THE WEREWOLF. BY HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN. FROM THE DANISH. THE MANCHESTER BANQUET. BY CYRUS REDDING BILL DAWSON'S EARLY DAYS AT SEA. BY HIMSELF. BEING THE REAL NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE. FRANCE AND PRUSSIA. POLITICAL skirmishing of a hostile character between France and Prussia may be said to have had its commencement when the former mooted the question as to Prussia's right to garrison the fortress of Luxemburg, held by the King of Holland as a duke of the German confederation, but not at the time incorporated with the North German confederation, which superseded the old diet of Frankfort. This difficulty, thanks to the intervention of foreign powers, more especially Great Britain, was brought to a pacific issue. The skirmishing has, however, ever since been continued, but upon a different basis. France, the Moniteur declares, wishes for peace, and unfeignedly accepts the state of things which events have created in Germany, but at the same time requires that Prussia shall confine herself within the limits of the treaty of Prague, and fully acknowledge that she has no more conquests to make. It is in this sense that a "despatch," and not a "note," was sent by M. de Moustier to Berlin, arguing that, Prussia having accepted French mediation at Nikolsburg, France now considered herself to be personally en cause, and further inquiring what are the Prussian government's intentions relative to Article 5 of the treaty of Prague which refers to Schleswig, pointing out, at the same time, that Prussia has no right to claim for the Germans disseminated in insignificant numbers through the territories to be retroceded exceptional guarantees not specified in the same treaty of Prague. The French government has also from time to time continued to urge upon Prussia a friendly arrangement with the King of Denmark in regard to the question of North Schleswig. The stipulation as to consulting the wishes of the Northern Schleswigers upon the question whether they should remain Prussian or become again Danish subjects, was, it is to be observed, a concession of Prussia to the representations of the Emperor of the French. It is true that Prussia entered formally into that engagement only with Austria, but she entered into it, not at the instance of Austria, which cared nothing about the matter, but at the direct request or demand of the French government. If there was nothing humiliating to her in yielding to the wishes of France upon this point, there can be nothing humiliating in the fact that France has urged the fulfilment of the promises then made. The Prussian government might have prevented all interference of France by at once fulfilling its engagements instead of waiting nearly twelve months before giving any sign of recognising them, and acting throughout that time in Sept.-VOL. CXLI. NO. DLXI. B the most oppressive manner towards the very persons whose wishes were to be consulted. The question of the retrocession of the northern districts of Schleswig ought, indeed, to have been settled amicably between Prussia and Denmark a long time ago, and if the Prussian government really means to act fairly, the matter can soon be pacifically determined. It has done something at last-it has entered into direct communication with the Danish government upon the subject, and seems disposed to arrange the new frontier, not in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, as expressed in a plebiscite, but by agreement between the two governments. Such an arrangement cannot be agreeable to the Emperor of the French, whose predilections for the free expression of nationalities, and whose belief in the tendency of such nationalities to agglomerate, are well known. The result of the voting in every village of North Schleswig, assuming the voting to be free, can à priori be most certainly reckoned upon, and the question remains, will Prussia, in any private arrangement with Denmark, cede to that country the line of frontier which she would obtain by a free vote of the population ? The fairest frontier would probably be one drawn from Flensburg to some point on the west coast, or from a point to the north of Flensburg, running in almost a straight line to Tondern, to which the German plenipotentiaries expressed in the London conferences the readiness of their governments to accede. Such a frontier, which would leave very many thousand Danes Prussian subjects, in fact, give Prussia the whole of the mixed districts, can only be assented to-not because it would be an equitable partition according to nationalities, but because it would be as just an arrangement as can be arrived at when the power is all on one side, although the right is on the other. The Prussians, however, do not like the idea of giving up the Sundewitt and Alsen. They can never abandon, they say, to an enemy a place which, like Duppel, has been the scene of their glorious exploits. Upon that principle no power ought ever to make a peace restoring to an enemy the field upon which it has won a great engagement, and Prussia herself ought to have retained at the peace of Prague the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. But it is pretended that Prussia requires these positions for her own security. Against whose attack? it has been pertinently asked. Denmark can never be an enemy whose hostility upon land need be apprehended. Yet the utmost that Prussia appears at present inclined to give is the frontier from Apenrade to Tondern, which was that first proposed on the part of Germany in the conferences, whilst Denmark asks for a frontier which would give her back Flensburg, while France asks for a plebiscite. There is certainly a Nemesis in this Prusso-Danish affair, which after leading to a disastrous war between the two allies in spoliation -Prussia and Austria-threatens under the complication of a northern confederation, which Thiers, Dupin, and their political acolytes declare to be offensive to France, to become another apology for a quarrel, the real grounds of which lie much deeper between France and Prussia. Even more difficult, however, than this question as to the extent of the retrocession is that of the guarantees which the Prussian government asks on behalf of those Germans who, by that very retrocession, would again become Danish subjects. Germans are scattered over the whole of North Schleswig, and in some of the larger towns they constitute the majority. Apenrade, Hadersleben, Tondern, and Christianfeld are more German than Danish. The Prussian government requires that Denmark should enter into some special undertaking for the security and protection of these