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Nothing in history seems so valuable to me as such sentiments, which do honour to human nature, and proceed from a heart, which neither false glory nor false greatness have corrupted. I confess it is with grief I see those noble sentiments daily expire among us, especially in persons whose birth and rank raise them above others, who, too frequently, are neither good fathers, good sons, good husbands, nor good friends; and who would think it a disgrace to them to express for a father and mother the tender regard, of which we have here so fine an example from a pagan.

Until the time of Epaminondas, two cities had exercised alternately a kind of empire over all Greece. The justice and moderation of Sparta had at first acquired it a distinguished pre-eminence, which the pride and haughtiness of its generals, and especially of Pausanias, soon lost to it. The Athenians, until the Peloponnesian war, held the first rank, but in a manner scarcely discerni ble in any other respect, than their care in acquitting themselves worthily, and in giving their inferiors just reason to believe themselves their equals. They judged at that time, and very justly, that the true method of commanding, and of continuing their power, was to evidence their superiority only by services and benefactions. Those times, so glorious for Athens, were of about forty-five years continuance, and they retained a part of that pre-eminence during the twenty-seven years of the Peloponnesian war, which make in all, the seventy-two or seventy-three years which Demosthenes gives to the duration of their empire: but for this latter space of time, the Greeks, disgusted by the haughtiness of Athens, received no laws from that city but with reluctance.* Hence the Lacedæmonians became again the arbiters of Greece, and continued so from the time Lysander made himself master of Athens, until the first war undertaken by the Athenians, after their re-establishment by Conon, to withdraw themselves and the rest of the Greeks from the tyranny of Sparta, which was now grown more insolent than ever. At length, Thebes disputed the supremacy, and, by the exalted merit of a single man, saw itself at the head of all Greece. But that glorious condition was of no long continuance, and the death of Epaminondas, as we have already observed, plunged it again into the obscurity in which he found it.

Demosthenes remarks, in the passage above cited, that the pre-eminence granted voluntarily either to Sparta or Athens, was a pre-eminence of honour, not of dominion, and that the intent of Greece was to preserve a kind of equality and independence in the other cities. Hence, says he, when the governing city attempted to ascribe to itself what did not belong to it, and aimed at any innovations contrary to the rules of justice and established customs, all the Greeks thought themselves obliged to have recourse to arms, and without any motive of private discontent, to espouse with ardour the cause of the injured. I shall add here another very judicious reflection from Polybius. He attri butes the wise conduct of the Athenians, in the time I speak of, to the ability of the generals who were then at the head of their affairs; and he makes use of a comparison, which explains, not unhappily, the character of that people. "A vessel without a master," says he "is exposed to great dangers, when every one insists upon its being steered according to his opinion, and will comply with no other measures. If then a rude storm attacks it, the common danger conciliates and unites them; they submit themselves to the pilot's skill; and all their rowers doing their duty, the ship is saved, and in a state of secu rity. But when the tempest ceases, and the weather grows calm again, if the discord of the mariners revive; if they will hearken no longer to the pilot, and some are for continuing the voyage, while others resolve to stop in the midst of the course; if on one side they loose their sails, and furl them on the other; it often happens that, after having escaped the most violent storms, they are shipwrecked even in the port. This is a natural image of the Athenian republic. As long as it suffered itself to be guided by the wise cout sels of an

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Aristides, a Themistocles, and a Pericles, it came off victorious from the greatest dangers. But prosperity blinded and ruined it; following no longer any thing but caprice, and having become too insolent to be advised or governed, it plunged itself into the greatest misfortunes."*

SECTION VIII.-DEATH OF EVAGORAS, KING OF SALAMIN. ADMIRABLE CHARACTER OF THAT PRINCE.

