they operated, he had an incomplete view of the truth. But when Descartes developed his theory of vortices, he was quite wide of the truth-he was altogether wrong. The phrase "incomplete view" is indeed so vague, that men who sport with verbal subtleties may justify the theory of Descartes as an incomplete view of the truth; a very incomplete view. At any rate no one will be disposed to assert that by the mere juxtaposition of Newton's doctrine with that of Descartes he could in any way eliminate the error that is in both.

If therefore all systems are not incomplete views of the reality --if all systems do not contain certain portions of the truth-how is the eclectic to decide which systems are available for his purpose, which philosophies are to be juxtaposed? This leads to the necessity of a criterium. M. Jouffroy tells us that it is an easy matter. We have only to collect all the systems which have ever been produced, have them translated and arranged in their legitimate order, and the truths discovered by each will become organized in one doctrine.

Without stopping to ask what is the legitimate order, and how we are to know it, the student is naturally anxious to learn by what criterium Eclecticism proposes to judge and separate truth from error in any system. The inquiry is pertinent. It is easy to bid us be careful in separating the wheat from the chaff, that we may garner it up in the storehouses of the world. Suppose the farmer does not know the wheat when he sees it, what criterium do you give him whereby he may judge wheat to be wheat, not chaff? None. The philosopher can only distinguish the truth in two ways: either he knows it already, and then he has what he is seeking; or else he knows it by its relation to and accordance with those truths which he is already in possession of. That is to say, he has a criterium in his System: those views which range under it, he accepts as extensions of his knowledge; those which range beyond its limits, he denies to be

true.

Suppose the eclectic places in juxtaposition the two great

schools which have always divided the world, viz. that which declares experience to be the source of all knowledge; and that which declares we have a great deal of our knowledge antecedent to and independent of experience. Both of these systems he pronounces to be composed of truth and error. He assumes this; for a little consideration might tell him that it is utterly impossible both should be correct: experience either is or is not the sole fountain of knowledge. The difference is as decided as that respecting the motion of the earth, or the motion of the sun. Ptolemy and Copernicus: choose between them; any compromise is impossible, unless you wish to side with the Sizar who, when the question was put, "Does the earth move round the sun, or the sun round the earth?" replied, "Sometimes one and sometimes the other." He was an eclectic apparently. Let us however for a moment grant that the two schools of Psychology are both partly right and partly wrong; we then ask, What criterium has the eclectic whereby to distinguish error from truth? He has none; the doctors are silent on the point.

That men derive assistance from others, and that those who went before us discovered many truths, all admit. And there can be no doubt that a juxtaposition and comparison of various. doctrines would be of service. Eclecticism, therefore, as a subsidiary process is valuable; and has always been practised. M. Cousin however converts this subsidiary process into a primary one, and dignifies it with the attributes of a Method. In the one sense it is simply that the inquirer consults the works of his predecessors, and selects from them all that he considers true : viz. such portions as confirm, extend, and illustrate his previous opinions; these opinions constituting his criterium. Let the reader reflect on the pertinacity with which men refuse to admit views which to others are self-evident, because those views are or seem to be opposed to religion, or the reigning doctrine, and he will clearly enough see the nature of this criterium. The history of opinion is crowded with instances of it. M. Cousin however does not so understand Eclecticism. He says we should admit all

systems as containing some truths; and these truths separate themselves from errors by the mere process of juxtaposition, somewhat in the manner, we presume, of chemical affinities.— A theory that needs, one would think, no further refutation than a simple statement of its principles.

Having dismissed Eclecticism as a Method, we need not waste time in examining M. Cousin's various and constantly shifting opinions. It is enough that he himself has relinquished them. It is enough that France and Europe reject them.

This final doctrine then fares no better than the doctrines which preceded it. Philosophy is still in search of its Method and its basis; and wearied out by so many fruitless efforts, it finally gives up the quest, and allows itself to be absorbed by Science. The dogmatic assertion of this position is to be found in Auguste Comte.

