II.

be produc'd by an agent himself percipient, SER M. either in that or a more perfect manner. Wherefore the reasoning related in Cicero *, is extremely weak, when in oppofition to Socrates's argument already mentioned, viz. whence did we derive our reafon, if there be no fuch thing in the world, it is alledged one may as well afk, whence had we numbers, mufick or speech?—And again, if the argument be good, that because there is understanding in us, therefore it must be originally in the world, by the fame argument it may be prov'd, that the superior intelligent in the world, must be an orator, a mathematician, and a philosopher. Nor is their reasoning any better who pretend, that if life and understanding in the effect require life and understanding in the cause, whereby we find ourfelves oblig'd to acknowledge these powers eternal and unmade, by the fame argument it may be prov'd, that fenfible qualities must be attributed to the original Cause, and there muft be, for example, an eternal unmade red and green. The answer to all which is very obvious, that none of thefe qualities mentioned require to their being, any thing diftinct from the animal and rational powers with their proper exercife; and therefore it is by no

* De natura Deorum, Lib. 3.

means

II.

SERM. means neceffary to fuppofe, that they belong to the original author of them: Whereas life and understanding, indeed the lowest perceptions, imply a perfection which paffive unpercipient powers, merely of themselves, can never reach to; and therefore they must be produc'd by another cause, to which either they formally, or a fuperior excellence muft be afcrib'd. Upon the whole then it is арраrent, that the secondary qualities of corporeal nature, as they are called, being really and properly no more than modes of perception, not the particular application of the human faculties, as in finging, fpeech and philofophy; I fay, that none of these have any thing parallel to the cafe of intelligence, to weaken the force of the argument from its being in the world to prove that it must be eminently in the cause of it. But leaft of all is there any pretence for alledging, that from our reafoning it may be inferr'd, that the cause of paffive matter must have its properties, fuch as figure, divifibility, &c. as well as that the cause of intelligence muft be intelligent. For daily experience fhews, in numberless inftances, that intelligence produces effects very unlike itself, and of a quite different nature; whereas not only no inftance can be alledg'd to show that figure, divifibility, &c. ever did produce confscious

11.

fcious intelligence, but it is impoffible that SERM. ever they should. For, as has been obferv'd, extended divisible matter, with all its changes and modifications, can never produce any thing to which thefe its effential properties do not infeparably belong; therefore not intelligence.

In this reasoning I have abstracted from the queftion concerning the poffibility of matter's being endued with thinking and active faculties, which fome wife men have thought too difficult for us to determine; alledging, that the human understanding does not fo thoroughly comprehend the nature of thought and of corporeal fubftance, as to be able to judge with certainty, that the latter may not, by the power of God, be made the fubject of the other; tho' they agree that matter, with its paffive powers and all its known properties, could never poffibly of itself have produc'd any degree of intelligence and activity. This is what I have afferted, and therefore that the human, rational, and felf-determining faculties, whatever the subject of them be, could not poffibly proceed from unintelligent matter and motion, or the fortuitous concourfe of atoms, which is all that Atheists mean, or that, I conceive, can be meant by undefigning neceffity or chance; confequently, that active intelligence must be self-original in nature. Nay, VOL. I. E

if

SERM. if we should suppose that there is no fubftance II. diftinct from body, and that the Deity himself

is corporeal, if it be allow'd that he is the intelligent Cause of all things, this as truly overthrows the caufe of Atheism, as the jufter principle of his eternal spiritual nature. Some Atheists have been so sensible of this infuperable difficulty which preffes their scheme, namely, to account for the rife of thought from unthinking matter, without the agency of a defigning Cause, that rather than abandon their fundamental principle, that there is nothing in the universe but mere matter with its modifications, they have fled to that most abfurd hypothefis, that all matter and every fingle atom of it, is intelligent: which, not to mention any more reasons, other Atheists themselves have refuted by this invincible one, -that then every living intelligent being, particularly every man would be, not a single perfon or intelligent agent, but a multitude or a fyftem of them, contrary to what every one is confcious of. But the opinion of the Atomifts is, if poffible, yet more extravagant; who from the figure, magnitude and motion of parts, confeffedly void of fense and understanding, would raise perception and consciousnefs, effentially different from all modes and compofitions of magnitude, figure and motion;

which is to suppose a real and distinct perfec- SER M. tion to be produc'd out of nothing, or with- II. out a cause.

may

It be objected against all this, that if from the order and harmony of the visible world, and from a multitude of fenfitive and rational beings, we justly infer a designing Cause; fuppofing this to be true, and that order and harmony, intelligence and activity are in the divine mind, what is the reason of this? And may we not prove by the fame argument, that it must be attributed to a prior caufe? I anfwer, our argument is not, that of everything which has being, or which is wife and good, there must be a caufe; but that, as in all other cafes, by various marks of contrivance in any work, the human mind is naturally led to acknowledge an intending author; fo in this cafe, by the clear evidences of defign in a numberless variety of inftances, even all parts of the known universe, the inanimate, the fenfitive and the rational, we find ourselves oblig'd to recognise an understanding and defigning Caufe. And here we may reft. If there be an intelligent Author of univerfal nature and of all the appearances we can difcern in the whole world, of their mutual relations, connexions and dependencies, he is the God for whom we enquire. A fearch after unseen Causes of unseen E 2 Caufes