EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The role of arms control in national security was enhanced in 1985 largely because the Soviet Union, after more than a year's absence, returned to bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons. In response to the Shultz/Gromyko meeting of January 8, the first of three rounds held in 1985 of the new and expanded bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms began March 12. During each round, work was concentrated in regular meetings of the three negotiating groups, Strategic Arms Reductions, Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, and Defense and Space, with overall plenaries of the United States and Soviet delegations held as required. The U.S. side, during the first round, proposed far-reaching plans for deep reductions in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and for a shift from exclusive dependence on offensive deterrence to a mix of offensive and defensive strategies. The Soviet side made a counterproposal during the third round which offered a 50-percent reduction of strategic weapons and an interim INF agreement. The United States responded quickly with new positions which built on the positive elements of the Soviet counterproposal. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was among the most controversial elements during the year's negotiations. The Soviets tried to link progress on negotiating reductions in offensive nuclear weapons to limitations on SDI research, a linkage which the United States would not accept. While the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, November 19-21, was successful in creating new bilateral understandings in several areas, basic disagreements over nuclear and space arms control issues were not resolved. However, there was agreement to redouble the negotiating efforts. The United States began this work in preparation for resumption of the talks in Geneva on January 16, 1986. Major efforts in the area of multilateral affairs during 1984 continued unabated through 1985. The United States played a prominent role at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva with work directed to negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. In addition, work continued in negotiations to develop concepts supporting a convention that would prohibit radiological weapons. Other issues discussed at the Conference included outer space arms control, nuclear testing limitations and related verification issues, and security assurances. The long and arduous mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna received new impetus on December 5 as a consequence of a new Western proposal which drew on the essential elements of the previous Eastern proposal and included NATO's enhanced verification provisions. The West proposed to defer the exchange of troop data, long the major sticking point in (XI) these negotiations, until after the implementation of a first stage withdrawal of 5,000 United States and 11,500 Soviet troops from the reductions area. In addition, a strong verification regime was proposed to ensure that the reductions agreed to were actually being taken; that the commitment not to increase residual levels was being observed; and that all other provisions of the agreement were being honored. As for progress at the 1985 session of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), in Stockholm, a new working group structure was adopted which we hope will lead toward a constructive drafting process to develop provisions of a possible agreement. The West has succeeded in winning support for its approach, which embodies verifiable and militarily significant confidence-building measures. The Soviets have been unsuccessful in their propaganda/political approach and have been forced to address Western proposals more seriously. The neutral and nonaligned states have presented proposals which tend to support Western positions on the need for effective verification and enhanced information. We hope for a positive outcome, which will represent a qualitative improvement over the Helsinki Final Act, in time for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Vienna Review Conference which begins in November 1986. ACDA played an important role in the development of two Presidential reports to the Congress in 1985 on Soviet noncompliance with certain arms control treaties and agreements. One of these reports was released in February, the other in December; both were in classified and unclassified versions. The December report reviewed specific and suspected violations listed in the February report, and the unclassified version made several public for the first time. Violations having to do with strategic arms limitation agreements were brought to the attention of Soviet representatives by their U.S. counterparts during past meetings of the United States/Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The SCC during 1985 met in Geneva April 10-June 14 and October 9-November 7, the 28th and 29th rounds since the establishment of the SCC in 1972. Other problems of Soviet noncompliance were raised in other diplomatic channels. In the context of verification and compliance, U.S.-proposed resolutions on the illegal use of chemical weapons and on the crucial importance of compliance with all provisions of arms control treaties and agreements were overwhelmingly adopted this year by the 40th U.N. General Assembly. Even as the United States continued its own scrupulous compliance with arms control agreements, the Soviet Union failed to provide satisfactory explanations or corrections for its noncompliance; the United States had to consider appropriate and proportional responses required for U.S. security in the face of Soviet violations. ACDA's nuclear nonproliferation program for 1985 was highlighted by the third Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference held in Geneva in August and September. The Conference, attended by representatives from 86 of the 130 parties to the treaty, provided opportunities for free and open discussions of all elements of the treaty and ended with the adoption by consensus of a final declaration which reaffirmed the parties' unequivocal support for the NPT. The United States continued its support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during the year. The results of the 1985 IAEA General Conference were favorable to U.S. interests. ACDA in 1985 played a significant role in IAEA affairs as well as in all U.S.-sponsored programs designed to ensure that nuclear materials and technology exported to or employed in the more than 500 nuclear facilities in over 30 countries are used only for peaceful purposes. To this end, ACDA has been involved in the development of new research reactor fuels which can be substituted for the volatile high-enriched uranium fuels currently in use. A breakthrough in 1985 was the full-core demonstration in the Oak Ridge Research Reactor of a uranium substitute, a high-density silicide fuel. During the year, ACDA played important roles on such other diverse interagency projects as the eighth U.S. inspection of Antarctic bases, managing of arms transfers, participating in the Middle East Arms Transfer Study, and the Public Law 309 report to the Congress on the impact of offsets used in payment for arms exports. The development of the fiscal year 1987 Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS) report to the Congress and the publishing of the fiscal year 1986 ACIS and the 1985 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers report were also completed with ACDA in the leading role. Much of ACDA's 1985 research was directed to verification issues affecting previously negotiated arms control treaties and potential future treaties. Another large share of the research effort was directed to the enhancement of procedures designed to prevent diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to weapons uses. Other research included analyses of the Soviet economy and Soviet military expenditures, arms transfer issues, test ban and seismic developments, strategic defense, and antisatellite (ASAT) arms con trol. This 1985 Annual Report to the Congress, our 25th consecutive such report, provides details on the above in addition to highlighting the many other important activities of the Agency. ABM AC DA ACIS ALCM ASAT BWC CBMS CD CDE CSBMS CSCE CTB CW DST ENMOD GAC GCC GLCM HEU IAEA ICBM INF LRINF LTBT MB FR NATO NNA NPT NST NTM NWF Z PNE POTAS RECOVER ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS Anti-Ballistic Missile Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Anti-satellite Biological Weapons Convention Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Confidence and Security-Building Measures Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Chemical Weapons Defense and Space Talks Environmental Modification Convention General Advisory Committee Gulf Cooperation Council Ground-Launched Cruise Missile High-enriched Uranium International Atomic Energy Agency Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Longer-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions North Atlantic Treaty Organization Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons National Technical Means Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors Re-entry Vehicle Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Standing Consultative Commission Special Consultative Group Strategic Defense Initiative Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Sea-launched Ballistic Missile RERTR RV SALT SCC SCG SDI SLCM SLBM SNEC SRINF START TRANSEAVER TTST UNDC UNGA Subgroups on Nuclear Export Coordination Shorter-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Transport by Sea Verification Threshold Test Ban Treaty United Nations Disarmament Commission United Nations General Assembly (xv) |