CHAPTER II.

AUGUSTE COMTE.

As I have devoted a whole volume to the exposition of Comte's philosophy,* it will be unnecessary to enter into a detailed exposition here; and the small space at disposal may be occupied with a general indication of his historical position and the nature of his Method.

In the course of this History one fact has been gradually assuming more and more distinctness, as the various failures to establish any solid basis for Philosophy have been brought before us: namely, that mankind has, from the origin of speculative inquiry, been pursuing a false Method. Gradually, as men became aware of this fact, they withdrew themselves more and more from Philosophy, and devoted their speculative energy to Science.

* Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences, 1853 (Bohn's Scientific Library, vol. 20).

Even those who, reluctant to relinquish the high aims of Philosophy, tried by changes of direction to discover new and more prosperous issues, and hoped in reinvestigating the nature of human knowledge to disclose some yet unsuspected path which might lead them to the goal, found Psychology itself forced to range beside the positive sciences, and to adopt the one Method which hitherto had alone been fruitful in results. And while from all directions a convergence towards Science was silently taking place, there arose a powerful thinker who proclaimed the inherent necessity of this convergence, and the necessity under which Philosophy now was of definitively relinquishing its ancient claims in favor of the positive Method, which could lead men to a general doctrine such as might once more establish harmony in their endeavors, and give to Europe an invigorating faith. In the Cours de Philosophie Positive, 6 vols., 1830-42, Auguste Comte did for the nineteenth century what Bacon did for the seventeenth he resumed in one vast work the various reforming tendencies of preceding ages. Whoever casts his glance at the present intellectual state of Europe, will perceive a great want of unity, caused by the absence of any one doctrine, general enough to embrace every variety of ideas, and positive enough to carry with it irresistible conviction. Look at the state of Religion:-Catholicism and Protestantism make one great division; but within the sphere of each we see numerous subdivisions; the variety of sects is daily increasing. Each Religion has remarkable men amongst its members; but each refuses to admit the doctrines of the others. There is, in fact, no one general doctrine capable of embracing Catholics, Protestants, Mohammedans, and their subdivisions. Look also at the state of Philosophy. There is no one system universally accepted; there are as many philosophies as there are speculative nations, almost as many as there are professors. The dogmas of Germany are held in England and Scotland as the dreams of alchemists; the Psychology of Scotland is laughed at in Germany, and neglected in England and France. Besides this general dissidence, we see,

:

in France and Germany at least, great opposition between Religion and Philosophy openly pronounced. This opposition is inevitable it lies in the very nature of Philosophy; and although, now as heretofore, many professors eagerly argue that the two are perfectly compatible and accordant, the discordance is, and always must be, apparent.

With respect to general doctrines, then, we find the state of Europe to be this: religions opposed to religions; philosophies opposed to philosophies; and Religion and Philosophy at war with each other. Such is the anarchy in the higher regions.

In the positive sciences there is less dissidence, but there is the same absence of any general doctrine; each science is on a firm basis, and rapidly improves; but a Philosophy of Science is nowhere to be found except in the work of M. Auguste Comte, which comes forward with the express purpose of supplying the deficiency. The speciality of most scientific men, and their incapacity of either producing or accepting general ideas, has long been a matter of complaint; and this has been one great cause of the continuance of Philosophy: for men of speculative ability saw clearly enough that however exact each science might be in itself, it could only form a part of Philosophy. Moreover, the evil of speciality is not confined to neglecting the whole for the sake of the parts; it affects the very highest condition of Science, namely, its capability of instructing and directing society.

In the early ages of speculation, general views were eagerly sought and easily obtained. As Science became rich and complex in materials, various divisions took place; and one man cultivated one science, another man another. Even then general views were not absent. But as the tide rolled on, discovery succeeding discovery, and new tracts of inquiry leading to vast wildernesses of undiscovered truth, it became necessary for one man to devote himself only to a small fraction of a science, which he pursued, leaving to others the task of bringing his researches. under their general head. Such a minute division of labor was