THE third year of the 101st Olympiad, soon after the Thebans had destroyed Platææ and Thespiæ, as has been observed before, Evagoras king of Salamin, in the isle of Cyprus, of whom much has been already said, was assassinated by one of the eunuchs. His son, Nicocles, succeeded him. He had a fine niodel before him in the person of his father; and he seemed to make it his duty to be entirely intent upon treading in his steps. When he took possession of the throne, he found the public treasures entirely exhausted, by the great expenses his father had been obliged to be at in the long war between him and the king of Persia. He knew that the generality of princes, upon like occasions, thought every means just for the re-establishment of their affairs; but for him, he acted upon different principles. In his reign, there was no talk of banishment, taxes, and confiscation of estates. The public felicity was his sole object, and justice his favourite virtue. He discharged the debts of the state gradually, not by crushing the people with excessive imposts, but by retrenching all unnecessary expenses, and by using a wise economy in the administration of his revenue. "I am assured," said he, "that no citizen can complain that I have done him the least wrong; and I have the satisfaction to know, that I have enriched many with an unsparing hand.§ He believed this kind of vanity, if it be vanity, might be permitted in a prince, and that it was glorious for him to have it in his power to make his subjects such a defiance.

He gloried also in particular upon another virtue, which is the more admirable in princes, as very uncommon in their fortunes; I mean temperance. It is most amiable, but very difficult, in an age and fortune to which every thing is lawful, and wherein pleasure, armed with all her arts and attractions, is continually lying in ambush for a young prince, and preventing his desires, to make a long resistance against the violence and insinuation of her soft assaults. Nicocles gloried in having never known any woman besides his wife during his reign, and was amazed that all other contracts of civil society should be treated with due regard, while that of marriage, the most sacred and inviola ble of obligations, was broken through with impunity; and that men should not blush to commit an infidelity in respect to their wives, of which should their wives be guilty, it would throw them into the utmost anguish and despair. What I have said of the justice and temperance of Nicocles, Isocrates puts into that prince's own mouth; and it is not probable that he should make him speak in such a manner, if his conduct had not agreed with such sentiments. It is in a discourse, supposed to be addressed by that king to his people, wherein he describes to them the duties of subjects to their princes; love, respect, obedience, fidelity, and devotion to their service, and to engage them more effectually to the discharge of those duties, that he does not disdain to give them an account of his own conduct and sentiments.

In another discourse, which precedes this, Isocrates explains to Nicocles all the duties of the sovereignty, and makes excellent reflections upon that subject, of which I can repeat here only a very small part. He begins by telling him that the private virtue of persons is much better supported than his own, by the mediocrity of their condition; by the employment and cares inseparable from it; by the misfortunes to which they are frequently exposed; by their distance from pleasures and luxury; and particularly, by the liberty which their friends and relations have of giving them advice; whereas the

• Polyb. 1. vii. P. 488

Isocrat. in Nicoc. p. 4

#bid.

† A. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374. Diod. 1. xv. p. 3t3.
p. 65-66.
Isocrat. in Nicoc. 8. 64.

generality of princes have none of these advantages. He adds, that a king, who would make himself capable of governing well, ought to avoid an idle and inactive life, should set apart a proper time for business and public affairs, should form his council of the most able and experienced persons in his kingdom, should endeavour to make himself as much superior to others by his merit and wisdom, as he is by his dignity, and especially to acquire the love of his subjects, and for that purpose love them sincerely, and look upon himself as their common father. Persist," said he, "in the religion you have received from your forefathers; but be assured, that the most grateful adoration and sacrifice that you can offer to the Divinity, is that of the heart, in rendering yourself good and just. Show upon all occasions so high a regard for truth, that a single word from you may be more confided in than the oath of others. Be a warrior, by your ability in military affairs, and by such a warlike provision as may intimidate your enemies; but let your inclinations be pacific, and be rigidly exact in never pretending to, or undertaking any thing unjustly. The only certain proof that you have reigned well, will be the power of bearing this testimony to yourself, that your people are become both more happy, and more wise, under your government."*

What seems to me the most remarkable in this discourse is, that the advice which Isocrates gives the king is neither attended with praises, nor with those studied reservations and artificial turns, without which fearful and modest truth dares not venture to approach the throne. This is most worthy of applause, and more for the prince's than the writer's praise. Nicocles, far from being of fended at these counsels, received them with joy; and to express his gratitude to Isocrates, made him a present of twenty talents.†

SECTION IX.-ARTAXERXES MNEMON UNDERTAKES THE REDUCTION OF EGYPT.

