Sophists. This skepticism is clearly set forth in the following passage from the speech of Callicles, in Plato's Gorgias:

'Philosophy is a graceful thing when it is moderately cultivated in youth; but, if any one occupies himself with it beyond. the proper age, it ruins him; for, however great may be his natural capacity, if he philosophizes too long he must of necessity be inexperienced in all those things which one who would be great and eminent must be experienced in. He must be unacquainted with the laws of his country, and with the mode of influencing other men in the intercourse of life, whether private or public, and with the pleasures and passions of men; in short, with human characters and manners. And when such men are called upon to act, whether on a private or public occasion, they expose themselves to ridicule, just as politicians do when they come to your conversation, and attempt to cope with you in argument; for every man, as Euripides says, occupies himself with that in which he finds himself superior; that in which he is inferior he avoids, and speaks ill of it, but praises what he excels in, thinking that in doing so he is praising himself. The best thing, in my opinion, is to partake of both. It is good to partake of philosophy by way of education, and it is not ungraceful in a young man to philosophize. But, if he continues to do so when he grows older, he becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards him as I should towards a grown person who lisped and played at childish plays. When I see an old man still continuing to philosophize, I think he deserves to be flogged. However great his natural talents, he is under the necessity of avoiding the assembly and public places, where, as the poet says, men become eminent, and to hide himself, and to pass his life whispering to two or three striplings in a corner, but never speaking out any thing great, and bold, and liberal."

That Protagoras, no less than Prodicus,* was a teacher of ex

* Prodicus is especially excepted by Aristophanes in his sweeping condemnation of the Sophists; and, indeed, the author of the well-known parable, The Choice of Hercules, must command the respect even of antagonists.

cellent morality, if not of the highest abstract views of the Good, is clearly made out, not only in Mr. Grote's work, but in that of Zeller, where the Sophists are unfavorably treated on the whole,* and is indeed supported by the testimony of Plato and Xenophon. The ethics of the Sophists may not have been of a very lofty kind, but they were considered, even by enemies, to be adapted to the exigencies of the day. They doubted the possibility of Philosophy; they were assured only of the advantage of Oratory. In their visits to various cities, they could not fail to remark the variety of laws and ordinances in the different States. This variety impressed them with a conviction that there were no such things as Right and Wrong by nature, but only by convention. This, therefore, became a fundamental precept with them. It was but a corollary of their dogma respecting Truth. For man there was no Eternal Right, because there was no Eternal Truth ; τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ: law was but the law of each city. "That which appears just and honorable to each city, is so for that city, as long as the opinion is entertained," says Protagoras in the Theaetetus (p. 229). This denial. of abstract Truth and abstract Justice is easily pushed to absurd and immoral consequences; but we have no evidence that such consequences were maintained by the Sophists. Plato often judges them by such consequences; but independently of the want of any confidence in his representations as faithful, we can often detect in Plato himself evidences of the exaggeration of his general statements. Thus, he on various occasions makes the Sophists maintain that Might is Right. Moderns, who always accept him as positive testimony, have therefore unanimously repeated this statement. Yet, it is obvious that they could not have held this opinion except in a very qualified form. And, in

* See Philos. der Griechen, i. 775. In one of his notes, Zeller alludes to Steinhart's doubt respecting the authorship of the Myth, attributed by Plato to Protagoras, as being "quite worthy of Plato himself." This is very characteristic of the ordinary tone of commentators, and we may well ask with Zeller, “Aber warum soll er fur Protagoras zu gut seyn ?”

the first Book of the Republic, Thrasymachus the Sophist is made to explain his meaning; namely, that Justice is the law ordained by the party which is strongest in the State. Thus, in a democracy the enactments of the people are the laws: these laws are for their advantage; therefore just. Now, in this admission, by Plato, of a qualification of the abstract formula, "Might is Right," we see evidence of that formula never having been promulgated by the Sophists; it was only an interpretation by Plato. What they meant was this: All law is but convention: the convention of each State is therefore just for it; and, inasmuch as any such convention must necessarily be ordained by the strongest party, i.e. must be the will of the many, so we may see that justice is but the advantage of the strongest.

