variable; and fo is every thing of pofitive ap- SERM. pointment and inftitution. But juftice and III. mercy, gratitude and truth never alter; the learned and the unlearned, the most uninftructed and the most polite nations agree in their notions concerning them; and whenever they are intelligibly propos'd, approve them. It is therefore evident, that morality is a part of the human conftitution, and must be attributed to its author. Let this be underftood in a sense agreeable to the nature of the thing. I do not mean that we are neceffarily virtuous, as we are fenfitive and intelligent; or that the practice of virtue is so esfential, that no man can poffibly be without it; (for the very notion of it imports free agency or choice;) but I mean, that the mind of man is fo fram'd, as, when it attains the full exercise of its rational powers, to be neceffarily fenfible of moral obligations; and fo far determin'd to fatisfy them, that it can-. not wilfully and defignedly act a contrary part, without doing violence to itself; which is all the neceffity that is confiftent with the nature of fuch a being, and the nature of morality. If it be fo, we may furely infer, that the cause of this conftitution was intelligent. Since all the individuals of mankind are found to have a fenfe of virtue, and every one SERM. one of them who reflects upon it must be conIII. fcious that it is engraven on his heart, prior to any intention of his own, or any inftruction that he knows of, it must either have happened without any defign at all, or it must have been defign'd by the Author of our being. To say that moral agency, which is fo univerfally the character of men, that without it no one can be reckon'd perfectly of the kind, and which is of so great importance, not only to the ornament and conveniency of life, but to all the highest purposes of our being, fo far, that the want of it would make an effential difference in the fpecies; to fay that this is merely accidental, in other words, that there is no cause to be affign'd for it at all, is too grofs an abfurdity to require any confutation. If our minds can reft fatisfied with that folution, there is an end of all rational enquiry; it may be faid every thing came from nothing, and there is no caufe to be fought of any perfection whatever. But if this be what we cannot poffibly acquiefce in, (and indeed I will venture to fay no man can, however he may force himself to a stupid inattention) there is nothing left to conclude, but that we were made moral agents by an intending intelligent Cause. I do not at prefent carry the argument so far as to infer from it the moral per III. perfections of the Deity, tho' it will very well SER M. bear even that; but he that will shut his eyes against the evidence of understanding and defign in the formation of the human nature, as we fee it is form'd univerfally, with a sense of virtue and vice, good and evil, right and wrong in actions, and with a neceffary approbation of the one and difapprobation of the other; I fay, he that can fhut his eyes against this evidence, is hardened beyond the power of reasonable conviction, and is no more fit to be argued with. Thus I have endeavoured, by a distinct confideration of the various works of God in the inanimate, the animal, the rational and moral world, to prove his Being, that is, (which was the point to be prov'd, and is directly the point in controverfy between us and Atheists) that the formation of the universe and all its parts, is to be attributed to an active in-telligent and defigning Caufe. But if this be fo clear as we alledge, how comes it to pass that any of mankind should deny it; nay, that men, in whofe writings there is a confiderable appearance of reasoning and learning, profeffedly maintain the contrary principle? That men fhould be ignorant of God may be accounted for from their inattention; nor is it any prefumption at all against the truth of his Being 7 SERM. Being and Attributes; fince we know in a- mankind are ignorant of the most certain To remove this prejudice which may arife in some minds from the profeffion of Atheism by learned men, let it be observed, First, That other great abfurdities, contrary to the cleareft evidence, even that of sense, have in like manner been advanc'd by philosophers themselves, whether from an affectation of fuperior knowledge, enabling them to puzzle the plainest truths and confound vulgar understandings, or from whatever other cause it proceeded, the fact is certain, that the most extravagant opinions have been vented with a fhow of strong arguments to fupport them, and demonstrations have been boafted of to prove what all mankind by their eye-fight knew to be falfe. It is very well known that. Zeno and other philofophers have pretended to prove by demonftrative reasons that there is SER M. not, nor can be any fuch thing as motion. III. Secondly, The nature of this subject is such, that our weak minds must neceffarily be embarrass'd in their conceptions of it: The necef fary existence and abfolute perfections of the fupreme Being, which our reason obliges us to afcribe to him, are fo far beyond our comprehenfion, that we cannot poffibly form an adequate idea of them. How can we, seeing all things about us in the world circumfcrib'd within certain bounds, conscious of limited existence, a limited power and understanding, and a short duration, comprehending infinity an eternity which muft belong to the first Caufe of all things? This incomprehenfiblenefs, and these difficulties in conceiving what is fo high above us, have been magnified by men, thro' the pride of their hearts, into strong objections against the truth, otherwise fully evident; and a fond conceit of their own abilities, which made them scorn to acknowledge any thing too hard for them, was the fatal fnare which betray'd them into the most horrid impiety. Thus, by what they called wisdom, or by a falfe fhow of knowledge, they know not God, tho' he manifefted himself clearly to them by his works. Thirdly, The opinions concerning the Deity, which someVOL. I. G times |