Germans, and the Danish government, naturally enough, declines to enter into any such engagement. It says that the laws of Denmark secure equal rights to all subjects of the State without reference to race, and that the Germans therefore require no special privileges to protect them in the enjoyment of their property and the exercise of their respective industries. Would Prussia ask the same guarantees of the Americans to protect the numerous Germans who emigrate to that country to avoid the severities of conscription at home? No; the object is manifest. Germany is a progressive country, Denmark is unfortunately retrogressive, and the North German confederation stands in the same relation to her as America does to Mexico and Central America. Grant her special protection over the Germans of North Schleswig, and the day would not be far distant when even a plebiscite would annex the whole peninsula to the fatherland. Denmark naturally dreads that if it were to give such an undertaking, to interfere on behalf of the Germans of North Schleswig, it would only be establishing an excuse for constantly claiming that right of interference, just as Turkey is now harassed by certain European powers; and that the result would not only be a constant source of embarrassment, but it might, under unfavourable circumstances, be made an apology for aggression. It may, no doubt, be argued, on the other side, that the Danes, whom this handful of Germans have now for three years so cruelly oppressed-the Germans of North Schleswig have been the instigators of the worst acts of tyranny of the Prussian authorities against their Danish fellow-countrymen-might seek to revenge themselves, but the Danish government would, for its own sake, take care that the Germans should have the full protection of the law against violence or any other injustice, and no just cause of complaint by which to arouse the susceptibilities of their countrymen. The treaty of Prague says nothing about guarantees, and it establishes a very plain and simple way of determining the extent of the retrocession. If the Prussian government objects to the solution of a plebiscite as proposed by the French government, it should make a fair proposal to Denmark, and it need not doubt for a moment that the Danish government would gladly close with such an offer, whilst it knows full well that the Germans, who would return to their allegiance to King Christian VIII., would enjoy the full protection of the law. To assume otherwise is to insult a fallen foe. The French government has an advantage in interfering in the affairs of Schleswig, inasmuch as it carries the sympathies of Great Britain and of other powers with it. The English are not the only people who have felt for the spoliation to which the little kingdom of Denmark has been subjected at the hands of its more powerful neighbours. The interest has been further augmented by probably one of the most remarkable instances in history of the personal aggrandisement of a dynasty at the very moment of an almost destructive loss of territory. One of its princes is heir-apparent to the throne of Denmark, another is the actual King of Greece. One princess has wedded the future King of Englaud, another the heir to the czardom of Russia. If the French government contents itself with urging with fitting courtesy the Prussian government to put the article of the treaty of Prague into execution, it only exercises a right-a right which Prussia has given her and fulfils a duty which that right imposes upon her. It is absurd for the German newspapers to treat any action of France in this question as insulting, and therefore inadmissible. Of course, if France should adopt an imperative tone, or display a hostile feeling, German patriotism might very properly fire up. But there have been no proofs of any such manifestation given as yet. It is the attitude of the two countries which gives a zest to every diplomatic movement. Both are armed or arming, as if prepared for a combat, that the events of a day may bring forth; both alike are mistrustful and defiant, and both are prepared for a struggle for military and political supremacy in the affairs of Europe. It is in this tacit and covert sense that we must understand the real importance and bearing of the repudiation of the interference of France by the German newspapers, notoriously Zeidler's Correspondence, which expresses its hope, in common with a large portion of the German press, that interference will cause no change in Prussia's treatment of the North Schleswig question. "It was already strikingly offensive," says the Prussian paper, " enough on the part of France to take upon herself to interfere with the establishment of the customs union, and to attempt by warnings and even by threats to prevent the South German governments from joining the customs parliament. But all this was not addressed direct to Prussia. Now that we are directly addressed, it is to be hoped that the government will give a thoroughly clear reply. We do not desire hostilities; still less have we any need to keep out of the way of them." The New Prussian (Cross) Gazette argues that it will only be possible to judge of the importance of the interference of France in the affairs of North Schleswig when it is known what connexion that interference has with the views and intentions of the French government in reference to the general situation in Europe. "The present step," it adds, "taken by that government may be of such a character as would require from Prussia an unmistakable declaration repelling any foreign intervention, or it may amount only to an offer of friendly advice, which could be accepted with equal expressions of friendship." Referring again to the same topic, it says, upon another occasion, when criticising Baron Dupin's warlike speech in the French Senate, "We should take no notice of it were it simply the expression of individual views, and not rather that of the feelings of a large proportion of the French people. Moreover, Denmark might conclude from it that a declaration of war by France against Prussia was imminent, and in consequence evade an equitable solution of the Schleswig question. We reply, therefore, to Baron Dupin, and at the same time to the Danes, that Schleswig did not fall into the hands of Germany and of Prussia through intrigue, but as the result of a just war, provoked by the systematic oppression of the German duchies of the Elbe. In the treaty of Prague, Prussia entered into an engagement with Austria to cede the northern districts of Schleswig to Denmark, in case the inhabitants of those districts should, by a free vote, express their wish for such a cession. |