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thus reducing single-point vulnerabilities;

⚫ hosting-placing critical payloads on a number of satellites, in effect creating multifunction space platforms in various orbits;

⚫ reconstitution-having replacement satellites ready for launch on short notice to replace combat losses; ⚫ duplication-relying on non-space-based systems to back up satellites;

⚫ surrogates-air-borne systems, such as Remotely Piloted Vehicles, that incorporate many of these strategies.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have taken a variety of survivability measures. The US has concentrated on anti-jam, satellite hardening and hosting, and in coming years will emphasize autonomy, maneuvering and migration. Ground segment vulnerability fixes and surrogate satellites are also receiving more attention. Two examples are indicative of the nature and scope of this work: the KH-12, and Navstar.

The KH-12 photographic reconnaissance satellite was substantially redesigned in 1977-78, adding about 3,000 kilograms of maneuvering fuel to its total weight. This greatly increased the satellite's total weight, and a program of thrust augmentation was undertaken to upgrade the Shuttle's maximum payload. The KH-12 will also incorporate a radar warning system that will enable it to avoid the radar-guided Soviet ASAT. The KH-12 is a multipurpose platform that replaces the earlier KH-8, KH-9 (Big Bird) and KH-11 satellites.

The Navstar Global Positioning System replaces the Transit navigation satellite. In contrast to Transit, there are three times as many Navstars in the total constellation, which orbits at an altitude almost ten times higher than Transit. Navstar is also a multipurpose platform, carrying the Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection System.

The Soviet Union has a limited reconstitution capability inherent in its high annual launch rate, which in recent years has averaged over two satellites per week. But the significance of this capability is difficult to judge, and may be less than some have suggested. There have been a number of instances when it might be assumed that the Soviets would be interested in monitoring a situation via satellite, when they have been slow to move. Most recently, the outbreak of the Falklands War caught the Soviets with a badly degraded ocean reconnaissance capability, and it took them many weeks to get their nominal on-orbit constellation up to full strength. Announced plans indicate that in coming years the Soviets will be concentrating on migrating their satellites to higher orbits as a key survivability measure, and other initiatives such as hardening can be assumed.

Survivability measures reduce the benefits that might accrue from having an ASAT, or being the first to use it. They should be pursued, as an adjunct to efforts to limit ASATS through arms control agreements. For it must be admitted that no combination of survivability initiatives can guarantee the survival of critical military satellites in the face of an unconstrained ASAT competition. Although these various measures can protect satellites from the pre

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sent generation of ASATS, and from any covert or nondedicated ASAT threat that might obtain under an ASAT arms control regime, an all-out ASAT competition will place all satellites at risk before the end of the century, if not the end of the decade. In the final analysis, an ASAT Treaty will be the single most important satellite survivability measure possible, and in its absence, all the others will be largely in vain.

VERIFICATION

Verification is properly viewed as the central issue in arms control. Nowhere is this more true than with respect to limiting the arms race in space. Administration officials have indicated that they regard questions pertaining to verification as a key unresolved matter in this area. They note that even a massively intrusive program of on-site inspection could not guarantee that the Soviets did not retain a few of their killer satellites, hidden under the floor of some farm house. But this is like worrying about whether someone has a bullet in his pocket when it is plain that he is not carrying a gun. Without the gun, the bullets are of little concern. The Soviet ASAT is launched atop a rocket that is about the size of three buses parked end to end. A ban on the deployment of such a massive weapon could be readily verified. The real verification problem is posed by the new American ASAT, which is the size of two coffins placed end to end; once this new weapon is tested to operational readiness, the Soviets would have little confidence in their ability to verify a ban on its deployment. Clearly, the time to achieve limits on such weapons is now, while it is still possible.

What Needs to be Verified

In the past, arms control negotiations have sought a balance between what could be verified and what should be verified. Most arms control agreements consist of limits on testing and deployment, in recognition of the difficulty of verifying limits on possession. An untested system that is not deployed poses very little actual threat. Thus the SALT and START negotiations have concentrated on limiting the types and numbers of delivery systems, rather than on seeking limits on the total number of warheads that each side has produced. In the absence of a suitable delivery system, warheads are of little consequence. This is true for ASATS as well as for nuclear weapons. The mere possession of even a large number of orbital intercept vehicles would pose little threat, in the absence of a significant deployment of its delivery vehicles, which could be readily verified.

