and by fome sketches of eternal truth, which SER M. we ourselves are enabled to difcern with de- III. light, we have not only clear evidence that the first of Beings, the original Cause of all things, is himself intelligent, but are led to a more enlarged view of what is the agreeable, tho' to us incomprehenfible object of his eternal contemplation.

3dly, This will ftill more fully appear, if we confider moral qualities and truths, which evidently appear to our minds, and are of the greatest importance to the ends of our being. Without entring into the detail of thefe qualities and truths, which may be fuppos'd to be fo far known as is neceffary to our prefent purpose, I fhall only make the following obfervations concerning them. Firft, That they are intirely abstracted from the external fenfes and their objects. Other animals which have thofe fenfes in common with us, give no dif covery of their having any notions of morality; and are not reckon'd moral agents, which is the highest and peculiar character of rational beings. How could the external senses lead us to any fentiments of virtue, which has not the least relation to any qualities of mat→ ter, either primary or fecondary? What resemblance have justice and benevolence to the figure and motion of bodies, or what affinity F 2 with

SERM. with colours, founds or tastes? Nor indeed III. do the ends of fenfitive life require fo fublime a fenfe as that of morality; the prefervation of individuals and of the kind, and their usefulness to other fpecies of beings in their manner, which are its highest apparent purposes; these ends, I say, are all answered by lower inftincts.

2dly, Moral qualities, which have no other fubject than the affections of the foul, and actions proceeding from them, tho' intirely independent on matter and all its properties, are yet real, and neceffarily regarded by our mind as fuch. A fenfe of moral beauty and deformity in human characters and actions, is as natural as a fenfe of another kind of beauty and deformity in corporeal forms; nay, our minds as neceffarily perceive a difference between cruelty and mercy, gratitude and ingratitude, temperance and debauchery, as between light and darkness, sweet and bitter, harmony and difcord, which we diftinguish by our external fenfes. The idea of virtue, whether in ourselves or others, is always accompanied with approbation, and vice with dif like. An excellent moral character conftantly attracts our esteem, and a vicious one cannot be confider'd otherwise than with averfion; a beneficent action is applauded, and a cruel

one

one condemned, abstracting from any advan- SERM. tage or disadvantage to ourselves arifing from III. either. We review virtuous difpofitions in our own hearts, and virtuous works flowing from them, with the highest fatisfaction, and the contrary are unavoidably attended with remorfe. It is true, that there is a great variety in the practice of virtue, which in fome inftances is attended with embarraffing circumstances, and in our present state there are many things to divert our attention from it. On these accounts and because of negligence, corrupt customs, the prejudices of education, and particularly falfe notions of religion, fome may have far less knowledge of virtue than others, and the virtuous affections may be weaker in them; but a sense of morality, (capable indeed of more or lefs improvement, according to our opportunities and the degrees of our attention and diligence,) feems to be indelibly imprinted on our nature, fo that we can no more diveft ourfelves of it altogether, than we can put off humanity itself.

3dly, As moral qualities, and truths concerning them, are real, and neceffarily regarded by our minds, fo they are of the greatest importance to the happiness of mankind. This I have hinted already with refpect to particular perfons; having obferv'd that the

F 3

peace

and

SER M. and fatisfaction of their minds depends, in a great III. measure, upon an inward confciousness of virtuous difpofitions, and the defigned regulation of their conduct by them. I believe every man will find by experience, that he is not able wholly to extinguifh his fentiments of morality, nor without the utmoft violence to obfcure and weaken them fo, but that his heart will condemn him for his crimes; nor can he arrive to an unmanly ease in his vices, 'till after a long courfe of affected ftupidity and fottifh infatuation; which is reproachful to the rational nature, and takes away the trueft felf-enjoyment. How unhappy are wicked men by their wickedness? What a train of miferies and misfortunes in the present state, arise from debauchery and fenfual exceffes; from fraud and violence? But if there be intelli

gence in framing the human nature, and appointing the condition of men, it must extend to the whole kind. And indeed morality may be therefore pronounced important to our natures, because it does not only in a fenfible manner affect the intereft of fingle perfons, but the greatest collective bodies of them, nay, the intire fpecies. Let any one imagine the whole human race to be without the least sense of virtue, of the fear of God, of good-will to mankind, of the excellence of honefty, gra

titude,

titude, fidelity, temperance, and the turpitude SERM. of the contrary, fo that there fhould be no- III. thing left but the fear of perfonal outward danger and inconveniencies to prevent the most licentious rage of unruly deftructive paffions, and all the mischiefs they could produce; how miferable, upon fuch a fuppofition, would our ftate be? It may be reasonably question'd whether the kind could have fubfifted fo long, or any remain'd to have inhabited the earth; but at least it is certain, life must have been a dull, uncomfortable, inelegant and infipid thing, in comparison of what it now actually is, unadorned with thofe arts and inventions which are owing to the fecure poffeffion of peace and liberty, unimprov'd by fcience, and deftitute of the high pleasures of friendship, and all kinds of delightful focial entertainment: (not to speak of a future state, the happiness of which (if there really be fuch a thing) muft neceffarily depend upon virtue;) nor is it poffible for the mind of man, calmly and deliberately to judge otherwise; and of that future ftate we have constant premonitions in our own prefaging thoughts, (fo strong as moft fenfibly to affect the comfort of our prefent being,) without, at least, any poffible fecurity against it.

F 4

Now