and Aland; Holland would join it to protect its frontiers: Belgium (a bit of iron between the hammer and the anvil) would join it to avert its occupation and conquest; Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, Hanover, Hesse, and Baden would all join it, even to Italy and Greece, and what could Prussia and Russia do in presence of such a coalition? Such a coalition, it suffices to say, is not on the cards, except such as are played with at “la petite Bourse" on the Boulevards. The real bearing of such an alliance only comes to light when we read that by its means Constantinople would become the capital of a Catholic empire, and would assist in the dividing out of the most formidable monarchy which has ever existed in the world. Muhammadanism would have ceased to exist, and the civilising mission of Catholicism would commence under the influence of France and Austria—their allies being already thrown overboard by anticipation, and before even their alliance is obtained.

It is a remarkable phenomenon that all ideal politics move in a circle round Constantinople, to which they invariably culminate as the axis upon which all policy revolves. It is so also in all discussions in regard to what is designated as the Yankee-Russian alliance. But the three hundred dunderbergs and monitors which are to occupy the Mediterranean would be as in a mouse-trap in presence of the coalition that we are promised will be there to encounter it! America, we are further told, is a factitious and material power. It has neither moral nor intellectual strength. It has no name, save that of the continent on which it exists; it is torn to pieces by factions and civil wars that spring from a vicious democracy, and which would run riot in time of war. The United States constitute a political union, and that is all, and an attempt to act as a great power in a foreign war would only hasten the breaking up of that badly aggregated union, in which the states of the South are disfranchised from political representation, and swayed by the bayonet. The Yankees, if ever they should act in alliance with Russia, would not, however, in all probability, engage the old European states from the West, which is their strong side, but from the East and the Pacific, where we have already pointed out the political and geographical movements of progress which are in operation.

It appears, however, that there exists a party in Austria-the party of ultramontane or bigoted Catholicism it may be called-which in the depth of its despair, as the last refuge of Catholicism in Central Europe, losing all influence in Germany, would gladly enter upon a suicidal alliance with France-Constantinople being held out as the reward for such an alliance. The New Fremden Blatt, which is said to be a semi-official organ of the chancellor of the empire, thinks that there is no need of a Russo-Prussian alliance to incite an understanding between France and Austria. "The cause of that understanding is of a date more recent; it dates from the treaty of Prague, which, it is true, is a mere convention concluded between Austria and Prussia, but the tenor of which is of an importance entirely European. (This is to say that Austria, having succumbed before Prussia, it is now prepared to seek the aid of France, or any other European power, to be reinstated.) The peace of Prague has

created in the very centre of Europe a power unknown there since the great emperors of Germany. It is true that, till now, it has been contended that a great and powerful state in the middle of Europe was necessary to maintain peace on the Continent; but in that case it would be desirable that such a state should be animated with pacific ideas. Such event would have occurred had Germany (i.e. Austria) succeeded in recovering her ancient grandeur, for Germany (ie. Austria) is an empire of civilisation and progress-an empire of peace. Instead of a united Germany, there rose a great and powerful Prussia, which has thus become a new danger for the peace of Europe. It is a fact that the Hohenzollerns must be logically aggressive, because a pause from Prussia would amount to a backward step. After Frederick the Great, that pause brought on Jena; the pause of the Holy Alliance brought on Olmütz. Prussia must be active; in other words, she must aim at conquests, and never cease to disquiet Europe. Unfortunately, close to her are numerous morsels such as excite her appetite. Germany is at the present time under the yoke of Prussia; militarily speaking, Prussia is a great power. It is of paramount necessity to circumscribe that power, and the end must be reached by means of the treaty of Prague. What Prussia took from the Austrians at Königsgratz, and what France had granted to her previously, has been in Germany limited by the Maine. But what neither France nor Austria did ever acquiesce in is, that Prussia. should plant her foot in Southern Germany. Already she has twice tried to do so. Firstly, by her treaties of offensive and defensive alliances; secondly, by the Zollverein Convention. Austria could, with reason, find in these a violation of the treaty of Prague, because in both circumstances Prussia used her preponderance, and compelled the southern states to accept her proposals.

