for the space program, except that the Soviet Air Force is in charge of astronaut training. The mechanisms the Soviets employ to ensure that the needs of all users of space systems are met is unclear.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I'd be happy to answer any questions that you or the members may have.

WRITTEN STAtement of MaRCIA S. SMITH

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be here today to discuss H.R. 3073, the People Protection Act. I have been asked to focus my statement on the proposal to establish a Unified Space Command for U.S. military space activities, and to provide some background on the military's involvement in the United States space program.

THE EARLY YEARS: COMPETING PROGRAMS

The Department of Defense (DOD) has played an important role in the United States space program since both began. When DOD was established in 1947, each of the services was conducting its own study of the utility of Earth orbiting satellites. One year later, James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, announced that these studies would henceforth be coordinated by the Committee on Guided Missiles in order to create an integrated program and eliminate duplication. Each service was assigned certain areas of research to perform. Thus began the attempts to coordinate input from the services.

In 1955, the United States officially announced that it would attempt to launch an earth orbiting satellite as part of the International Geophysical Year. By this time, the intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) being developed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency was moving along well and the Jupiter C was considered as one potential launch vehicle. In addition, the Navy was developing the less capable Viking sounding rocket, and the Air Force was building the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The decision on which to use in the satellite program was based on technical and political factors.

DOD selected the Navy to develop a satellite launcher because Viking (later renamed Vanguard) could be ready in the shortest period of time with the least impact on the schedule for developing IRBMs. From a policy perspective, President Eisenhower wanted to use non-military technology for the United States space program to convince the world that out interest in space was for peaceful purposes. The Vanguard launcher met this requirement in that it was a sounding rocket, not a missile, and was not based on IRBM or ICBM technology, even though the Navy was obviously a military organization. In addition to developing the rocket, the Naval Research Laboratory was charged with developing the satellite to be orbited (also called Vanguard).

Eisenhower's hope of placing the first U.S. satellite in orbit with this non-military technology was not to be realized, however. After an embarrassing failure of the first Vanguard launch on December 6, 1957, two months after Sputnik 1 was placed in orbit by the Soviets, the President was persuaded to allow the Army to use its Jupiter C to launch the Explorer 1 satellite, developed by the Army's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. This was accomplished on January 31, 1958. In fact, it is generally believed that the Army could have placed a satellite in orbit during a September 1956 test of the Jupiter C, but the President would not grant permission to fire the fourth stage of the rocket.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SPACE ACTIVITIES ARE SEPARATED

During the months immediately following the launch of Sputnik, there was considerable debate over what organization should manage the new United States space program. All three services felt they had the necessary expertise. On an interim basis, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, ARPA, was established under DOD early in 1958 to, among other things, nurse the fledgling space program.

Eisenhower still wanted a clear split between military and civilian space activities, so later that year, the Congress passed and the President signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act which created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to oversee civilian space activities, while responsibility for military space operations resided with DOD. The two Army organizations involved in space activities at that time-the Development Operations Division of the Ballistic

Missile Agency led by Wernher von Braun, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory— were transferred to NASA.

THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DOD SPACE ACTIVITIES EXPANDS

The first few years of military space activities were filled with intense interservice rivalry over who would have responsibility for what. Initially, the Air Force was given responsibility for developing reconnaissance and early warning satellites, the Navy for navigation satellites, and the Army for communications satellites, with all these activities coordinated by the DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

Lack of coordination continued to be a problem, however, and finally, on March 6, 1961, the Air Force was assigned primary responsibility for military space R&D by the Secretary of Defense. The Navy and Army were allowed to keep the program on which they were working (Navy's Transit navigation satellite program and Army's ADVENT communications satellite project), but the clear signal was that Air Force was in charge. The Navy has continued to have a significant role in space activities with both the Transit navsats and the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSAT COM) satellites, but the Army's involvement has diminished over the years. Several Army geodetic satellites were launched, but overall the Army is a user of space systems developed by the other services (with Army input as to its requirements). Currently, the Army's major involvement in space is in the field of ballistic missile defense. In addition to the military services, the intelligence community has developed its own requirements for satellite systems, but its role is classified so cannot be discussed here today.

As the years passed, the Air Force assumed an ever larger role in DOD space activities. In 1973, for example, the Air Force was placed in charge of the NAVSTAR satellite program (for navigation) even though the Navy had traditionally been responsible for this type of satellite. Air Force dominance in military space activities was further augmented by the emergence of the space shuttle program. Today, the Air Force spends about 90 percent of the money appropriated for U.S. military space activities. Of the $8.3 billion appropriated for DOD space activities in fiscal year 1983, $7.1 billion was for the Air Force, 0.5 billion went to the Navy, 0.4 billion to the Army, and 0.2 billion to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (the remainder is categorized as miscellaneous).

ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR FORCE AND NAVY SPACE COMMANDS

The Air Force establishment of a Space Command in September 1982, partly at the instigation of Congressman Kramer and this committee, was interpreted in many quarters as a recognition by that service of the role that space activities should play in future Air Force operations.