ARTAXERXES, after having given his people a relaxation of several years, had formed the design of reducing Egypt which had shaken off the Persian yoke long before, and made great preparations for war for that purpose. Achoris, who then reigned in Egypt, and had given Evagoras powerful aid against the Persians, foreseeing the storm, raised a great number of troops from among his own subjects, and took into his pay a great body of Greeks, and other auxiliary soldiers, who were under the command of Chabrias.§ He had accepted that office without the authority of the republic.

Pharnabasus, having been charged with this war, sent to Athens to complain that Chabrias had engaged himself to serve against his master, and threatened the republic with the king's resentment if he was not immediately recalled. He demanded at the same time Iphicrates, another Athenian, who was looked upon as one of the most excellent captains of his time, to give him the command of the body of Greek troops in the service of his master. The Athenians, who had a great interest in the continuance of the king's friendship, recalled Chabrias, and ordered him, upon pain of death, to repair to Athens by a certain day. Iphicrates was sent to the Persian army.

The preparations of the Persians went on so slowly, that two whole years elapsed before they entered upon action. Achoris king of Egypt died in that time, and was succeeded by Psammuthis, who reigned but one year. Nephreritus ascended the throne next, and four months after him, Nectanebis, who reigned ten or twelve years.||

Artaxerxes, to draw more troops out of Greece, sent ambassadors thither to declare to the several states, that the king's intention was, that they should all live in peace with each other, conformably to the treaty of Antalcides; that all garrisons should be withdrawn, and all the cities suffered to enjoy their liberty under their respective laws. All Greece received this declaration with pleasure, except the Thebans, who refused to conform to it.T

Ibid. ad Nicoc

t Plut. in Vit. Isoc. p. 838. Corn Nep. in Chab et in Iphis. TA. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374. Diod. 1 xv. p. 355.

A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377. Diod.l. xv. p. 328, et 347.

Euseb. in Chron.

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At length every thing being in readiness for the invasion of Egypt, a camp was formed at Acæ, since called Ptolemais, in Palestine, the place appointed for the general rendezvous. In a review there, the army was found to consist of two hundred thousand Persians, under the command of Pharnabasus, and twenty thousand Greeks, under Iphicrates. The forces at sea were in proportion to those on land; their fleet consisting of three hundred galleys, besides two hundred vessels of thirty oars, and a prodigious number of barks to transport the necessary provisions for the fleet and army.*

The army and fleet began to move at the same time; and that they might act in concert, they separated from each other as little as possible. The war was to open with the siege of Pelusium; but so much time had been given the Egyptians, that Nectanebis had rendered the approach to it impracticable both by sea and land. The fleet, therefore, instead of making a descent, as had been projected, sailed forward, and entered the mouth of the Nile called Mendesium. The Nile at that time emptied itself into the sea by seven different channels, only twof of which remain at this day; and at each of those mouths there was a fort with a good garrison to defend the entrance. The Mendesium not being so well fortified as that of Pelusium, where the enemy was expected to land, the descent was made with no great difficulty. The fort was carried sword in hand, and no quarter given to those who were found in it.

After this signal action, Iphicrates thought it adviseable to reimbark upon the Nile without loss of time, and to attack Memphis, the capital of Egypt. If that opinion had been followed before the Egyptians had recovered from the panic into which so formidable an invasion, and the blow already received, had thrown them, they would have found the capital undefended, and it would have inevitably fallen into their hands, and all Egypt been re-conquered. But the main body of the army not being arrived, Pharnabasus believed it necessary to wait its coming up, and would undertake nothing, till he had re-assembled all his troops; under pretext, that they would then be invincible, and that there would be no obstacle capable of withstanding them.

Iphicrates, who knew, that, in affairs of war especially, there are certain favourable and decisive moments, which it is absolutely proper to seize, judged quite differently, and in despair to see an opportunity suffered to escape, that might never be retrieved, made pressing instances for permission to go at least with the twenty thousand men under his command. Pbarnabasus refused to comply with that command, out of abject jealousy; apprehending, that if the enterprise succeeded, the whole glory of the war would redound to Iphicrates. This delay gave the Egyptians time to look around them. They drew all their troops together into a body, put a good garrison into Memphis, and with the rest of their army kept the field, and harassed the Persians in such a manner, that they prevented their advancing farther into the country. After which came on the inundation of the Nile, which laying all Egypt under water, the Persians were obliged to return into Phoenicia, after having first lost the best part of their troops.

