eral comparison, aren't we substantially behind the Soviets in both third generation and short wave length laser technology based on what you know?

Dr. DELAUER. Mr. Battista, I prefer not to comment because you've mixed a lot of things in there and in open session I would not care to comment on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much Mr. Secretary, for your cooperation.

The next witness will be Hon. Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. PERLE. Thank you Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before this session today.

Following the President's speech in March of this year two broad tasks were assigned to the Government as a whole and the Department of Defense in particular, an assessment of the broad rangeing, relevant technologies and systems which you've heard summarized by Dr. DeLauer this morning, and an analysis of the strategies and arms control implications of the underlying principle that the President sought to establish in his speech, which is the desirability of defense. This work has now been completed and submitted to the President. He has yet to choose from among the options that have been presented to him and there are still other options, so all I can do at this moment is make some very broad comments about the implications of defense for strategy and arms control, and renewed interest in defense.

One of the most important findings in the deliberations that have taken place within the administration is that defense against ballistic missiles has the potential for increasing deterrence and stability. One often hears the view expressed that movement in this direction would actually reduce stability. We've come to quite the opposite conclusion. Defense against ballistic missiles would significantly reduce the utility of preemptive attack. The preemptive attack is the single most significant threat to the stability of the nuclear balance.

You could accomplish this by increasing the uncertainty an attacker would face in a contemplated nuclear strike or in our retaliatory capability. Depending on what technologies are developed and the success that we have in the technical dimension, defenses could significantly decrease the incentive to deploy and maintain MIRV'd ballistic missiles. If we were successful in developing boost phase intercept capability, there would be little advantage in concentrating large numbers of warheads on missiles when several such missiles could be destroyed in this phase of the missiles flight. There are, and would continue to be, uncertainties about deterrence. There is nothing easy or automatic about it, and I think that would be true if we were to add defensive technologies to our present array of offensive forces. There will always be uncertainties about the ultimate effectiveness and vulnerability of any defensive system. We recognize that. There clearly are future uncertainties about the size, composition, and vulnerabilities of offensive

forces as well, and the overall United States-Soviet military balance will be important.

With respect to arms control, let me be very clear. The President's initiative is consistent with the full array of treaty obligations the United States has undertaken and will continue to be in this technologically oriented effort. The initial stage of the President's initiative contemplates only research on a broad range of defensive technologies and under the existing treaty arrangement, research on defensive technology is permitted. Indeed similar research is going forward at a significant pace on the Soviet side and has been ever since the 1972 ABM treaty was signed. We believe that the President's initiative is complimentary to our goals and objectives in existing arms control negotiations.

We are trying to bring about significant reductions in offensive forces. We will continue to do so. Defensive forces have the potential for reducing the value, the premium placed on ballistic missiles, and in that sense they believe that they can increase the likelihood for negotiations with respect to offensive forces.

I might take just a second to remind this committee that when we agreed in 1972 to significant constraints on the deployment of ballistic missile defenses, we did so with the understanding that there would be subsequent negotiated constraints on the size of United States and Soviet strategic arsenals. The United States contends that without such constraints, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized and constitute a basis for the withdrawal from the treaty. I would only note that the SALT treaties provided no such restraints and that the decade since SALT I has been a nearly unrestrained increase in Soviet strategic forces.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The second bell has rung. The members must leave. We'll recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon. Dr. DeLauer, I'd like to ask one question.

Does the administration support H.R. 3073?

Dr. DELAUER. That's this bill? I'd like to just remind you, Mr. Chairman, that our position was stated very clearly in the letter to you on the 26th of September signed by Mr. Taft, and that still remains our particular position.

The CHAIRMAN. That's still the administration's position?

Dr. DELAUER. Yes.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

[Whereupon, a recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. This morning the committee heard the testimony from the Department of Defense witnesses. We have questions. We will submit them to the Department for the record.

This afternoon we'll hear Ms. Marcia Smith, analyst assigned to the science policy research, Congressional Research Service.

STATEMENT OF MARCIA S. SMITH, SPECIALIST IN AEROSPACE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Ms. SMITH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it's a pleasure to be here today to discuss H.R. 3073, the People Protection Act.

As you know, congressional guidelines do not permit CRS staff to take positions on matters before Congress so I've been asked only to provide some background testimony on the military's involvement in the space program and to discuss some of the questions that Congress might address during consideration of whether or not to establish a unified space command. My prepared statement goes into the background of DOD space activities. In the interest of time I will skip over that part of my statement now, and say only that the Army was responsible for developing the first U.S. satellite, Explorer, and placing it in orbit. The Navy had originally been chosen to develop a satellite launcher but after an embarrassing failure of the Vanguard rocket in December 1957, the Army was given the go-ahead to use its vehicle for that purpose and it was successfully accomplished on January 31, 1958.

During the months immediately following the Soviet launch of Sputnik there was considerable debate over what organization should manage the U.S. space program. In a sense the first U.S. space agency turned out to be a military organization, the Advanced Research Projects Agency which served to, among other things, nurse the fledgling space program. In 1958 Congress passed and the President signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act which created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] to oversee civilian space activities while leaving military activities to DOD.

