any succours from coming out of it. Accordingly the three hundred soldiers having forced the palisade, pursued those who guarded it as far as the part of the city wall which covered Temenites; where, pouring in indiscriminately with them, they were repulsed by the inhabitants with loss. The whole army afterwards demolished the wall, and pulled up the palisades of the entrenchments, and carried them off.

After this success, whereby the Athenians were masters of the northern parts, they began the very next day a still more important work, and which would quite finish their enclosure of the city; viz. to carry a wall from the hills of Epipole westward, through the plain and the marshes as far as the great harbour. To prevent this, the besieged, beginning the same kind of work as they had carried on on the other side, ran a trench, lined with palisades, from the city through the marshes, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallations as far as the sea. But the latter, after finishing the first part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, resolved to attack this new work. For this purpose, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus to the great harbour of Syracuse, it having continued in that road hitherto; and the besieged had always the sea open to them, by which the besiegers were obliged to get their provisions from Thapsus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain, before daybreak; when throwing planks and beams into that part where the marshes was only slimy and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greatest part of the fosse lined with palisades, and then the rest, after having beaten the Syracusans, who gave way and retired; such as were on the right towards the city, and the rest towards the river. Three hundred chosen Athenians having attempted to cut off the retreat of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greatest part of which were drawn up in battle, repulsed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and threw the first battalion into disorder. Lamachus, perceiving this from the left wing, where he commanded, ran thither with the Argives and some archers; but having passed a trench, and being abandoned by his soldiers, he was killed, with five or six who followed him. The enemy immediately passed the river, and seeing the rest of the army come up, they retired. At the same time their right wing, which had returned towards the city, resumed courage from this success, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached some troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipole, which served as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be nguarded. They forced an entrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias saved it. He was sick in this fort, and at that time in his bed, with only his domestics about him. Animated by the danger, and the presence of the enemy, he struggled with his indisposition, rose up and commanded his servants immediately to set fire to all the timber lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. The unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that general. At the same time, the fleet was seen sailing into the great harbour according to the orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans having perceived this from the hill, and fearing that they should be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the land forces, retired and returned to the city with all their force; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fosse lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on the contravallation as far as the sea.

In the mean time the Athenians, who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy, and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea; viz. a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and another of circumvalla tion against those Syracusan troops which were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who was now sole general, conceived great hopes; for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters vessels laden with provisions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard, in his passage, the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward nevertheless; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preserve to the nations of Italy such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared, in all places, that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island; and were headed by a general, whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself now, contrary to his natural disposition, confiding in his own strength, and elated with his success, persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate, did not regard the approach of Gylippus, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy, in any manner, his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose the landing of Gylippus, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair would have been ended.

SECTION XIII. THE SYRACUSANS RESOLVE TO CAPITULATE, BUT THE ARRI- * VAL OF GYLIPPUS CHANGES THE FACE OF AFFAIRS, &C.-NINETEENTH YEAR

OF THE WAR.

THE fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed; and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and marshes towards the great_port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogilus, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion, that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.*

It was at that very instant, and at the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked round him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which came to their aid. The Syracusans astonished, or rather stupified, as it were, with this news, could scarcely believe what they heard. While they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a fort in his way, marched in order of battle directly for Epipolæ; and ascending by Euryalus, as the Athenians had done, he prepared to attack them from without, while the Syracusans should charge them, on their side with the Syracusan and his own forces. * The Athenians, exceedingly surprised by his ar rival, drew up hastily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make the least answer to this proposal; and some of the soldiers

* A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 485-489. Plut. in Nic. p. 535, 596. Diod. 1. xiii. p. 138, 139. ↑ Jeges.

bursting into a laugh, asked the herald, "whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian privateer, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the present state of the city? Both sides therefore prepared for battle.