Nevertheless, the limited initial responsibility given to AF Space Command-control of weather satellites, early warning systems (terrestrial and space), and the Consolidated Space Operations Center, which is not yet built-left some question as to the level of commitment to this new organization. The relationship between Air Force Space Division (part of Systems Command), and the new Space Command was especially murky. The head of Air Force Space Division was made Vice-Commander of Space Command, but for all practical purposes the link between Space Division and Space Command was only a dotted line. The question remained as to whether Space Command would be the real force behind space planning, or if Space Division would play that role in addition to its R&D work.

In the past year, some of these issues have been resolved. It has been made known, for example, that once they are operational, the antisatellite (ASAT), NAVSTAR, and MILSTAR communications satellite systems will be assigned to AF Space Command. The emerging role of Space Command in developing long term Air Force goals has also been reported in the trade press. Still, the distinction between the "R&D" mission of Systems Command versus the "operational" mission of Space Command is not entirely clear.

Meanwhile, the Navy has established its own Space Command to provide a focus for its space activities. The interservice rivalry aspect of this has not escaped public notice, with some commentators suggesting that the Navy was concerned that if it did not move fast, the Air Force would walk away with all space activities.

DEBATE ABOUT A UNIFIED SPACE COMMAND

Thus, we reach the current situation where the Air Force and Navy have separate Space Commands, the Army does not have an equivalent organization, and the question has arisen as to whether there should be a Unified Space Command.

The United States currently has six Unified Commands: The European Command (USEUCOM); the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM); the Pacific Command (PACOM); the Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); the Central Command (USCENTCOM); and the Readiness Command (USREDCOM). The first five have area responsibilities, while the last has a functional mission that is world-wide.

Unified Commands are established in order to accomplish a broad, continuing mission by forces of two or more services in large-scale strategic operations; in a large area requiring single responsibility for coordination of unified operations therein; or requiring centralized direction over all assigned resources. These definitions would certainly seem to apply to space activities.

In considering whether or not to establish a USSPACECOM, some of the questions the committee might want to address include the following.

Should a Unified Command be oriented toward policy or operations?

There are some who see USSPACECOM as the answer to a perceived lack of policy coordination in the military to define and accomplish goals in space. The existing unified commands are designed primarily to coordinate action, though, not policy. Policy guidance is provided by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the goal is to create a more effective policy-making machinery, then perhaps attention should be paid to changing these existing mechanisms.

What assets should be assigned to a Unified Space Command?

Should a USSPACECOM have all U.S. satellite systems, including reconnaissance, navigation, weather, communications, and space weapons assigned to it? What about systems that technically are still in the development stage? The term "operational" is not well defined. Does it mean IOC (initial operational capability) or FOC (full operational capability)? For example, the NAVSTAR system will not be fully operational until 18 satellites are in orbit, but seven have been launched already and could serve a limited role in navigation. Would NAVSTAR remain under the jurisdiction of AF Systems Command until it was declared fully operational, or would it be assigned to USSPACECOM?

Currently, communications satellites are under the control of the Defense Communications Agency, Transit is operated by the Navy, and since the ASAT system is in development, it is managed by AF Systems Command. The organization responsible for reconnaissance satellites is classified so cannot be discussed here other than to say that it is not either Navy or AF Space Command. Would all of these systems be available to a USSPACECOM?

A related question concerns space assets belonging to our allies. NATO has its own communications satellites, and although the NATO countries do not have "military" satellites, they are developing systems which might be useful. The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, (CINCEUR) also serves as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, (SACEUR) so that in the event of hostilities all European forces can be marshalled together. Would a similar arrangement be developed for space assets, so that the "CINCSPACE" would wear a “SACSPACE” hat as well?

What role should service space commands play?

Should the Air Force and Navy Space Commands continue to furnish service input to a USSPACECOM, or could they be abolished to prevent duplication of effort and to save money, and instead simply have Army, Navy, and Air Force components of USSPACECOM? Conversely, would each service head want his own organization reporting directly to him instead of to a USSPACECOM to advise him on space matters?

How should a Unified Command be budgeted?

In recent weeks, I have been told that one reason the Air Force might be supportive of a Unified Command is the hope that the finding would be attributed in the DOD budget to the Unified Command itself, instead of to individual services, so that the $7-$8 billion for space activities that currently comes out of the Air Force budget would become available for other activities. The existing commands do not operate in this manner, however. Funding is provided through each of the services, and the administrative costs associated with the Unified Command are paid for by the service which hosts the headquarters; that is, if command headquarters is on an

Army base, the Army pays for the overhead. If USSPACECOM was headquartered on an Air Force base, then, the Air Force might have to spend more on space than it does now (although the overhead costs would probably be minimal).

Which service should head the Unified Command?

Would the Air Force be placed in charge of the Unified Command, or would leadership rotate among the various services, and if so, what would be the rotation schedule? Which service would be first? Which service would the Deputy Commander represent? One rationale that has been cited for creating a Unified Command is to allow each service to have a fair say in what space activities are pursued in a given budget year. Realistically, would this happen if one service were always in charge?