The first few years of military space activities were filled with intense interservice rivalry over who would have responsibility for what. Initially the Air Force was given responsibility for developing reconnaissance and early warning satellites, the Navy for navigation satellites, and the Army for communications satellites, with all these activities coordinated by the DOD Director of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Lack of coordination continued to be a problem, however and finally on March 6, 1961, the Air Force was assigned primary responsibility for military space R&D by the Secretary of Defense. The Navy has continued to have a significant role in space activities, with both the Transit navigation satellites and communications satellites. The Army's involvement has diminished over the years however. The two Army organizations which developed and launched Explorer, the Development Operations Division of the Ballistic Missile Agency led by Wernher von Braun, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory were transferred to NASA, and overall the Army is a user of space systems developed by the other services. Currently the Army's major involvement in space is in the field of ballistic missile defense.

The Air Force's role in space has grown over the past decades and in fiscal year 1983 the Air Force was appropriated $7.1 billion for space activities. Another $1.2 billion was appropriated that year for Army, Navy, and DARPA space-related activities.

The Air Force establishment of a Space Command in September 1982, partly at the instigation of Congressman Kramer and this committee, was interpreted in many quarters as a recognition by that service of the role that space activities should play in future Air Force operations.

In the past year the role of the Air Force Space Command has become more clearly defined. For example, it has been made known that once they are operational the antisatellite, NAVSTAR navigation satellite, and MILSTAR communication satellite systems, will be assigned to Air Force Space Command. The emerging role of the Space Command in developing long-term Air Force goals has also been reported in the trade press.

Still, the distinction between the R&D mission of Systems Command and its space division versus the operational mission of Space Command is not entirely clear.

Meanwhile, the Navy has established its own Space Command to provide a focus for its space activities. Thus, at the current time two of the services have their own space commands and the question has arisen as to whether there should be a Unified Space Command.

The United States currently has six unified commands, five of which have geographic responsibilities while the sixth, the Readiness Command, has a worldwide functional responsibility. Unified commands are established in order to accomplish a broad continuing mission by forces of two or more services; large scale strategic operations in a large area requiring single responsibility for coordination of unified operations therein; or requiring centralized direction over all assigned resources. These definitions would certainly seem to apply to space activities.

In considering whether or not to establish a USSPACECOM, some of the questions the committee might want to address include the following.

Should a Unified Command be oriented toward policy or operations? There are some who see USSPACECOM as the answer to a perceived lack of policy coordination in the military to define and accomplish goals in space. The existing Unified Commands are designed primarily to coordinate action, though, not policy. Policy guidance is provided by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the goal is to create more effective policymaking machinery, then perhaps attention should be paid to changing these existing mechanisms.

What assets should be assigned to a Unified Space Command? Should the Unified Command have all U.S. satellite systems, including reconnaissance, navigation, weather, communications, and space weapons assigned to it? What about systems that technically are still in the development stage? The term "operational" is not well defined. Does it mean IOC, initial operational capability, or FOC, full operational capability? For example, the NAVSTAR system will not be fully operational until 18 satellites are in orbit, providing worldwide three dimensional data. IOC is when sufficient satellites are in orbit to provide worldwide two dimensional data, which is a lesser number of satellites. When would a system like this be transferred to an operational command?

A related question concerns space assets belonging to our allies. NATO has its own communications satellites, and although the NATO countries do not at this time have military satellites, they are developing systems which might be useful. The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, [CINCEUR] also serves as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe [ŠACEUR] so that in the event of hostilities

all allied forces in Europe can be marshaled together. Would a similar arrangement be developed for space assets, so that the CINCSPACE would wear a SACSPACE hat as well?

What role should service Space Commands play? Should the Air Force and Navy Space Commands continue to furnish service input to USSPACECOM, or could they be abolished to prevent duplication of effort and to save money, and instead simply have Army, Navy, and Air Force components of USSPACECOM? Conversely, would each service head want his own organization reporting directly to him instead of to a USSPACECOM to advise him on space matters?

How should a Unified Command be budgeted? In recent weeks, I've been told that one reason the Air Force might be supportive of a Unified Command is the hope that the funding would be attributed in the DOD budget to the Unified Command itself, instead of to individual services, so that the $7 to $8 billion for space activities that currently comes out of the Air Force budget would become available for other activities. Funding is provided to the existing Unified Commands through each of the services, rather than as a single line item in the budget, however, so if this arrangement were chosen for USSPACECOM it would be a change in procedure, although I understand that the House Appropriations Committee is considering changes along these lines.

Which service should head the Unified Command? Would the Air Force be placed in charge of the Unified Command, or would leadership rotate among the various services, and if so, what would be the rotation schedule? Which service would be first? Which service would the Deputy Commander represent? One rationale that has been cited for creating a Unified Command is to allow each service to have a fair say in what space activities are pursued in a given budget year. Realistically, would this happen if one service were always in charge?

Is it time to establish a Unified Space Command? Right now there are relatively few operational satellite systems-recognizing the ambiguity of that term-although several systems are in development. How critical is it to establish a Unified Command in 1983 or 1984? Should this action wait until systems such as NAVSTAR and ASAT-if that program is continued-are operational? Until space-based ballistic missile defense issues are decided? Until a decision is made as to whether the Air Force should be assigned its own space shuttle orbiters? Or is it better to have the organization in place to facilitate transfer of these new systems to operational status and to provide planning directions for the future?

Mr. Chairman, I was also asked to comment briefly on how the Soviet Union coordinates its space programs. There is very little information available on the organizational structure of the Soviet program, other than to say that they have no equivalent of NASA to conduct civilian activities. The Soviets insist that their entire program is conducted for scientific reasons and in the interest of the national economy, rather than for military purposes. This characterization is not accepted outside the Soviet bloc to the best of my knowledge.

The strategic rocket force in the Soviet Union is in charge of all Soviet space launches, and it appears it has overall responsibility