Gylippus stormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The same day an Athenian galley was taken, as it sailed into the harbour. The besieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut, about the extremity of it, the single wall of the Athenians, and to deprive them of all communication with the troops, posted in the intrenchments which surrounded the city, on the north side, towards Tyche and Trogi lus. The Athenians, after having finished the wall, which extended as far as the sea towards the great harbour, returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the single wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, a part that was weaker and lower than the rest, marched thither in the night with his troops; but being discovered by the Athenians, who were encamped without, he was forced to retire upon seeing them advance directly towards him. They raised the wall higher, and themselves undertook the guard of it; after having fixed their allies in the several posts of the remainder of the intrenchment.

Nicias, on the other side, thought proper to fortify the cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the sea, straitened the mouth of the great harbour; and his design thereby was to procure provisions, and all other things he might. want, the more easily; because the Athenians, by possessing themselves of that post, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval force of the Syracusans, and were the better able to observe their various motions; and that besides, by having the sea open, they would not be forced to have all their provisions from the bottom of the great harbour, as they must have been, should the enemy, by seizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep close in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, from the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left, but from the side next the sea. Sending therefore his feet, and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, by which the ships were enabled to lie at anchor; he also secured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet suffered very much; for, as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were surrounded by the enemy's horse, the third part of which were posted at Olympia, to prevent the garrison of Plemmyrium from sallying, and were masters of the open country. Advice being brought to Nicias, that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he sent two galleys against it; ordering them to observe the enemy towards Locris, Rhegium, and the rest of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time Gylippus, employing those very stones which the Athenians had got together for their use, went on with the wall which the Syracusans had begun to carry through Epipolæ, and drew up daily in order of battle before it, as did the Athenians. When he saw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the space between the two walls. The narrowness of it having rendered his cavalry and archers useless, he came off with loss, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his soldiers, by doing them justice, had the courage to reproach himself for the ill success they had met with, and to declare publicly that he, not they, had occasioned the late defeat; because he had made them fight in too narrow a spot of ground. However, he promised soon to give them an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his, and accordingly, the very next day, he led them against the enemy, after having exhorted them, in the strongest terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving that though he should not desire to come to a battle, it would however be absolutely necessary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their line beyond the contravallation, to which they were already very near, because otherwise this would be granting them a certain victory, therefore marched against the Syracusans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond that place where the walls terminated on both sides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle: when, charging the enemy's left wing with his horse, he put it to flight, and soon

after defeated the right. We have here an instance of what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing; for Gylippus,with the same men, the same arms, the same horses, and the same ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night, the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to surround them.

After this success, the Syracusans, to whose aid the Corinthian fleet had arrived, unperceived by that of the Athenians, resumed courage, armed several galleys, and marching into the plains with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of prisoners. They sent deputies to Lacedæmon, and Corinth, to desire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in person to all the ci ties in Sicily, to solicit them to join him, and brought over the greatest part of them, who accordingly sent him powerful succours. Nicias finding his troops diminish and those of the enemy increase daily, began to be discouraged; and not only sent expresses to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the situation of affairs, but likewise wrote to them in the strongest terms. I repeat his whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the state of things at that time in Syracuse, and may serve as a model for such kind of relations.*

Athenians, I have already informed you, by several expresses, of what passed here: but it is necessary you should know the present situation of affairs, that you may resolve accordingly. After we had been victorious in several engagements, and almost completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuse with a body of Lacedæmonian and Sicilian troops; and having been defeated the first time, he was victorious the second, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are in consequence shut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, or complete cur works, through the superiority of the enemy's forces; for part of our soldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and consequently we have not an opportunity of employing all our forces in battle. Besides, as the Syracusans have cut our lines, by a wall, in that part where they were not complete, it will no longer be possible for us to invest the city, unless we should force their intrenchments; so that, instead of besieging, we ourselves are besieged, and dare not stir out for fear of their horse.