Present Soviet ASAT and Verification

Limits on the testing and deployment of the Soviet ASAT could be readily verified by national technical means. There is no need to attempt to limit mere possession by the Soviet Union of ASAT interceptor satellites. The inability to verify the physical destruction of intercep tor satellites is the expressed reason that the Administration is not moving forward to limit ASATS. But readily verifiable limits on testing and deployment would adequately control ASAT capabilities.

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Present Soviet ASAT-Testing and Verification

The Soviet ASAT is launched into orbit atop a modified version of the SS-9/SS-18 ICBM known as the F-LV. The launch is readily observable by early warning satellites. Once in orbit, the interceptor can be tracked by a variety of ground-based radars and cameras. The intercept maneuvers are readily distinguishable from the activities of other satelittes. The telemetry stream from the ASAT is subject to monitoring by ground- and space-based sensors. Because of its unique characteristics, testing of the Soviet ASAT could be readily verified.

Beginning in 1986, the Shuttle will launch the re-usable KH-12 photo reconnaissance satellite, which will be able to out maneuver the present Soviet ASAT.

Present Soviet ASAT-Deployment and Verification

The F-LV launch vehicle of the Soviet ASAT is over 10 feet in diameter and 150 feet long and is readily observable from space. It is over 30 feet longer than the SS-18 ICBM, with which it shares a common technological heritage, and is substantially different in appearance. A ban on the deployment of the Soviet ASAT could be adequately verified.

Defense Department statements concerning the operational status of the Soviet ASAT are based on reconnaissance satellite observations that the Soviets maintain several (the exact number is not clear based on the open literature, but it seems to be between two and five) launch pads at a high state of readiness, indicated by such activities as prompt snow removal. Under a deployment ban, at a minimum the operational readiness of these pads should be reduced. A much higher level of confidence as to compliance with the deployment ban would be achieved should the Soviets agree to dismantle these launch pads and their supporting facilities, which are in excess of what is required by their space program and strategic training activities. A further measure of confidence would be provided by a Soviet commitment not to increase the capacity (observable by an increase in floor space and railroad con

November 1983

nections) of other launch facilities that are capable of supporting launches by their ASAT rocket booster. The capacity of the vehicle processing and fuel storage facilities at these sites would have to be greatly expanded to support a major ASAT campaign, and such an expansion would be readily observable.

Dedication of existing SS-18-type silos to the ASAT role would be readily observable. There are about 18 such silos at Baikonur, and a lesser number at Plesetsk, that are used to launch SS-18's for crew training and reliability checks. These could support F-LV launches of ASATS. However, since the F-LV is over 30 feet longer than the SS-18, because of its much larger third stage, these silos would need substantial modification, such as the construction of a three-story building over the silo. The greater support requirements of the ASAT vehicle itself, compared to the payload of an SS-18, would also necessitate the construction of additional support facilities. Dedication of these silos to the ASAT role would also remove them from their regular duties, resulting in a changed pattern of activity which would be observable. Despite the "rapid reload" capability of these silos, they will suffer greater damage from a launch than the regular F-LV launch pads, resulting in long repair times and a lower volume of launches. The basing of ASATS in operational silos would be immediately apparent, and any significant deployment would reduce Soviet strategic force levels.

Present Soviet ASAT-Possession and Verification

The Reagan Administration has argued on many occasions that since it would be nearly impossible to verify through national technical means alone the dismantling and destruction of the Soviet ASAT system, there is no real basis for an agreement limiting these weapons. But the standard of verifiability they require is so stringent, is so strict, that one wonders as to its seriousness. Clearly, they are correct in assessing the limits to verifying such a measure. Even if all the personnel of the CIA and the FBI (and even the Post Office) were loosed upon the Soviet Union to roam the country at will, the task of hiding a handful of interceptor satellites no larger than a small car would still be child's play.

