agreements to which they are parties. One-sided compliance
does not strengthen stability but instead undermines it.

We have taken pains to ensure that we are in full compliance
with our obligations. The Soviet Union must do the same. To
be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance.
We must keep in mind that independent verification is more
difficult for us, given the ease with which the Soviets can
determine what is occurring in our open society, compared to
US difficulty in verifying relevant developments in the
Soviets' closed society.

The Summit also provided impetus to the Conference on
Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe (CDE) for confidence-building in Europe, to Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) for conventional force reductions,
and to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for banning

chemical weapons.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable convention prohibiting and destroying existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. And they also agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical Bilateral talks on these vital issues will begin

weapons.

in 1986. We are concerned about the trend of chemical weapon

use,

for example, Vietnamese use of Soviet-supplied chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia, the Soviet use of such weapons in Afghanistan, and most recently the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in its war with Iran.

Assessment

Governments enter into agreements when greater benefits

for each are achievable by agreeing rather than by not agreeing. In negotiating with the Soviet Union, we must remain acutely aware of the major asymmetries in our interests, values, ideology and outlook. We must remain equally sensitive to attempts by the Soviets to secure reductions in, or abandonment of, crucial elements of our military capability without providing agreements that truly enhance stability and security for both sides. Unilateral cancellation of critical US military programs is viewed by the Soviets not as a sign of goodwill but as a lack of will on our part. In addition, the present differences in the number and kinds of weapons systems possessed by the two

sides and differences in the two sides' strategic postures

make for extraordinary complexity in negotiation, even assuming a Soviet willingness to bargain in good faith.

As 1985 ends, it is impossible to know whether the Soviet Union will be prepared to bargain in good faith in 1986 on key areas of potential common ground. There are positive and negative signs. In any event, we must continue to be patient. Negotiations with the Soviet Union, particularly those involving security matters, are generally painstakingly slow. The United States made forthcoming proposals in the 1985 final round in Geneva--indeed we extended that round to present fully our new proposal in each of the three areas of the NST negotiatons. we have indicated our willingness to engage in a genuine give

And

and-take, offering compromise when appropriate Soviet compromises are made in return. We still await Soviet responses to these very specific and forthcoming proposals.

The question of where we go from here can best be answered

by President Reagan's statement on November 21 at the joint ceremony in Geneva following his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

The real report card on Geneva will not come in for months or even years. But we know the questions that must be answered:

Will we join together in sharply reducing offensive nuclear arms and moving to nonnuclear defensive systems to make this a safer world?

Will we join together to help bring about a peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Central America so that the peoples there can freely determine their own destiny without outside interference?

Will the cause of liberty be advanced and will the treaties and agreements signed, past and future, be fulfilled?

If the answers to those questions are to be yes, the Soviets must do their part.

We will not enter into further arms control agreements without effective verification, and we cannot close our eyes to Soviet noncompliance with existing treaties. As we press the Soviet Union to correct its noncompliance and while reserving our right to take proportionate and appropriate responses to continued noncompliance, we will at the same time continue to seek equitable and verifiable agreements that effect deep reductions in a stabilizing manner in the offensive nuclear weapons of both sides.

BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AFFAIRS

In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1984, President Reagan proposed to reinvigorate the nuclear arms control process which the Soviets, reacting to the implementation of the 1979 NATO decision on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) missiles, had suspended in December 1983. After meetings between the President and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in late September, the United States and the Soviet Union arrived at an informal agreement to continue discussions which might lead to a revival of a serious US/Soviet arms control dialogue. This agreement led to a joint announcement by the United States and the Soviet Union on November 22, 1984, of a decision to enter new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and space arms.

In order to reach a common understanding about the subject and objectives of such negotiations, a team led by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, and including the Director of ACDA, met with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva, January 7-8, 1985. During these two days of discussion, both sides set forth their views on the nature of the strategic relationship and the problems that needed to be dealt with. The Secretary stated that the US goal in future negotiations would be the achievement of a more stable balance of forces

at significantly lower levels of arms.

Over the longer

term, the United States would seek ways to move toward a

more stable system involving increased reliance on defensive

systems.

After two days of intensive talks Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed to the following plan for the new negotiations:

The sides agree that the subject of the
negotiations will be a complex of questions
concerning space and nuclear arms, both
strategic and intermediate range, with all
the questions considered and resolved in
their interrelationship. The objective of
the negotiations will be to work out effec-
tive agreements aimed at preventing an arms
race in space and terminating it on earth,
at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and
at strengthening strategic stability. The
negotiations are to be conducted by a dele-
gation from each side, divided into three
groups.

On that basis, the first round of the nuclear and space talks opened in Geneva on March 12, 1985. The President appointed Ambassador Max Kampelman to head the US delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) and to lead the negotiating group for the Defense and Space Talks (DST). Ambassador John Tower was chosen to head the negotiating group on Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and Ambassador Maynard Glitman to lead the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiating group. Early in the first round, the basic format of the negotiations was agreed upon. Each of the negotiating groups