The foregoing will, we trust, suffice to show that the tenets attributed to them by Plato, are often caricatures, and admit of very different explanation. Well might Gorgias exclaim, on reading the Dialogue which bears his name, "I did not recognize myself. The young man, however, has great talent for satire.”

The Sophists were the natural production of the opinions of the epoch. In them we see the first energetic protest against the possibility of metaphysical science. This protest, however, must not be confounded with the protest of Bacon-must not be mistaken for the germ of positive philosophy. It was the protest of baffled minds. The Philosophy of the day led to skepticism; but with Skepticism no energetic man could remain contented. Philosophy was therefore denounced, not because a surer, safer path of inquiry had been discovered, but because Philosophy was found to lead nowhither. The skepticism of the Sophists was a skepticism with which no great speculative intellect could be contented. Accordingly with Socrates Philosophy again reasserted her empire.

6

FOURTH EPOCH.

A NEW ERA OPENED BY THE INVENTION OF A NEW

METHOD.

CHAPTER I.

SOCRATES.

§ I. THE LIFE OF SOCRATES.

WHILST the brilliant Sophists were reaping money and renown by protesting against Philosophy, and teaching the word-jugglery which they called Disputation and Oratory, there suddenly appeared amongst them a strange antagonist. He was a perfect contrast to them. They had slighted Truth; they had denied her. He had made her his soul's mistress; and, with patient labor, with untiring energy, did his large wise soul toil after perfect communion with her. They had deserted Truth for Money and Renown. He had remained constant to her in poverty. They professed to teach every thing. He only knew that he knew nothing; and denied that any thing could be taught. Yet he believed he could be of service to his fellow-men; not by teaching, but by helping them to learn. His mission was to examine the thoughts of others. This he humorously explained by reference to his mother's profession, namely that of a midwife. What she did for women in labor he could do for men pregnant with ideas. He was an accoucheur of ideas. He assisted ideas in their birth, and, having brought them into light, he examined them, to see if they were fit to live: if true, they were welcomed;

if false, destroyed. And for this assistance he demanded no pecuniary recompense, but steadfastly refused every bribe of the kind.

He was the declared questioner of all men who were renowned for wisdom, or any intellectual eminence; and they were somewhat puzzled with their new antagonist. Who is he?—Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. What does he?-Converse. For what purpose ?—To expose error.

Some gorgeous Sophists, in their flowing robes, followed by crowds of eager listeners, treated the poor and humbly-clad Socrates with ineffable contempt. He was rude and ungainly in his movements; unlike all respectable citizens in his habits. Barefoot, he wandered about the streets of Athens absorbed in thought; sometimes he stood still for hours, fixed in meditation. Every day he strolled into the market-place, and disputed with all who were willing. In appearance he resembled a Silenus. His flattened nose, with wide and upturned nostrils, his projecting eyeballs, his thick and sensual lips, his squab figure and unwieldy belly, were all points upon which ridicule might fasten. Yet when this Silenus spoke there was a witchery in his tongue which fascinated those whom his appearance had disgusted; and Alcibiades declared that he was forced to stop his ears and flee away, that he might not sit down beside Socrates and “grow old in listening to his talk." Let us hear Alcibiades describe him.*

"I will begin the praise of Socrates by comparing him to a certain statue. Perhaps he will think that this statue is introduced for the sake of ridicule; but I assure you that it is necessary for the illustration of truth. I assert, then, that Socrates is exactly like those Silenuses that sit in the sculptor's shops, and which are carved holding flutes or pipes, but which, when divided in two, are found to contain withinside the images of the gods. I assert that Socrates is like the Satyr Marsyas; that your form and appearance are like these Satyrs, I think that even you will

* Plato, Symposium, Shelley's translation.