to each other, as to make up one regular whole. SER M. But above all, that understanding which we III. are confcious of in ourselves, even conftrains' us to acknowledge the fupreme eternal Mind as its Author. For if inanimate matter form'd into a system, discovers his glorious wisdom and activity, much more his own living image in our perceptive and felf-determining powers. This last well deferves a more particular confideration, as containing a peculiarly illuftrious manifeftation of the divine wisdom; and I hope, by a due attention of what paffes in our own minds, we shall find ourselves obliged to recognize the All-ruling intelligence of our Maker, and to adore him who is perfect in knowledge. At least, fuppofing the former reasoning to be juft, what I fhall further offer upon this fubject, will give us a more enlarged idea of the divine understanding, which is the principal point in our prefent inquiry.

Here I fhall confine myself to what is called pure intellection, that is, thofe exercifes of the mind which abftract wholly from the external fenfes, and the sole object of them, fingular corporeal exiftence. For tho', as I obferv'd before, the fenfitive and intellectual powers are imploy'd about the fame object, apprehending it in a very different manner, yet are there intelligibles, indeed thofe of the fublimeft kind, in which we have the greatest certainty

SERM. certainty of knowledge, as well as the nobleft III. mental entertainment, which do not at all

'fall under the perception of the fenfes; fuch as the abftract ideas of natures or effences, eternal truths and moral qualities, which have all of them, tho' no fenfible existence, yet an important reality, and the ideas of them in the eternal mind are their original archetypes.

First, Abstract Natures or Effences are reprefented by fome as the mere creatures of the human understanding, taking occafion from the apparent fimilitude and diffimilitude of things to form abftract notions of their feveral different kinds, which no where fubfift but in the understanding itself; at the fame time referring to the internal conftitutions of things, the true caufe of the apparent fimilitude and diffimilitude of their outward forms. These internal conftitutions are the real Effences, for the most part unknown to us; and the effences which are the objects of our apprehenfion, are therefore called nominal, because the true interior nature of things, whereby they are what they are, complete in themselves and invariably distinct from all others, lie too deep for us to discover. Now tho' this may be a fair representation of the method in which the human understanding proceeds, and the true origin of its ideas of Effences, (which being pofterior to individual existence,

existence, and derived from it, can be no SERM. more perfect than our knowledge of indivi- III. dual exifting things) yet it leads us by clear reasoning to conclude, that there is a more perfect knowledge of Effences, which abftracting from actual existence, can only fubfift as ideas in a mind, but it must be a mind infinitely more perfect than ours.

To fhew this, I shall take leave to borrow an observation from a celebrated author, who gives the very account of Effences which I have been mentioning. He tells us, that we know the Effences, and distinguish the fpecies of artificial things, with far lefs confufion and uncertainty than natural things, because an artificial thing being a production of man, which the artificer defign'd, and well knows the idea of, the name of it is fuppos'd to ftand for no other idea, nor to import any other Effence than what is certainly to be known, and eafy enough to be apprehended. He might have said, that every fenfible Artificer must perfectly know the real effence of his own work, fo far as it is his own, however ignorant he may be of the nature of the materials, stones, timber, iron, filver, gold, or whatever they are, which another intirely unacquainted with the mechanic art, may understand much better; yet the proper difpofition

Locke's Effay on Human Understanding, Book III. Ch. VI.

SER M.pofition of the parts, and joining them fitly III. together, fo as to make one compleat fabric or machine, which is his own work, he must know; and his understanding reaches to a thorough comprehenfion of the defign, which is its true effence, before he begins the manual operation. Now applying this to the great Artificer of nature, who stretch'd out the heavens by his wisdom, and establish'd the earth by bis difcretion, we must conclude, that fince he was the intending Cause of the world, and exercis'd active intelligence in the formation of all things, the plan was form'd in his All-comprehending mind. In other words, the defign or the archetypal ideas of the true Effence of things, fubfifted in his understanding before the things themselves actually had a being: for who can imagine such an inconfiftency as intelligence in the operation and not in the intention? Can a work be made with wisdom, and wisdom not be prior to it, or the parts of a ftructure fo put together as to fhew wife contrivance, without the Agent's having laid a scheme before-hand, and formed a model by which his proceeding fhould be directed?

But further we must conceive in a defigning caufe, freedom and choice, especially in a complicated production, which comprehends

a great

a great variety of parts. One general end is to SER M. be obtain'd, taking in many which are fubor- III. dinate; a vast variety of means are prefented" to the mind, the fittest of which are to be chofen, and the reft rejected. This to imperfect understandings is the cause of long deliberation upon their projects; they take time to compare the means which offer themselves to their thoughts; and try which, upon the whole, as far as they can judge, are the most convenient; but without a plurality of fuch means or parts, we can have no notion of wisdom exercis'd in the work, for it confifts in a choice or preference of the best and fitteft. Now when we furvey the world, fo much of it as is known to us, (how extenfive actual existence is beyond our fight or the reach of our understandings we cannot poffibly tell,) containing fuch a multitude of beings as cannot be numbered, all form'd and difpos'd with intelligence and design, shewing that the ideas of them fubfifted before in the mind of the author; what a vaft variety of ideas, (we lose ourselves in imagining it,) must we fuppofe to have been in the fame underftanding, that there might be room for that preference, which we cannot help thinking, is abfolutely neceffary to the exercise of wifdom in his works? No one can say the world

could