However, there is no need to seek a ban on possession of ASATS, since a ban on use, testing and deployment is an adequate guarantee for American security. The number of launch vehicles and launch pads available for placing these interceptors into orbit is small, and could be reduced even further by an agreement limiting ASATS. Given the operational limitations of the Soviet ASAT (low reliability and limited launch windows), coupled with the slow pad recycle time of these launch facilities (probably on the order of several days), it would be difficult for the Soviets to assemble covertly the dozens of large rockets that would be needed for an extended ASAT campaign.

Residual Soviet ASAT and Verification

The low-altitude satellites that would be vulnerable to such a campaign are at risk regardless of the provisions of arms control agreements, or of Soviet compliance with

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them. A number of Soviet systems, which would not be limited by any plausible ASAT Treaty, would provide some residual ASAT capability, should it be desired. The manned Soyuz spacecraft, and its unmanned Progress counterpart, could be readily applied to the task of disabling a few low-altitude satellites.

Future Soviet ASAT and Verification

While some Soviet satellites might incorporate some marginal ASAT capability without detection, dedicated space-based ASATS would be difficult to disguise. A space-based laser with an effective range of more than several hundred miles would of necessity have a mirror many yards in diameter, and on the whole be quite a massive structure with a rather distinctive configuration.

Although the external physical characteristics of a space mine might not differ from those of other types of satellites, the limited maneuvering capabilities that such a disguise would impose on the space mine would require it to be stationed in an orbit rather similar to that of its intended target. While one or two such space mines might escape detection, given the variety of orbits that the dozens of American military satellites occupy, it would be virtually impossible to deploy a "space mine field" without detection.

American ASAT and Verification

Limits on the testing of the US ASAT could be readily verified, since the tests involve unique equipment and operations. But because of its small size and the small number of rockets that would be an effective force, a ban on the deployment of the US ASAT would be difficult to verify once its testing is complete. The testing program itself will produce potentially operational capabilities.

American ASAT-Testing and Verification

The testing of the MALS ASAT will be readily observable by the Soviets. In addition to press reports, their national technical means will observe mission-unique support equipment accompaning the F-15's in the test program, and will monitor the telemetry of the tests themselves. The Instrumented Target Vehicles (ITVs) that the ASAT will be shot at are 6-foot-diameter balloons, whose orbital characteristics and flight dynamics are unique. Tests against a point in space without benefit of an ITV will not provide adequate assurance in testing the error-free accuracy needed for the MALS impact kill mechanism. Thus a ban on testing the American ASAT would be verifiable.

American ASAT-Deployment and Verification

Because of its very small size, and the small number that will compose the operational force, a ban on the deployment of the MALS will be very difficult for the Soviets to verify and could pose a major stumbling block for limiting the arms race in space.

The MALS is comparable in size to the Phoenix air-toair missile and the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). All these missiles are normally transported in coffin-like protective containers that are normally stored in buildings until just prior to use. Thus there will be very little to

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distinguish the MALS from many of the other types of ordnance normally seen at Air Force facilities. This situation is further complicated by the fact that the operational force of ASATs will number only 112, a small force that could be easily hidden in almost any warehouse or other small building.

The F-15's that will launch the MALS are not dedicated to the space defense role, but rather are assigned to the Tactical Air Command for continental air defense and other duties. These are provided with kits that can adapt the F-15 for the ASAT role in about six hours. These kits are normally stored indoors, and even when installed on the underside of the F-15, they are not observable to national technical means.

American ASAT-Possession and Verification

The MALS test program will generate a number of intercept vehicles and other types of equipment that are essentially identical to the operational items and not subject to ready detection by national technical means. Although Aviation Week would no doubt report on any tests of the ASAT, neither this nor any other open source would be able to account for the whereabouts of all the various MALS components produced as part of the test program, and of those components produced for the operational system prior to the assumed ban on possession. Thus as the test program continues and the scheduled deployment grows closer, the verifiability of a ban on possession of ASATS including MALS inexorably errodes. Future American ASAT and Verification

This erosion would be particularly troubling from the Soviet point of view with regard to more advanced American ASATs, which could be assembled by merely adding a larger first stage to the existing second stage and MHV. Thus it would be a very straightforward task for the United States to field an ASAT capability, either against Soviet satellites in medium altitude orbits using a larger air-launched system or against Soviet satellites in geostationary orbit, using a Trident SLBM as a booster. To the extent that the MHV is tested to operational readiness, it can be expected that Soviet interest in a ban on possession will increase.