But enough of concessions. As soon as Prussia puts forward for the third time (why the third more than the first ?) exigencies that would destroy the independence of the southern states of Germany, Austria and France ought to oppose Prussia. To-day they openly ask in Prussia why France should interfere with the treaty of Prague? Such a question is shere nonsense, and it is also an abnegation of the truth, both preconcerted and bold.

Let us ignore that at Nikolsburg M. Benedetti was always between Count Bismark and Count Mensdorff. But would it not be a shameful thing to forget that France, by her attitude, greatly helped Prussia to go on with the war of 1866? Has not the Prussian prime minister been at Biarritz? Did he not offer Luxemburg to France as the price of her benevolent neutrality? Had not France shown herself disposed to such an arrangement-had she informed Italy that she was opposed to her conquering Venetia through Prussia-had France placed a corps of observation at Lille or at Besançon-would Prussia have been able, even with her needle-guns and her intellectual strength, which we gladly admit, to send a single man to the frontiers of Bohemia ?

The arrière pensée of a Prusso-Russian alliance had not yet dawned at that time. Russia was not ready, and the pacification of Polandwe mean her crushing-was not in the advanced state that it is

now. And, also, the Prussian army did not possess then that assurance and that confidence in its own strength that it entertains now. Prussia would have deemed herself happy if she had been able to acquire the Elbe Duchies for a portion of the country of Glatz, and for a large sum of money. The sovereigns of Hanover, of Hesse, and of Nassau would still sit on their thrones. It is France which has accomplished the greatness of Prussia. Yet the Emperor Napoleon is not, we are told, entitled to interfere with what is going on in Germany! Is it, perhaps, because he did not paraph any pact with Count Bismark at Biarritz? No. We can reckon on the association of the principal Prussian organs, if we recognise the right of France to interfere in what is going on on her frontiers. We are edified enough about that continual bavardage of inimity from France to Germany. It was the same in old times; but we do not know yet to-day if we must prefer Prussian Hegemony to the Emperor Napoleon's protection upon the Rhenish Confederation. But one thing is certain, Austria and France, the most interested neighbours, are compelled to keep a certain watch, since not Germany, but Prussia, has acquired so much power in the centre of Europe. A wider development of Prussia would give them the right to oppose that country in common. This would not be an alliance against Germany, but one against Prussia.

It may suit the interests of Austria to represent an alliance with France as one not against Germany but against Prussia, but there are few politicians in the fatherland who will be taken in by so shallow a pretext. Misfortunes, it is said, make us acquainted with strange bedfellows, and Austria, there is every reason to suppose, has entered into an understanding with France to see the left bank of the Rhine pass under her yoke, so long as such a protection, as she pleases to call it, can be pacifically obtained by the triumphs of diplomacy, and she can at the same time, and by the same pacific triumphs, be allowed to place herself at the head of a South German and Catholic Confederacy. Before this pleasant little arrangement could be brought about without a war, and the sanguine anticipations of the two emperors can be realised, they must, to use the homely but expressive metaphor Marshal Pelissier was so partial to, “have discovered the secret of making omelets without breaking eggs."

It is a curious circumstance, that whilst France is endeavouring to seduce Austria into an alliance, upon the understanding that the latter is to be placed at the head of a South German Confederation, with Constantinople in the perspective, whilst France is to be gratified by the possession of the left bank of the Rhine, that Prussia is endeavouring to bring about the same results by the more reasonable offer of the Danubian Principalities, Bosnia, Servia, and Montenegro, to be obtained by diplomatic cession, and if not, by force of arms; Prussia to be rewarded by imperial power over a united Germany, and the German provinces of Austria to be ruled by viceroys, who will have seats in the grand council of German princes.

NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

THE FRONTIERS OF FRANCE.

"FRANCE," says the author of a work crowned by the French Academy, “has recovered its 'natural' frontier in the south: will she recover her natural frontier in the north? Undoubtedly and unquestionably so. She requires the limits that the hand of God has traced out for her; those which she possessed in her Celtic and Roman past; those which she re-conquered in her regeneration of 1789. She must include in her territory the battle-field of Tolbiac and the tomb of Charlemagne; she must have, as Vauban said to Louis XIV., son pré carré-her territory squared off. The natural frontiers of France have taken their place in the public right of Europe for seventy-two years past; they are a fundamental necessity of the existing times; they are the basis of the peace of the world."

