receive notifications of transits of SS-20s on missile transporter vehicles consistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

Immediately after the INF Treaty's entry into force, the Soviets were not in compliance with Article IX requirements to list Treaty Limited Items (TLIs) and their locations in the data update to the MOU. This summer, the United States presented a demarche to the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels on the related issue of TLI at non-declared locations and insisted on full Soviet compliance. While the Soviets never acknowledged their failure to meet the locational restrictions or explained the reasons for this failure, they have moved to correct their noncompliance and have dismantled or removed TLI previously observed at non-declared sites. In addition, noncompliant activities occurred with regard to: 1) unnotified movements of training launchers; 2) TLI at a facility declared ready for elimination; removal of SRMs from an elimination facility; and 3) TLI at non-declared locations.

A compliance-related question that also arose, but did not result in a conclusion of noncompliance, was Soviet failure to provide complete and accurate technical data in the MOU.

Το reiterate, these instances of Soviet noncompliance have been resolved to our satisfaction or are in the process of resolution.

With regard to the ABM Treaty, the United States continues to be concerned about the Krasnoyarsk radar, the location of which is a significant violation of a central element of the Treaty. The radar demonstrates that the Soviets were designing and programming a prospective

violation of the ABM Treaty even while they were negotiating a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons with the United States.

The deployment of the radar near Krasnoyarsk, and the deployment of a Flat Twin radar and a Pawn Shop radar van at Gomel outside a permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test range are violations of the ABM Treaty, while other Soviet ABM-related activities involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity. These other issues, along with the Krasnoyarsk radar and Gomel, are:

the development and testing of components required for an ABM system that could be deployed to a site in months rather than years;

the concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM components; the development of modern air defense systems that may have some ABM capabilities; and

the demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers in a period of time short enough to cause US concern as to Soviet capabilities and intent with regard to rapid reload.

Our continuing reexamination of Soviet ABM-related activities demonstrates that the Soviets have not corrected their outstanding violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar. During the 1988 ABM Treaty Review Conference, US representatives told Soviet representatives that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty, and that this violation will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved.

Soviet deployment of the Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) near Krasnoyarsk, the deployment of the Flat Twin radar and Pawn Shop van observed at Gomel, and the totality of Soviet ABM-related activities in

1988 and previous years, suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. As President Reagan said in the December 1985 Report, a unilateral Soviet ABM defense:

...would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility.

The integrity of the arms control process is also compromised by Soviet violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the BWC. Information obtained in 1988 does nothing to allay our concern about Soviet noncompliance with these important agreements.

The United States has determined that the Soviet Union maintains an active offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of

the BWC.

The

treaties on nuclear

record of Soviet noncompliance with the testing is of political, legal, and military concern. Since the LTBT came into force over 20 years ago, the Soviet Union has conducted its nuclear weapons test program in a manner incompatible with the terms of the Treaty. That conduct has regularly resulted in the release of nuclear debris into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the USSR. When the Soviets ended their unilateral nuclear testing moratorium on February 26, 1987, they resumed their pattern of noncompliance by conducting tests in a way which resulted in the release of radioactive matter into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the USSR. Even though materials from these Soviet tests do not pose calculable health, safety or environmental risks, and the infractions have no apparent military significance, Soviet

authorities have denied that these events have occurred and rebuffed our requests for technical discussions which might lead to prevention of further Soviet venting.

On November 9, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union began full-scale, stage-by-stage NTT negotiations in which the first step was to agree on effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the TTBT and the PNET. Our goal is to complete protocols to the two Treaties and submit them and the Treaties themselves to the Senate for advice and consent as to ratification. As part of those negotiations, the sides agreed to conduct a JVE at each other's test site. JVES were conducted with a nuclear explosion at the US test site on August 17, 1988, and at the Soviet test site on September 14, 1988.

These JVES did not change the previous US finding of likely violation. In December 1988, after a comprehensive review of the

evidence, the United States reaffirmed that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of the legal obligations under the TTBT.

The findings and analysis contained in these Reports are an integral part of our approach to arms control and national security policy. We seek sound agreements that are equitable, effectively verifiable, and can strengthen US and Allied security. But such agreements must be faithfully carried out if they are to fulfill those objectives and contribute to a more secure international environment. Ensuring that a country lives up to the commitments it has freely undertaken is essential to the confidence necessary to the whole arms control process.

5- NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

The US Government views the

proliferation

of nuclear weapons capability with concern. Special attention is given to the so-called Threshold States that have sought nuclear technology which could be used to develop nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the growing dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, the United States Government continued in 1988 to urge that all nonnuclear-weapon states promise not to acquire nuclear weapons, that they make this promise legally binding and that they assure their neighbors and the rest of the world that their nuclear programs are peaceful by submitting them to IAEA safeguards.

Nonproliferation Institutions

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

The NPT is a cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. With 138 parties as of December 31, 1988, including three states that have nuclear weapons (United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) while excluding two special category parties which are 80 designated and listed in Appendix III (St. Christopher-Nevis and Taiwan), the NPT is the most widely adhered-to arms control agreement in history. Nuclear-weapon states that are parties to

the NPT have undertaken not to transfer nuclear explosives to states that do not have nuclear weapons or to assist these states to manufacture nuclear explosives. Nonnuclear weapon states that have joined the NPT have promised not to acquire nuclear explosives and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.