Not content with these advantages, they are bringing new succours_from Peloponnesus, and have sent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Sicily to declare for them; and the rest to furnish them with men and ships, to attack us both by sea and land: I say by sea, which, though very surprising, is however but too true. For our fleet, which before was considerable from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in those very circunstances, and extremely weakened.

"Our galleys leak every where; because we cannot draw them on shore to careen them, lest those of the enemy, which are more numerous, and in better condition than ours, should attack us on a sudden, which they seem to threaten every moment. Besides, we are under a necessity of sending many backwards and forwards to guard the convoys which we are forced to fetch from a great distance, and bring along in sight of the enemy; so that should we be ever so little negligent in this point, our army would be starved.

"With regard to the ships' crews, they decrease sensibly every day; for as great numbers disperse to maraud, or to fetch wood and water, they are often cut to pieces by the enemy's horse. Our slaves, allured by the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, desert very fast to it. The foreigners which we forced into the service, diminish daily; and such as have been raised with money, who came for plunder rather than fighting, finding themselves disappointed, go over to the enemy, who are so near us, or else hide themselves in Sicily, which they may easily do in so large an island. A great number of citizens, though long used to, and well skilled in working of ships, by bribing the captains, put others in their room, who are wholly inexperienced and inca

Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 490-494. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. 1. xiii.

P.

139

pable of serving, and by that means have quite subverted all discipline. I am now writing to men perfectly well versed in naval affairs; and who are very sensible, that, when order is neglected, every thing grows worse and, worse, and the fleet must inevitably be ruined.

"But the most unhappy circumstance is, that though I am generalissimo, I cannot put a stop to these disorders. For, Athenians, you are very sensible, that such is your disposition, that you do not easily brook restraint; besides, I do not know where to furnish myself with seamen, whereas the enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and should the cities of Italy, from whence we have our provisions, hearing the extremity to which we are reduced, and your not taking the least care to send us any succour, join the Syracusans, we are undone, and the enemy will have no occasion to fight us.

"I could write of things which would be more agreeable, but of none that could be more advantageous to you, nor which could give you a more just idea of the subjects on which you are to deliberate. I am sensible that you love to have such advices only sent you as are pleasing; but, I know, on the other side, that when affairs turn out otherwise than you expected and hoped for, you accuse those who deceived you; which induced me to give you a sincere and genuine account of things, without concealing a single circumstance. By the way, I am to inform you, that no complaints can be justly made either against the officers or common soldiers, both having done their duty very well. "But now that the Sicilians join all their forces against us, and expect a new army from Peloponnesus, you may lay this down as the foundation for your deliberations, that your present troops are not sufficient; and therefore we either must be recalled, or else a land and naval force, equal to the first must be sent to us, with inoney in proportion. You must also think of appointing a person to succeed me, it being impossible for me, through my nephritic disorder, to sustain any longer the weight of the command. I imagine that I deserve this favour at your hands, on accourt of the services I have done you in the several commands conferred upon me, so long as my health would permit me to act.

"To conclude, whatever resolution you may come to, the request I have to make is, that you would execute it speedily, and very early in the spring. The succours which our enemies meet with in Sicily are all ready; but those which they expect from Peloponnesus may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you do not exert yourselves, the Lacedæmonians will not fail, as they have already done, to be beforehand with you.' The Athenians were strongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impression on them as Nicias expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a successor; and only nominated two officers who were under him, viz. Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys, and some money,* about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succour should be sent him; during which, the latter was raising troops and contributions, in order to set sail early in the spring.

The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, being supported by the Corinthians, were very industrious in preparing reinforcements to send into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from sailing to that island. Accordingly they entered Attica early, under the command of king Agis; and after having laid waste the country, they fortified Decelia ; having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater despatch. This post is about a hundred and twenty furlongs from Athens, that is, about six French leagues, and the same distance from Boeotia. Alcibiades was perpetually soliciting the Lacedæmonians, and could not be easy, till he had prevailed with

* One hundred and twenty talents.