles the question against me. But, begging pardon of his Lordship's numerous admirers, he was a poor philosopher, and a still poorer theologian. His reasons, when he chooses to give them, may be as good as other people's; but his authority, in a question like this, is not worth quoting. I conceive Cicero to have been rather a superior man to Lord Chesterfield, and rather better qualified to assign its just value to the a posteriori argument. What value he does assign to it, and what degree of conviction he draws from it, may be seen by looking into his truly interesting treatise, De Natura Deorum. Indeed it is astonishing that any man with his eyes open should ever have asserted that the being of God is discoverable from the works of nature. Nature is a seal ed book, and has no theological in VOL. XXIII, NO. I. formation to impart, excepting to those who view it through the medium of revelation. That the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work, is perfectly true. But to whom do they impart this information? Not to every man. Not even to every man who is most attentive to trace the motions and discover the mechanism of the planetary system-not to him who has cultivated physical science with the greatest care and the highest success-No, but to the Christian, and to him alone.Others can see nothing of God in his works: To all of them, whether they be idolaters upon whom the light of the gospel has never shone, or philosophers too deeply engaged in searching into the works of nature to think of their Creator, the language of the poet is alike applicable. ing and attributes of God can be discovered from his works, that even after that discovery has been made, it will soon again be lost, where there is nothing besides these works to preserve it. If this reasoning be correct, and I do not see how it can be controverted, it leaves the deist to choose whether he will renounce the fundamental article of his creed, or adopt that system to which alone he is indebted for his knowledge of it. It leaves him no rest for the sole of his foot in deism, as it proves that he has derived from revelation alone that knowledge of the being and attributes of God, which no nation, no individual can be shown ever to have derived from any other source. I shall suppose then, that the deist, rather than utterly renounce his belief in the being of God, makes some advances towards Christianity,-identifies his cause with that of the Socinian, and says, "I will consider Jesus Christ as a philosopher, or, if you please, as a teacher peculiarly commission.. ed by God, for the instruction of men, but totally denying his divinity, and the inspiration of the sacred writers. I treat their writings just as I do those of any other author. I separate the wheat from the chaff, the good from the dross,-adopt what is true and renounce what is false. In read ing Plato and Xenophon, I take it for granted that they have not always exactly represented the sentiments of Socrates; and that even when they have done so, Socrates himself might be wrong. In the same manner, in reading the New Testament, I may suppose that the writers have sometimes mistaken their master's meaning, and that when they do not, even he was not exempted from the possibility of error. And admitting that he was a teacher who had a more intimate acquaintance with the spiritual world, and more rational and sublime views of the divine nature, and of the human soul, than any other philosopher ever had, I make a sufficiently liberal allowance, and can carry my concessions no farther." Let us consider this. You will examine the Bible just as you do the writings of other philosophers, But do, pray, tell us from what source you are to derive that know ledge which will enable you to examine either the one or the other? You will winnow the chaff from the wheat; but where will you find a van? The Christian can separate what is true from what is false in the systems of either ancient or modern philosophers, because he has an unerring standard to the test of which he can bring their sentiments, the Bible. But supposing the Bible never to have been written, where would you have acquired ability to sit in judgment upon men who are so much your su periors in every mental qualification, as the philosophers of Greece and Rome? Do you know of any man who, without the aid of revelation, has carried, or can carry theological knowledge farther than they have done? If you do not, it is surely requiring no very extravagant exertion of modesty to require you to admit, that without the same aid it would be absurd to hope from you an acuteness of intellect, a profundity of knowledge, and an accuracy of reasoning, which such men as Socrates and Cicero could not boast. To set a Brahmin to correct the mistakes of such men, would be to employ the light of the moon in order to detect the spots in the sun; and where have you acquired more knowledge than the Brahmin, but from the Bible? By the Bible alone can we try the works of heathen philosophers; and it, like the sun, can be examined only by its own light. It is the sun of the moral world. Before its rising, "darkness covered the land, and gross darkness the people." And should it be again extinguished, instead of talking about the theological absurdities of Greek and Roman philosophers, we would soon be happy to support our pigmy speculations, and prop our rickety systems, by the authority of these mighty names. They carried knowledge as far as unassisted reason could carry it. What they left in obscurity, revelation alone has brought to light; and their works remain a striking commentary on the text-"The world by wisdom knew not God." You are still, then, reduced to this alternative-Admit your Bible, or deny your God. It is indeed ridiculous to say that you will not admit that view of the character of God that is contained in a book, to which alone you are indebted for your knowledge even of the exist ence of such a being. But the doctrine of the Trinity, you say, is a stumbling block that you cannot get over. That this doctrine is mysterious, I grant, nor, in expressing this mystery, is it easy to confine one's self to language that is not liable to abuse. The doc trine, represented in the simplest manner I can think of, is this: He who sends the Saviour to assume our nature and atone for our sins, is God. He who is so sent is God, -and He who applies to our souls the purchased redemption, and pro duces in us that change which is necessary to fit us for the kingdom of heaven, is also God. But while these three possess that perfect unity which is implied in the name, and essential to the nature of God, each is spoken of in such a way as leads us inevitably to conclude that he possesses a distinct personality, and has some characteristic peculiar to himself. Now to this doctrine you object-That it is incomprehensible and contradictory. That it is incomprehensible I maintain, as well as you; that it is contradictory I deny; and that neither the one nor the other is your real reason for opposing it, I am strongly inclined to suspect. This doctrine is incomprehensible. Does this circumstance in the slightest degree diminish the probability of its truth? Speak candidly, and you will say, it does not. It is incomprehensible. When you have said this, you will add, that you do not pretend to say that it is contradictory. For you are a man of reason. You will therefore say, When a proposition is submitted to me which I understand, I am entitled to decide whether it be true or false; but when I have admitted that I do not understand it, I will take care to avoid the absurdity of adding that it is unreasonable, for, to speak technically, no man can predicate both incomprehensibility and contradiction of the same thing. It is incomprehensible; but, when you have renounced the doctrine of the Trinity, when you have reduced your notion of the Divine Unity to the utmost simplicity possible, have you then made the nature of God comprehensible? No; you have on◄ ly removed one incomprehensibility in the nature of God; you have left a thousand behind. Years, ages, are passing over him, yet you cannot say he is older; new events are continually taking place before him, yet you cannot say he is wiser; new creatures are continually added to his kingdom, yet you cannot say that his power or dominion are increased. He occupies every part of space, yet part of it is occupied by immense masses of matter. And though the substance of all these could be compressed, as some wise men tell us it could, into the size of a nut-shell, still the contradiction remains; God occupies all |