SER M.deavoured to prove the wisdom of the Deity by II. the beautiful order of the material world, and

particularly the frame of the human body, he argues to this purpofe,-That as every man is confcious of a mind, an intelligent principle within him, he is thereby led to acknowledge understanding in the world without him. For, as in the compofition of our bodies, there is deriv'd to us a part, and but a very small part of the folid, the liquid, and other ingredients, in the mighty mafs of furrounding matter, it would be very strange, if reafon, which is our higheft excellence, fhould come to us by fome lucky chance from nothing, or no intelligent caufe; and that there should be no fuch thing originally in the univerfe or the whole of being, when yet we fee the plain marks of it in the orderly difpofition of all things.

The Stoics us'd just the fame reasoning; and added, that as in the human conftitution, fo in the intire fyftem of things, the whole is more excellent than a particular part; that it would be extreme vanity in mankind to fancy themselves the head of the universe, being indeed but a very small part of it; and that which comprehends and prefides over all, must have in itself all absolute perfection, from which every real perfection scattered through the world is derived.

It was a received maxim among the an- SER M. cients, but very differently understood, that II. Nothing can come from Nothing. Not to enter into the confideration of the use which Atheists made of it against the creation of matter, which our prefent argument does not require, the maxim in this sense is most certainly true, that nothing can be produc'd, without a fufficient caufe in order of nature before it; and that no real * perfection can be in the effect, which is not in the cause, either actually or virtually: For if it were, that perfection would be produc'd without a cause, or by nothing, which is a direct contradiction. Now, applying this to the point before us, the question is, how came intelligence into the world, if not from an intelligent cause? The Atheist may, if he pleases, ridicule what we call perfection; for indeed his principles tend to level all things, and destroy the beautiful fubordination which there is in nature;

but

* The word Perfection is here ufed, as it is commonly, without explication. For understanding it the better, and to prevent mistakes, we may obferve, that as the human mind cannot avoid difcerning a difference in things, it as neceffarily, upon comparison, prefers fome to others. The measure of this preference in our judgment, is the fense we have of natural and moral Good. By perfection therefore is meant, a capacity of enjoyment, or a capacity of virtue, which we can't help apprehending real, and valuable in the degree wherein it is poffefs'd; and where it has the plain appearances of an effect, we can't help apprehending, as in all other effects, an equal or fuperior in capacity is the Caufe.

SERM.but it is furprising, that any one poffefs'd of II. rational powers should think fo meanly of

them. Is there no excellence in confcious thinking, with all its various modes; in reasoning; in the discernment of truth, and an intellectual progress in discovering it; in the exercife of liberty by a rational self-determination, and of our best affections, with the various enjoyment they afford; is there, I fay, no excellence in all this above the qualities of pasfive unintelligent beings? But though I think the human mind can scarcely help acknowledging a fuperior excellence in the intellectual and moral capacity, far furpaffing the, powers of incogitative and merely paffive being, which therefore must owe itself to a superior intelligent caufe; yet waving this confideration, 'tis impoffible to doubt of the thing itself, that there actually is what we call understanding in man. Let us fee then, if the rife of it can be accounted for without a prior intelligence as its caufe. Suppofing, tho' ever fo abfurdly, all the appearances of corporeal nature not to require, to their being and their order, the direction of any defigning Agent, but that their magnitude, figure, and all other qualities, proceed from unguided moving force, or the fortuitous jumble of their compounding parts; the question is, if intelli

gence

gence with all its modes is thus alfo to be ex-SERM. plained, and if it has been ftruck out in the II. fame neceffary or cafual manner? And any attentive person will be convinc'd, that this folution is altogether infufficient, and indeed extremely unreasonable. For all the visible phænomena of inanimate nature, whatever diversity there may be in their exterior appearance, carry the marks of their internal constitution, having ftill infeparably belonging to them, the effential properties and primary qualities of that whereof they are compounded, such as folidity, divifibility, figure, its capacity of motion and reft, to which it is in its own nature indifferent, not capable of itself, to change its ftate from either to the other, but always yielding to force; intelligence can never be the refult of these, any or all of them, or any compofition or change of them. For let magnitude, figure and motion be ever fo much altered, compounded or divided, they can really produce nothing but magnitude, figure and motion: But perception and consciousness have no relation to thefe; our ideas of them are as diftinct as any can poffibly be. What resemblance has consciousness to motion or figure? Or, by an attentive confideration, must not every one perceive, that reasoning and volition have not the

leaft

SERM.leaft affinity with magnitude or divisibility? II. And if, by the most apparent distinction of our

own ideas, we may not conclude a real difference of things, there is an end of all certainty, and our knowledge is reduc'd to utter confusion.

The secondary qualities of paffive unintelligent being, fuch as colours, founds, tastes, refulting from the various texture, difpofition, and motion of its parts; (and our adversaries may suppose that all perceptions arife in the fame manner as they do ;) these secondary qualities, I fay, are really no more than our own fenfations, not the modes of external objects but of thought, requiring themselves a peculiar principle for the fubject of them, and therefore a fuperior power to produce them; confequently, instead of being an argument to fhow that understanding might poffibly take its rife from unthinking matter and its modifications, they really ferve the quite contrary purpose. If ever there had been nothing in the world but paffive matter and motion, however compounded and diversified, not only there never cou'd have been any fuch thing as consciousness, but indeed there never could have been fo much as colour, found and tafte, fince these are only modes of perception, and therefore peculiar to beings indued with a perceptive power, which could only

be