although useful in the past, had not been as productive as

the more recent

minigroup meetings. The minigroup meetings allowed for more flexibility and deeper probing of the positions of both sides. As the Soviet Union retreated from the progress achieved in earlier rounds, they continued to request that the United States choose one of the two Soviet alternative proposals.

As the negotiations were slowing down in Geneva, the United States was

Ministerial, both sides elaborated their positions, discussing areas of The Soviet Union was willing to talk about

agreement and disagreement.

what type of research could be accomplished in space, but when pressed by the United States to clarify their position further, no progress was

achieved.

One week after the Moscow Ministerial (October 30), Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met again in Washington. At this meeting, the Soviet Union expressed unwillingness to discuss SDI. Instead, they indicated that the sides should discuss these issues in terms of "strategic stability." Although the United States acknowledged that this approach could result in more constructive Defense and Space exchanges in the future, the Soviets would not engage further on their new statement. And they have made clear that this represents no substantive change in their efforts to cripple SDI. It is interesting to note that even though the Soviet Union had discussed this "new" approach in Washington, the Geneva negotiators showed no new flexibility and even regressed from earlier stated positions. With this apparent dichotomy in the Soviet position, the United States prepared for the Summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

The Soviet Union came to the Washington Summit stating that they were not prepared to discuss strategic defenses. Instead, despite their violation of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side wanted only to discuss adherence to the Treaty. Despite their presummit positioning, some

Both

Defense and Space progress was made with the Soviets in Washington. their delegations in Geneva to work out an

sides agreed to instruct

agreement that would commit

the sides to observe the ABM Treaty as research, development, and

signedin 1972, while conducting required

testing permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for a specified period of time. The sides also agreed that intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, if the sides have not agreed otherwise, then each side would be free to decide its course of action. The sides also agreed that the agreement they would negotiate would have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, or other similar legally binding documents. In addition, the sides agreed to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the US-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear

stability.

In summary,

the Washington Summit provided the required background to further clarify the sides' Defense and Space positions and establish the

starting point for future Geneva negotiations.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

On May 4, US and Soviet negotiators reached agreement in Geneva on a draft joint text to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in their respective capitals. The agreement was signed in Washington September 15. The objective of the centers is to help reduce the risk of war between the United States and the Soviet Union that might result from accident, miscalculation, and misunderstanding in peacetime. The NRRCS required two rounds of negotiations, January 13 and May 3-4.

Authority for concluding the NRRC derives from the authority vested in the President as under Article II, Section 2, US

Commander-in-Chief

Constitution, and his authority to conduct foreign relations under Article II, Sections 1 and 3, US Constitution, as exercised on a day-to-day basis by the Secretary of State under 22 USC 2656.

Under the agreement, each side will set up a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in its capital. The US center will be staffed by Americans, the

Soviet

The centers will

center by Soviets. communicate at the Government-to-Government level by direct satellite links that can transmit rapidly full texts and graphics. In this respect the centers will be very similar to, but independent of, the modernized "Hotline" which is reserved for Heads of Government. The centers are not intended to supplant existing channels of communications or have a crisis management role. The NRRCs will exchange information and notifications as required under certain existing and future arms control and confidence-building measures

agreements.

The United States has a long-standing commitment to seeking improved confidence-building measures as part of an overall effort to establish a more stable and secure world. Since the early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on a number of measures to reduce the possibilities for

misunderstandings

and

miscalculations that might

the

increase the risk of nuclear war. For example, in 1963 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a direct communications link between their leaders the "Hotline." As a result of US initiatives, further improvements to that system were agreed upon in 1971 and 1984, latest upgrade becoming operational in 1986. In 1971, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the Agreement on Measures to Reduce The Risk of The Outbreak of Nuclear War, commonly called the "Accident Measures" Agreement, which requires notifications in the event of certain nuclear-related incidents. In 1985, again as a result of a US initiative, the two sides signed a "Common Understanding" to that agreement clarifying their obligations under it.

Nuclear Testing

US and Soviet technical experts held three sessions of discussions on nuclear testing issues in Geneva during 1987. During these meetings, the sides strove without success to reach agreement on the agenda and goals for nuclear testing negotiations.

In Moscow, at the April Ministerial

meeting, this problem was also addressed, as well as in Washington in discussions between US and Soviet officials during the summer. Despite these efforts, there was still no agreement by September.

At the September 15-17 Ministerial meeting in Washington, the problem of the agenda for the negotiations was taken up again, and agreement was announced on September 17 through the following joint US-Soviet statement: The US and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. The first objective at these negotiations will be an agreement on effective verification measures which will make possible the ratification of the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their

elimination.

For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification

measures ' for the US-USSR Treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to

design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

The first session of these full-scale negotiations, held in Geneva November 9-20, was devoted to working out details for conducting the joint verification experiments. The results of the session were announced by Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze December 9 during the Washington Summit. The United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to conduct the experiments as soon as possible at their test sites (Nevada and Semipalatinsk). For the purpose of the joint experiment, each side will provide the other with an opportunity to measure the yield of one or two explosions at each test site with yields not less that 100

kiloton and approaching 150 kiloton. The experiment will include the use of the US Continuous Reflectrometry for Radius versus Time Experiment Furthermore, in order to help

(CORRTEX) technique for yield measurement.

prepare for the joint experiment, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to exchange visits of the delegations to the two test sites in order to familiarize themselves with site conditions and operations. The US delegation is scheduled to visit Semipalatinsk January 11-14, and the Soviet delegation will visit the Nevada Test Site January 26-29, 1988. The next negotiating session will be held following these visits. Standing Consultative Commission

under

The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was established Article XIII of the ABM Treaty concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union on May 26, 1972. The SCC is charged with promoting the objectives and the implementation of the provisions of that Treaty and the Accident Measures Agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union September 30, 1971.

The SCC met in Geneva twice during 1987 in Geneva to discuss ABM Treaty issues of concern to the two sides. The first regular 1987 session

(SCC-XXXIII) was held from March 18 to

April 27; the second regular

session (SCC-XXXIV) was held from September 16 to November 5.

ACDA provides the US Component of the SCC a Washington base of operations and plays a leading role in interagency preparation for the SCC sessions by chairing the SCC Backstopping Committee. In addition, ACDA also provides a technically qualified representative and a lawyer to the Component while it is involved with discussions with the Soviets in Geneva.

Progress during 1987 toward the INF agreement and a possible START