U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

'The Bureau of Multilateral Affairs contains three divisions: European Security
Negotiations, international Security Affairs, and Science and Technological Policy.

The Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Control contains four divisions: Arms
Transfer, International Nuclear Affairs, Nuclear Safeguards and Technology, and
Delense Programs and Analysis.

The Bureau of Strategic Programs contains three divisions: Theatre Affairs,
Strategic Affairs, and Defense and Space.

"The Bureau of Verification and Intelligence contains three divisions: Verification,
Intelligence, and Operations Analysis.

plementation and compliance issues. In addition, by direction of Congress, judgments on compliance are the direct responsibility of the ACDA Director-and of the President. In order to increase ACDA's expertise on implementation issues and provide Agency management with the necessary support to make informed judgments, the inspectors recommended that ACDA create a small staff directly under the Director's control, to be called the "Arms Control Operations Office." This office should be staffed by personnel with technical and legal competence in implementation issues (now assigned to other offices throughout ACDA), with the U.S. staff of the SCC and the SVC reporting to the Director through this office. The operations staff would coordinate ACDA input into the implementation policy guidance process, perform special compliance studies as directed, and integrate internal Agency judgments on the implementation of treaties and agreements.

The U.S. Government created the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, to conduct U.S. monitoring and on-site inspections in the U.S.S.R. in connection with the implementation of the INF agreement and to manage similar activities of the Soviets in the United States and Western Europe. Because of the need to organize, staff, and fund this organization quickly, it was judged most feasible to organize it under Department of Defense auspices. Without being critical of the functioning of OSIA thus far, the inspectors, nevertheless, concluded that it may be time to regularize the position of OSIA within the arms control institutions of the U.S. Government.

This seems particularly necessary since it is likely that OSIA's role will expand to manage the monitoring of future arms control agreements. One means of accomplishing this would be to make the head of OSIA a second Deputy Director of ACDA, in order to provide better policy guidance. At present, there are problems regarding policy guidance, primarily in defining those issues which should be left to field management, those which OSIA and its parent agency can decide, and those in which there is legitimate interagency interest. Therefore,

even before permanent institutional measures affecting OSIA's future are agreed, the inspectors recommended that ACDA strengthen its internal procedures to integrate ACDA views on policy requirements for effective operation of OSIA

Management of Resources

The inspectors were critical of ACDA management of resources. The personnel structure of ACDA is unclear and needs immediate attention. ACDA should arrange for a complete survey of positions and grades by an outside agency with personnel management expertise, such as the Office of Personnel Management or the Department of the Air Force. ACDA also needs to do more to develop a reasonable career ladder and to improve training and development of employees. The Director should reaffirm ACDA's commitment to equal employment opportunity and affirmative action principles. The Director and senior management should formulate and disseminate goals and objectives to guide the work of the Agency staff, which lower level management would then translate into bureau, office, division, and individual workplans. The Agency also needs to improve communication within ACDA.

ACDA has made significant progress in improving its internal security controls, following the recommendations provided in earlier General Accounting Office and OIG security reviews. There are still a number of security issues that need to be addressed, and the inspectors recommended prompt action on these.

Management and Administration of Arms Control Delegations

The inspectors also visited Geneva and Vienna to survey the management and administration of arms control delegations in those cities. Problems exist, and ACDA and the State Department together need to address these issues on an urgent basis. At present, no single agency has established guidelines for managing administrative support of arms control delegations in these cities. The resulting confusion has led to a degree of interagency competition

on providing perquisites, which, in turn, has led to a number of questionable administrative practices.

The inspectors recommended that the Department of State and ACDA develop an agreement that will give the ACDA Director clear and unambiguous authority to establish

and enforce appropriate and reasonable standards for the administrative support of these delegations. This agreement should be approved by an interagency group representing all departments and agencies that furnish personnel as members or advisers of delegations engaged in arms control negotiations.

The OIG security survey conducted during the last reporting period found that there was an overall lack of attention to security and oversight of programs prior to the appointment of a new Director of ACDA in April 1988. The auditors made 43 recommendations to correct the Agency's security deficiencies. Of these recommendations, 34 were addressed to ACDA and nine to the Department of State. The latter included reconfiguration of ACDA offices in the Department of State and physical arrangements for adequate handling of ACDA's sensitive compartmented information. All nine of these recommendations have been resolved and are being implemented.

Auditors also found that the Agency's administrative officer in Geneva had improperly employed two family members. The auditors recommended immediate termination of one family member's employment, appointment of an independent contract officer for the personal services contract of the other, and disciplinary action against the administrative officer.

ACDA's top management was receptive to OIG recommendations. As of March 1, 1989, all 34 of the security survey recommendations addressed to ACDA were favorably resolved, and all but 15 recommendations were closed. ACDA is implementing the remaining recommendations. Its actions cover most of the major deficiencies noted by OIG auditors in physical and personnel security as well as security in communications, documents, and automated data processing. Even when action is completed, however, senior ACDA management must maintain close oversight of all procedures and controls to ensure correction of a longstanding disregard of appropriate security practices.

With regard to the above-mentioned nepotism issue, the one family member's employment was terminated, a new contract officer was appointed to oversee the personal services contract of the other, and the administrative officer retired.