U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ... Annual Report: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the ... Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Covering Calendar Year ... , Pursuant to Section 50 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as Amended (75 Stat. 639, 89 Stat. 760).U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986 |
À l'intérieur du livre
Résultats 1-5 sur 100
Page xi
... progress on negotiating reductions in offensive nuclear weapons to limitations on SDI research , a linkage which the United States would not accept . While the meeting between Presi- dent Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev ...
... progress on negotiating reductions in offensive nuclear weapons to limitations on SDI research , a linkage which the United States would not accept . While the meeting between Presi- dent Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev ...
Page xii
... progress at the 1985 session of the Conference on Confi- dence and Security - Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe ( CDE ) , in Stockholm , a new working group structure was adopted which we hope will lead toward a constructive ...
... progress at the 1985 session of the Conference on Confi- dence and Security - Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe ( CDE ) , in Stockholm , a new working group structure was adopted which we hope will lead toward a constructive ...
Page 1
... progress can be achieved on meaningful agreements both to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals and to diminish the risk of war . The United States is ready to do its part to achieve these objectives , and we will be probing Soviet ...
... progress can be achieved on meaningful agreements both to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals and to diminish the risk of war . The United States is ready to do its part to achieve these objectives , and we will be probing Soviet ...
Page 2
... progress in arms reduction . Another barrier to progress has been the Soviet position at the negotiating table that all three major subjects under discussion -- strategic offensive arms , intermediate nuclear forces , and space and ...
... progress in arms reduction . Another barrier to progress has been the Soviet position at the negotiating table that all three major subjects under discussion -- strategic offensive arms , intermediate nuclear forces , and space and ...
Page 3
... Progress here has been impeded by the fact that thus far the Soviets continue to seek a ban on all US re- search ... progress at the Nuclear and Space Talks and in other negotiations . The statement calls for " early progress , " and ...
... Progress here has been impeded by the fact that thus far the Soviets continue to seek a ban on all US re- search ... progress at the Nuclear and Space Talks and in other negotiations . The statement calls for " early progress , " and ...
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ... Annual ..., Volume 28,Partie 1988 United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Affichage du livre entier - 1990 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM Treaty ACDA ACDA's Affairs agreed areas arms control agreements arms transfers ballistic missiles bilateral Bureau chemical weapons Committee compliance Conference on Disarmament continued Control and Disarmament cooperation countries CSCE December Defense and Space deployed deployment Director Disarmament Agency discussions Document effective verification efforts elimination entered into force Europe export facilities Foreign Geneva GLBM IAEA IAEA safeguards ICBMs INF Treaty inspected Party issues Kenneth Adelman limit LRINF MBFR measures meetings missiles and launchers multilateral arms control NATO negotiations nonproliferation nuclear explosives Nuclear Proliferation nuclear testing nuclear weapons peaceful nuclear President Reagan proliferation proposal Protocol provides Review Conference Reykjavik Round SALT II Secretary Gorbachev seismic session shorter-range missiles sides Soviet noncompliance Soviet Union SRINF stability Strategic Arms Strategic Defense Initiative strategic defenses Test Ban Treaty Treaty of Tlatelolco Treaty Treaty TTBT US-Soviet violation warheads Washington
Fréquemment cités
Page 136 - May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Page 302 - Commission, within the framework of which they will: (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed...
Page 110 - Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties...
Page 123 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 72 - An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.
Page 123 - To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will: a.
Page 124 - This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 169 - It is the sense of the Congress that adequate verification of compliance should be an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement. In recognition of such policy and in order to assure that arms control proposals made or accepted by the United States can be adequately verified, the Director shall report to the Congress, on a timely basis, or upon a request by an appropriate committee of the Congress...
Page 122 - ... into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as...
Page 122 - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions. 4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with...