"But to every day its troubles. We have seen with what perseverance, what moderation, what wisdom, all the kings of France have laboured for centuries in reconstructing our territory, and the powerful vitality, the robust greatness, which this long and patriotic labour has conferred upon France. The aim was, we know, unfortunately exceeded, and the work has in part to be recommenced; but what progress has it not made in less than fifty years? Our neighbourhood to the Scheldt and the Alps transformed, Savoy and Nice re-conquered, the coalition broken up, and France replaced in its rank! The rest is a work of time, patience, and conciliation. It will be carried out without disturbance, and pacifically if Europe is wise and confiding, if it will abdicate its prejudices and its old resentments, if it accepts necessities traced by nature, history, reason, and justice; but from that day, whatever it may wish, whatever it may do, the treaties of 1815 will have ceased to exist."

These are not the words of a hasty contributor to a daily paper, or of an excited partisan pamphleteer; they are the well-digested and sober utterances of an historical writer-M. Théophile Lavallée-in a work on the frontiers of France, which has, as before remarked, been honoured by an expression of the highest approbation on the part of the French Academy, has gone through three editions, and may be admitted to represent the opinions of seven-eighths of the French people, and to judge by the Emperor Napoleon III.'s celebrated declaration of abhorrence of the treaties of 1815, made at Auxerre, of the present ruler of France. There is no other policy popular in France, and each successive ruler has, as a natural sequence of his being called to the head of affairs, to adopt it as a labour of time, or as an apology for aggression. So also there is no bulwark to the peace of Europe but a united Germany. Nov.-VOL. CXLI. NO. DLXIII.

S

Such alone can resist this hereditary and historical policy of France, and keep the most ambitious and turbulent of European military powers

within bounds.

This, however, is not the question which we propose to ourselves to discuss at the present moment. It is what are really, as seen and studied not from a French, but from an independent point of view, the so-called natural, historical, reasonable, and just frontiers of France. To do justice to such an inquiry it is absolutely necessary, although archæological investigations are antagonistic to the fever of politics, to go back to the beginning.

The Romans, it is well known, colonised the banks of the Rhine, just as they did those of the Danube, simply with the view of holding in control the countries watered by those noble rivers. They selected their military posts or stations with this view, and with a well-considered regard to the peculiarities of the case, choosing more particularly the points of junction of rivers, as these opened a means of communication with the interior. Most of the cities and strong places which exist on the left bank of the Rhine had their origin in these Roman posts. Such are Strasburg (Argentoratum), Mayence (Moguntiacum), Coblentz (Confluentes), Cologne (Colonia Agrippina), Neuss (Nova Castra), and others.

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Eight legions, constituting a force of from twenty to twenty-five thousand men, garrisoned these military colonies, thus planted in the centre of a region of its own. The Rhine, M. Lavallée himself admits, is a river which rather unites than separates Gaul from Germany." "It is a political limit, rather than a military frontier; the region that it flows through, from Basle to the sea, is a geological whole-a natural basin-through which it makes its way; the countries on both banks so resemble one another in climate, soil, productions, and inhabitants, that they appear to be indivisible; and, lastly, Gaul and Germany being as it were confounded in this neutral territory, they are perpetually called upon to influence and react one upon another." Yet the very writer who admits these facts argues in favour of the Rhine being made to constitute a natural as well as an arbitrary and artificial military frontier to France!

The real view taken of the matter by the Romans became sufficiently manifest in the times of the Emperor Probus, who divided the whole region into Germania prima and Germania secunda. The Franks, however, would never let these German colonies rest. They devastated the towns, and drove the population away into the interior. Julian drove them back across the Rhine, but they incessantly returned to the charge. When the Franks became confounded with the Gauls, upon the overrunning of the north of Europe by the Alamans, Frisons, and Saxons, the same territory became by its population a mere extension of Germany, and the Franks, no longer seeking to re-establish strong places on the Rhine, were satisfied upon the victory of Clovis, at Tolbiac, in asserting a kind of military supremacy over the mixed populations of the valley. Charlemagne extended these claims of domination to the north and east, to the Elbe and the Danube; in Italy, on the side where Gaul was threatened by the Lombards, to Volturna; and in Spain, where it was threatened by the Visigoths and Saracens, to the Ebro, with results which proved as fatal in the ninth, as the extension given to the French