tintire fyftem? But now that I find myself SERM. "in fuch a fituation, what am I to do? I. "There are instincts in my nature, which "prompt me to various actions and enjoy "ments; I am furnished with the inftru

cr

ments of fenfation and motion, I fee, and "hear, and taste, and smell, and feel; I can move the organs of my own body, and "by them fome other bodies, merely by an "act of my own will, or the voluntary exer❝tion of an inward felf-determining power; "I have hunger and thirst at certain return

ing feafons, and am readily fupplied with "meat and drink, whereby this body is nou"rish'd and fenfibly refresh'd. This is common with me to a multitude of living things in different fhapes, with which the "earth is for'd: but I find in myself the << powers of reafon and higher affections, "whereof they give no difcovery, which "leads me to conclude there is a nobler end "of my being, and I am capable of a greater happiness. I can reflect, compare my own perceptions of things, and inquire into their origin and tendencies; I perceive at "first view some truths, and they give me pleasure; I inveftigate others by a delibe"rate attention to my own ideas, and to "their agreement and relations, ftill with a

I.

SERM." growing fatisfaction; I am confcious of li"berty or a freedom of choice, and the ideas "of

of right and wrong in action, naturally oc"cur to me; I must therefore be directed in

my conduct by a regard to that difference; "I find benevolence to fenfitive beings, ef

pecially those of my own kind, naturally " arise in my mind, together with reverence "and gratitude to a fuperior nature, the suppofed author of my existence and of all my enjoyments; which affections, as they reflected on with delightful felf-approbation, a more excellent enjoyment than any fenfible object can yield; fo they are "accompanied with a defire to please that fuperior Being, and be approved by him. "But how fhall I continue poffefs'd of exist

are

ence, with all the variety of enjoyment "that belongs to it, which is fo very defira"ble? And fince experience convinces me "that the present life is frail, and has in it " a mixture of unhappiness, what prospect "have I of a future ftate, (for the thoughts of

falling again into nothing fill my mind "with horror;) and how shall I attain to the highest perfection I am capable of? For it plainly appears that, at least, the nobler powers of my nature may admit of a more "various exercise than the prefent, and a fur

"ther

<<ther improvement. All that is poffible for SERM. “me to do, as an intelligent agent, whereby I. "I may contribute to my own happiness, "and anfwer the end of my being, is to fol"low the guidance of my own reason and "what nature points to, confidering the "whole of my conftitution, and preserving "the just fubordination of its lower, to its fuperior parts: and for the continuance of my being, and what additional felicity I may defire or expect, I must hope in the "fame fupreme power and goodness, to which "I owe all that is now in my poffeffion."

If these are the inquiries and the fentiments which the mind of man, unbyass'd by any prejudices or prepoffeffions, would naturally fall into; (and whether they are or not, let any one judge, who carefully attends even to the most obvious appearances in the human constitution,) we may confider whether they are not very becoming us. It is true we grow up to the exercise of our reason gradually; the first part of life is pafs'd over with very little reflection; the world is become familiar to us; we have learn'd the use of things, and opinions concerning them, which engage our affent and our affections, before we come to that maturity of understanding which is neceffary to qualify us for a thorough and raA 3 tional

SER M. tional examination. But neither the familia

I.

rity contracted with our own existence and
the world, (we cannot but be fenfible, that
our knowledge of both is of no long ftand-
ing,) nor any prejudice we may have received
in a childish immature state, should divert us,
when we have attained to the full ufe of our
reafon, from attending fuch important in-
quiries, which the leaft felf-reflection will
fhew to be every way worthy of men. Whe-
ther our inquiries will rationally end in reli-
gion, founded on the belief of a Deity, is
what I am now to confider. This, however,
feems to be the plainest and most natural way
of attaining fatisfaction in that great point;
For by the Deity we mean the powerful, wise
and good parent of mankind, the maker,
preferver, and ruler, of the world; and how
fhall we know him but by the characters of
his perfections ftampt upon his works? Thus
the apoftle argues in my text, That which
may
be known of God is manifest to men, for
God bath fhewed it unto them (by their own
reafon.) For the invifible things of him from
the creation of the world, are clearly feen, be-
ing underfood by the things that are made,
even his eternal power and godhead.

ge

It is certain, the belief of a Deity has nerally obtained among mankind. Excepting

the

vour;

the objects of the mind's immediate intuition SE'R M. and of fenfe, concerning which there can be I. no difpute; excepting these, I say, perhaps there is not any one point to which Men have more univerfally given an explicit affent, than the Being of God. This is thought, by fome, to be a strong prefumption in its fafor they alledge, nothing but the clear irrefragable evidence of truth could have induced all nations of the world to agree in it. As to vulgar opinions, acknowledged to be erroneous in other points, fuch as the magnitude and distance of the heavenly bodies, the cafe is very different; for there the error plainly arifes from inattention, and forming a judgment too hastily upon the report of sense, concerning appearances which it cannot examine. But in fuch a point of speculation as the existence of the Deity, to the knowledge of which we are led by our own moft obvious reflections, and which the more it is attended to, the more firmly it is believed; an uniform agreement feems to proceed from the voice of nature, or God himself speaking intelligibly to every nation by his works. There is, undoubtedly, in the human mind, a knowledge of things which are not the objects of fenfe, nay inftances reason corrects fenfe, and discovers its mistakes: in

in many