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SERM. could not poffibly have been otherwise than it III. is, or any of its parts otherwife than they are,

in this fenfe that it would imply a contradiction in the nature of things. For that is in effect to deny all free agency, and all wisdom in the formation of the world; which is, I think, already prov'd by convincing arguments. But if that the world could not be otherwise than it is, fuppofes intelligence, and therefore means that of all poffible fyftems appearing to his own mind, the Creator chofe that which in the whole, was the fittest and the best;―This neceffarily implies what I just now faid, namely, that other models or defigns were equally in his power, and all alike actually in the view of his understanding, prior, I do not fay in time, but in our order of conceiving, to the determination of produ cing the fyftem which now actually exists. This feems to be the true meaning of Plato's ideas, which he reprefents as the original forms and exemplars of whatever is in being; that is, the conceptions of the divine moft perfect intellect, in which the whole fcheme of exiftence was laid; tho' fome of the latter Platonifts turned his doctrine to an absurdity, (and perhaps he gave too great occafion to it himfelf,) calling thofe ideas not only archetypes and patterns, but living fubftances and phyfi

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cal causes, nay, a fort of deities. Here then SERM. we find in the univerfe, not only intelligence, III. directing the frame of nature, finishing all the particular forms in it, and appointing them their proper places, difpofing the whole circle of being, and guiding the intire series of causes, with their operations; but an understanding not limited by the universe itself, reaching to the utmost bounds of poffibility, and comprehending all conceivable effences or intelligible forms, relations, connexions and dependencies of things.

2dly, As thefe abftract ideas appearing to our minds, are the materials of all our science which is not converfant about fingular existence, and in proportion as they are difcerned by every mind, they are the materials of its knowledge; fo upon comparing them refults Truth, (for it confifts in their agreement,) which is another real and important object of the understanding. Our minds are made with a defire to discover truth, and they reft in it when found, with great fatisfaction; tho' our knowledge of effences is very imperfect, and what we call the effences of natural things actually exiftent, that is, our own abstract ideas of them, are for the most part little more than nominal; yet the perception of their agreement is to us certain truth, and we acquiefce

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ŞER M.acquiefce in it with pleasure: But that mind III. which thoroughly comprehends the real na

tures of things, having form'd them with all their properties and powers, muft fee an, infinity of truths in their various relations, which we cannot difcern. Let it be especially obferv'd, that our principal and most fatisfying knowledge is purely intellectual, the subject of it being our own ideas, which abstract intirely from exiftence. For example, the points, lines and figures which are the subject of mathematical demonftration, are not perceived by our fenfes, nor fuppofed to have a senfible existence, but only are our own ideas abftracting from all matter, really form'd, or imagin'd to be form'd into such figures; those ftraight lines, curves, triangles, fquares and other figures, whose properties, mutual relations, equalities and proportions are demonftrated, perhaps could none of them exactly, certainly fome of them could not be exempli fied in bulky materials, nor do the demonstrations concerning them depend on that, the fubject of them being only our own ideas; yet no man who understands them will fay they are chimerical, fince he fees real truth in them, to which he cannot refuse his affent: nor can it be reasonably faid that they depend wholly on the mind, and are its arbitrary combina

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tions of its own ideas; for it cannot make SERM. truth or falfhood, but must confider them as III. independent on its own pleasure, and equally real whether it difcerns them or not. It remains then that geometrical theorems and other propofitions, (for I mention them only as examples,) are eternal verities, the fame at all times, and, as fome of the ancients speak, ingenerable and incorruptible, alike true whether any human mind perceives them or not, nay whether any human mind exifts or not. But were these eternal neceffary truths altogether unknown before any human mind exifted? No, they were the proper objects of eternal neceffary intelligence, fubfifting in the eternal mind. The occafion of our discerning them is taken from the works of God; it is from corporeal beings we get the ideas of figures and numbers; (tho' the abstract ideas we form of them, are not fenfible but intellectual,) and the fame may be faid concerning the fubjects of other self-evident, or demonftrated propofitions. Now has God fcattered over his works fuch traces of intelligence, that very imperfect obfervers are led by them to fee, and be delighted with truth, and shall himself not discern that fame truth? Nay, must he not have difcern'd it from everlasting, fince from everlasting it was equally difcernable by a perVOL. I.

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SER M. fect understanding, which comprehended the III. effences, that is, the ideas of things with all

their relations, whence that truth neceffarily refults? Surely we have no mental perfection but what is derived from the eternal Mind, the Father of our fpirits. If then we are endued with a power of difcovering truth, (which we cannot reflect upon without having pleafure in it, as an excellence in our nature,) he must have possess'd that power in a more eminent and perfect manner before we had a being, and the truths which were eternally knowable, must be to him eternally known. Human science lies within a narrow compafs, but certainly it is one of the most delightful entertainments the mind can have. What pleasure does it give to fome at leaft, to fee a propofition demonftrated, which comprehends, and to full conviction determines the relation of a great variety of things, for example, the proportion of many different lines or figures? And can we imagine that our nature, in every part of its conftitution carrying the plaineft marks of understanding and defign, could be made with a sense of beauty in fuch truths, and yet the defigning Author of that nature, be ignorant of them? Thus we behold the divine wisdom manifested in the intelligible as well as the fenfible world,

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