such negotiation except in the unacceptable context of a comprehensive test ban.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Systems

Verification of a comprehensive ASAT ban would be difficult.

The

For example, a ban on all ASAT systems would require that the existing Soviet ASAT interceptor system be eliminated. Soviet interceptor is relatively small and is launched by a type of space booster that the Soviet Union uses for other space launch missions. It is not clear how many interceptors or boosters have been manufactured. The USSR could maintain a covert supply of interceptors that could be readied quickly for operational use, probably without the risk of US detection.

The fact that ASAT capabilities are inherent in some systems developed for other missions or are amenable to undetected or surreptitious development makes it nearly impossible to verify compliance with a truly comprehensive testing limitation that would eliminate tests of all methods of countering satellites.

Conclusions

The basic US objectives with respect to verification and compliance are to get the Soviet Union to comply with its current arms control obligations, to deny the Soviet Union the benefits of noncompliance, and to deter the Soviets from possible further or future noncompliance.

The record of Soviet noncompliance during the 1970s and 1980s suggests, however, that our verification needs include a number of related requirements. First, verification must be an intregal part of the treaty drafting process and to the greatest extent possible, provisions of agreements should be drafted to minimize dependence on data that the Soviets can deny or distort. Second, the United States should seek to attain the proper verification capabilities to meet treaty requirements. New and exciting technological opportunities should be exploited. However, some of them can be very expen

sive. All of these possible new initiatives could make important contributions to US verification capability.

Finally, we must recognize that if the Soviets believe that they can violate with impunity, no verification regime, however strong, can deter violations. For arms control to add to international stability and to US and allied security, it must be maintained as a viable structure by all states. Unless it is made clear that compliance is "cheaper" for the Soviets than violations, they will have no incentive to comply.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

The Treaty on The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are the two central nonproliferation institutions. During 1986, efforts continued to strengthen them and the other elements of the nonproliferation regime. All of the components of national nuclear commerce were reviewed to ensure that they meet the legitimate needs of foreign civil nuclear programs and that they promote US nonproliferation objectives and do not increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. This included a review and tightening of US nuclear export policies, negotiations between the United States and Japan on a new civil nuclear cooperation agreement, preparations for a UN conference to be held in 1987 on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and regular discussions with the principal countries involved in nuclear export activity.

Considerable attention was also paid to developments during 1986 with regard to countries that have held open the option to acquire nuclear explosives, or that otherwise are suspected of harboring such ambitions. Efforts were made to

convince these states that NPT adherence, full-scope IAEA safeguards, and conformance with accepted worldwide nonproliferation norms would enhance international peace and security.

Buttressing Nonproliferation Institutions

The NPT, with 135 parties, is the most significant and widely supported measure to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries. The nonnuclear powers that join this Treaty pledge not to acquire nuclear explosives and agree to accept international inspection by the IAEA of their entire nuclear programs. Even more importantly, by their adherence to the NPT, these countries endorse nonproliferation as a norm essential to international stability.

The 1985 ACDA annual report noted the success of the 1985 NPT Review Conference, which endorsed the NPT as important to the security of all nations. This endorsement gave momentum to efforts in 1986 to promote additional adherence

to the NPT. Since the 1985 Review Conference, five countries have joined the NPT North Korea, Malawi, Colombia, the Yemen Arab Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago.

North Korea's adherence was especially important since its decision to join the NPT guarantees that its expanding nuclear activities will be subject to international safeguards administered by the IAEA. Such safeguards on North Korean nuclear activities should go far to allay suspicions that could undermine the stability of the Korean peninsula.

In support of the NPT, the United States has long sought to provide parties to the Treaty with special preference in regard to US nuclear exports. By law and policy, the United States may provide only minor assistance to non-NPT nonnuclearweapon states that have nuclear activities not subject to international safeguards; all significant nuclear exports and the vast majority of all US assistance to foreign civil nuclear programs go to NPT parties. The United States also demonstrates preferential treatment of NPT parties through a voluntary contribution to certain IAEA technical assistance programs.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

Treaties establishing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones are

another approach to preventing the spread of nuclear explosives. The first such treaty in a populated region of the world is the Treaty for The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco after the suburb of Mexico City where the Treaty was opened for signature in 1967. Such regional initiatives can complement the NPT and demonstrate commitment to nonproliferation.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco is in force for twenty-three Latin American countries. While the Treaty is not yet in force for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, it does offer them the opportunity to provide each other with an internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons and a commitment to accept international inspection of all their peaceful nuclear activities.

The United States has long supported the Treaty of Tlatelolco and has ratified the Protocols to the Treaty. Countries

for which the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in force and which have acceptable IAEA safeguards agreements in force are eligible for the same preferential treatment for US nuclear exports and assistance as NPT parties. In 1986, there were continued efforts to promote entry into force of this Treaty for all nations in Latin America, but there was no progress.

There were additional consultations during 1986 on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ). This Treaty, opened for signature in 1985, came into force in December 1986. It has three Protocols that the United States is

eligible to join.

International Atomic Energy Agency:

Political Developments

The IAEA was created in 1957, with the strong support of the United States. Its objective is to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under a system of safeguards designed to guard against diversion of nuclear material to military use. Over the years, this Agency has evolved into one of the most effective international organizations. It

provides the underpinning for international nuclear commerce, serves as an important mechanism to verify peaceful use commitments under the NPT, promotes the economic well being of developing countries through its assistance in peaceful nuclear applications, and increasingly has become the focal point for international cooperation on nuclear safety.

On April 26, 1986, the Soviet Union's Chernobyl power station experienced the most severe reactor accident in the history of the nuclear age. An explosion ripped through Reactor Number 4 at this station, spewing radioactive debris for thousands of miles. In the aftermath of this tragedy, there were calls for increased international cooperation on nuclear safety. President Reagan and six allied leaders at the May Economic Summit in Tokyo called for improved efforts to ensure that there is timely notification of such accidents and that foreign emergency assistance is available.

There was a

As a result of this accident, the IAEA was the focus throughout 1986 for international cooperation. special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in May which laid out a program for dealing with the issue. Two conventions were negotiated under IAEA auspices and opened for signature in September. These conventions (1) called for other countries and the IAEA to be notified if the consequences of a significant accident are likely to carry across national borders, and (2) established a framework that would facilitate international cooperation in providing emergency assistance. The IAEA also has led an international conference at which the USSR issued a report and answered questions about its own investigation into the causes and consequences of the accident. In September, there was a Special Session of the IAEA General Conference on nuclear safety that provided high level political support to the IAEA's enhanced safety efforts and endorsed the two conventions noted above. The United States and fifty other countries signed the conventions at that time; the Administration