Conclusion

In sum, it is neither possible nor necessary to achieve verifiable limits on dedicated anti-satellite systems that are more restrictive of ASAT capability than the level of ASAT capability that would reside in non-dedicated systems with some residual ASAT capability. The alternative responses are either to seek to restrain ASAT developments that in coming years may place a growing number of satellites at risk or to take the all-or-nothing approach of the Administration, saying that the only alternative to perfect ASAT control is no ASAT control. The Administration seems to judge arms control by a more stringent standard, requiring that it never fail, than the standard imposed on weapons, which are assumed to have a finite and limited reliability. Arms control and weapons procurement are twin paths to national security, and should be judged by equal standards of performance; in

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deed if arms control fails, we can resort to weapons, but if weapons fail, arms control will be of no avail.

The longer testing of ASATS continues, the more difficult it will be to control these weapons. A mutual moratorium on ASAT testing will slow the momentum of the arms race in space and should be implemented as soon as possible.

A Moratorium on ASAT Testing

Meaningful limitations on ASATS must be achieved soon, or not at all. Once the new American ASAT is tested to operational readiness, the Soviets will have little confidence in their ability to verify a ban on its deployment. One likely Soviet response will be testing and deployment of a space laser, a move with potentially disasterous implications for international stability.

Soviet leader Yuri Andropov proposed a moratorium on the testing of ASATS on August 18, 1983 during the course of a meeting with a delegation of United States Senators. According to press reports, Andropov said that "The USSR assumes the commitment not to be the first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapon, that is, imposes a unilateral moratorium of such launchings for the entire period during which other countries, including the USA, will refrain from stationing in outer space antisatellite weapons of any type."

There is some confusion as to just what this moratorium covers. Does the proposal apply only to "stationing" of space-based systems? Or does it include "launching" ground-based and air-based systems "into outer space", and thereby cover the existing Soviet and American systems? Would the moratorium cover only the all-up testing of ASAT systems, that is against objects in space, or would it apply also to the testing of ASAT components?

To avoid these various definitional ambiguities, in June 1983 FAS proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should agree to a moratorium on the testing of antisatellite weapons against objects in space. Such interceptions are the only way of testing the homing guidance sensors on ASATs, which are the least proven elements of these systems. The use of homing guidance sensors against realistic targets in space is the only way that this critical

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November 1983

technology can be adequately tested. The Soviets have yet to perfect satisfactory radar or heat-seeking sensors, and the American heat-seeking sensor is currently experiencing problems. A moratorium on their testing would effectively freeze the development of such weapons.

AN ASAT TREATY

The US and USSR conducted three negotiating sessions in 1978 and 1979 concerning ASATS. These talks were discontinued when the Carter Administration decided to concentrate its arms control efforts on ratification of the SALT II agreement, and they were never resumed, as a result of the general deterioration of US-Soviet relations following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviets proposed a Draft Treaty on space weapons to the UN in 1981, but it was seriously flawed and attracted little attention.

The Soviet Union proposed a new Draft Treaty on space weapons in August 1983. In a number of important respects the recent Soviet initiatives include very positive improvements over their previously articulated positions. In contrast to the rather modest 1981 Draft Treaty, the new set of Soviet proposals covers a broad range of activities, including prohibitions on the use, threat of use, testing and deployment of all space-based weapons, as well as of all types of anti-satellite weapons. The scope of the new proposals seems to suggest a very real Soviet interest in dealing with the major issues posed by the space weapons competition:

There are a number of ambiguities in these proposals that will need to be resolved before the willingness of the Soviets to agree to meaningful limits on space weapons can be fully assessed. Some of these ambiguities might be regarded as an effort by the Soviets to suggest the possible scope and nature of an agreement without having to give away the store' in advance of actually signing a Treaty. Other ambiguities are of the sort that normally arise when translating from one language to another and could be readily resolved. However, some of the provisions of the Draft pose problems that are more substantive in nature and may pose greater difficulties. But the place for these ambiguities to be resolved is the negotiating table.

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