Traditionally, the Atlantic and Pacific commands are headed by Navy Admirals, while the European Command, Southern Command, and Readiness Command are headed by Army Generals. The Central Command is now headed by an Army General, but leadership may rotate between the Army and Marine Corps.

Is it time to establish a Unified Space Command?

Right now, there are relatively few "operational" satellite systems (recognizing the ambiguity of that term), although several systems are in development. How critical is it to establish a Unified Command in 1983 or 1984? Should this action wait until systems such as NAVSTAR and ASAT (if that program is continued) are operational? Until space-based ballistic missile defense issues are decided? Until a decision is made as to whether the Air Force should be assigned its own fleet of space shuttle orbiters? Or is it better to have the organization in place to facilitate transfer of these new systems to "operational" status and to provide planning directions for the future? This relates back to the previous question of whether the USSPACECOM would be established primarily for policy or operations.

SOVIET ORGANIZATION FOR SPACE

Mr. Chairman, I was also asked to comment briefly on how the Soviet Union coordinates its space programs. There is very little information available on the organizational structure of the Soviet program, other than to say that they have no equivalent of NASA to conduct "civilian" activities. The Soviets insist that their entire program is conducted for scientific reasons and "in the interest of the national economy," rather than for military purposes. This characterization is not accepted outside the Soviet bloc, however. In fact, Western analysis estimate that 70 percent of Soviet launches each year are for military purposes, and another 15 percent are for joint military/civil applications.

The Strategic Rocket Force is in charge of all Soviet space launches, and it would appear that it has overall responsibility for the space program, except that the Soviet Air Force (a functional equivalent of the U.S. Strategic Air Command) is in charge of astronaut training. The mechanisms the Soviets employ to ensure that the needs of all users of space systems are met is unclear.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman, as you know, congressional guidelines on CRS objectivity and nonpartisanship require that CRS staff confine their testimony to technical, professional and non-advocative aspects of the matters under consideration by Congress. I hope that my comments have been helpful in this regard. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or other committee members may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Any questions?
Mrs. Schroeder, do you have any questions?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. No, I just want to compliment the witness. Thank you.

Mr. KRAMER. I'd like to ask one question if I might.

I appreciate your testimony. It's good to see you again. This may be beyond the scope of your capabilities due to the disclaimers that you mentioned in your paper, but you have talked historically about service rivalry in the space program with a number of references to it. From a historical perspective do you have any nonpartisan opinions that you could share with us with respect to what the

creation of an all-service command has done in the past on interservice rivals?

Ms. SMITH. Mr. Kramer, I am not an expert on unified commands as such. As you know, I'm an expert on space activities, and I really don't think I'm qualified to answer that question.

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The next witness will be Mr. Henry Kendall.

STATEMENT OF HENRY KENDALL, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. KENDALL. Thank you very much. I am a professor of physics at MIT, and chairman of the Union of Concerned Scientists. The Union of Concerned Scientists, a public interest group, for some time has had an interest and has conducted studies in the area of space defense, antisatellite weaponry and similar matters.

I am grateful to the Armed Services Committee of the House for holding this hearing on the very important topic of defense against ballistic missiles. Before I start my summary of my testimony I would like to note that Prof. Hans Bethe of Cornell had hoped to appear as well, but was unable to attend. He prepared a written statement in which the Union of Concerned Scientists full concurs, and which I would like to submit for the record.

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF HANS A. BETHE

I am grateful to the House Committee on Armed Services for holding this hearing on the very important topic of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). During the 1960's I devoted a very considerable effort to BMD research and to advising the government in this subject. I continued to have an active interest in BMD in my capacity as a consultant to the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories. I therefore wish to express my appreciation to the Committee for affording me this opportunity to express my views.

Everyone would like to escape from the dreadful threat of mutual assured destruction. The People Protection Act, which is before this Committee, seeks to achieve this goal by endorsing the President's call for a defense that would not only protect our citizens against nuclear attack, but would even “render nuclear weapons obsolete". To that end it proposes a far-reaching reorganization of government that would create new civilian agencies and new military commands charged with the mission of developing and deploying space-based directed energy weapons. In so doing it would profoundly alter the very foundations on which our national security rests.

Before launching the Nation on this new path, Congress must address itself to some fundamental questions. In particular:

(1) Does current scientific knowledge provide us with tangible evidence that an effective defense of civilians against nuclear missiles can be created?

(2) What would be the most probable Soviet response to the initiatives called for by the People Protection Act?

As we shall see, the projections that one can make from our present scientific knowledge unambiguously show that the directed energy technologies required for an effective population defense are, in almost their entirety, far beyond the current state of the art. At best, many years would be required to transform the concepts that have been proposed into working weapons systems. On the other hand, a host of highly effective countermeasures against these far-off weapons are already know today. The Soviet Union will, without a doubt, adopt some of these countermeasures. A more ominous Soviet reaction should also be anticipated: a large buildup of offensive forces that would culminate in a far greater nuclear threat to our own population, and in a strategic balance between the superpowers that would be much more unstable in crisis situations.