Thus this expedition, which had cost immense sums, and for which the preparations alone had given so much difficulty for upwards of two years, entirely miscarried, and produced no other effect, than an irreconcileable enmity between the two generals who had the command of it. Pharnabasus, to excuse himself, accused Iphicrates of having prevented its success; and Iphicrates, with much more reason, laid all the fault upon Pharnabasus. But well assured that the Persian lord would be believed at his court in preference to him, and remembering what had happened to Conon, to avoid the fate of that illustrious Athenian, he chose to retire secretly to Athens in a small vessel which he hired. Pharnabasus caused him to be accused there, of having rendered the expedition against Egypt abortive. The people of Athens made answer, that if he could be convicted of that crime, he should be punished as he deserved. Bu,

Diod. 1. sv. p. 358, 359,

Lamietta and Rosetts

his innocence was too well known at Athens to give him any disquiet upon that account. It does not appear that he was ever called in question about it; and some time after, the Athenians declared him sole admiral of their fleet.

Most of the projects of the Persian court miscarried by their slowness in putting them in execution.* Their general's hands were tied up, and nothing was left to their discretion. They had a plan of conduct in their instructions, from which they did not dare to depart. If any accident happened, that had not been foreseen and provided for, they must wait for new orders from court; and before they arrived, the opportunity was entirely lost. Iphicrates, having observed that Pharnabasus took his resolutions with all the presence of mind and penetration that could be desired in an accomplished general, asked him one day, how it happened that he was so quick in his views, and so slow in his actions? "It is," replied Pharnabasus, because my views depend only upon me, but their execution upon my master."†

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SECTION X.-THE LACEDEMONIANS SEND AGESILAUS TO THE AID OF TACHOS. HIS DEATH.

AFTER the battle of Mantinea, both parties, equally weary of the war, had entered into a general peace with all the other states of Greece, upon the king of Persia's plan, by which the enjoyment of its laws and liberties was secured to each city, and the Messenians included in it, notwithstanding all the oppositions and intrigues of the Lacedæmonians to prevent it. Their rage upon this occasion, separated them from the other Greeks. They were the only people who resolved to continue the war, from the hope of recovering the whole country of Messenia in a short time. That resolution, of which Agesilaus was the author, occasioned him to be justly regarded as a violent and obstinate man, insatiable of glory and command, who was not afraid of involving the republic again in inevitable misfortunes, from the necessity, to which the want of money exposed them, of borrowing great sums, and of levying great imposts, instead of taking the favourable opportunity of concluding a peace, and of putting an end to all their evils.

While this passed in Greece, Tachos, who had ascended the throne of Egypt, drew together as many troops as he could, to defend himself against the king of Persia, who meditated a new invasion of Egypt, notwithstanding the ill success of his past endeavours to reduce that kingdom.§

For this purpose, Tachos sent into Greece, and obtained a body of troops from the Lacedæmonians, with Agesilaus to command them, whom he promised to make generalissimo of his army. The Lacedæmonians were exasperated against Artaxerxes, from his having forced them to include the Messenians in the late peace, and were fond of taking this occasion to express their resentment. Chabrias went also into the service of Tachos, but of his own accord, and without the republic's approbation. This commission did Agesilaus no honour. It was thought below the dignity of a king of Sparta, and a great captain, who had made his name glorious throughout the world, and was then more than eighty years old, to receive the pay of an Egyptian, and to serve a barbarian, who had revolted against his master.

When he landed in Egypt, the king's principal generals, and the great officers of his house, came to his ship to receive and make their court to him. The rest of the Egyptians were solicitous to see him, from the great expectation which the name and renown of Agesilaus had excited in them, and came in multitudes to the shore for that purpose. But when, instead of a great and magnificent prince, according to the idea his exploits had given them of him, they saw nothing splendid or majestic either in his person or equipage, and saw only an old man of a mean aspect and small body, and dressed in a bad

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† Ibid. P. 375.

d. 1. xv. p. 358.
Plut. in Agesil. p. 616-618. Diod. 1. xv. p, 397-401.
Ant. J C. 363. Xenoph. de Reg. Agesil. p. 663. Corn. Nep. in Agesil. c. vi

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