IX.

voluntary Maker of all things, difpofing the SER M. whole frame of nature as it pleased him, and continually governing it by his own immediate agency, nothing can be hid from him. If in all that variety of being, and all the appearances which are in the univerfe, from the greatest to the leaft, from the utmost circuit of heaven to the center of the earth, there is nothing which his hand has not form'd, and his providence does not direct, every thing must be thoroughly known; for wherever his power works, there his understanding difcerns.

This confideration leads us to form an idea of the Divine knowledge as different from, and infinitely more perfect than ours, even with respect to those objects which are, in fome measure, known to us. It is from a reflection on our own understandings we take our rife to the apprehending of that perfection in the Deity; but we ought not to imagine. that things appear to him in the fame manner they do to us. Nothing is more evident than that different perceptive powers have different views of the fame object. Our reafon in many cases corrects the report of our senses, and fees things in quite another light; much more is it to be thought that an infinitely perfect mind fees not as man fees, that things are known to him, not in a remote and distant

SERM. way, by their external appearances and efIX. fects, as they are to us, but that his underftanding penetrates into their inmost natures, and difcerns clearly all their properties and powers. The little knowledge we have, was given us for particular purposes, not for a thorough comprehenfion of things; nor are they, any of them, put abfolutely into our power, to govern and to use them every way, and for all the ends they are capable of serving, which would require a thorough underftanding of their nature, attributes, and powers of every kind. We difcern by our fenfes fome qualities of material objects; rather they are the occafion of exciting certain ideas in us, whereby the bountiful author of nature has made them useful to the preservation, the conveniency, and the enjoyment of life. Our reafon goes a little farther, discovering by obfervation, and by attending to the connexions and dependencies of things, other properties and relations, which may be applied to useful purposes in life, and afford various entertainment to the mind; ftill however there remains a great deal unknown to us, indeed the human understanding seems to be unequal to the comprehenfion of any thing. But the Maker and abfolute Governor of all things knows them perfectly, not by external appearances

pearances and effects afcending to the difco- SERM. very of causes, as we do; but as he formed IX. the plan of the whole univerfe and the intire extent of being, in his own counfels, he fees effects in their caufes, having by the free determination of his own will, given them whatever measure of power and perfection they poffefs. None of thofe effences can be hid from him, of which he had the perfect idea in his own mind before the Being actually existed: He can be ignorant of no property, virtue, or efficiency, (nor any thing that can be effected by it) which is derived wholly from himself; all the powers of nature, with the remoteft confequences which depend upon them, must be at once in his view; and feeing he has all the creatures abfolutely under his dominion, difpofing of them at his pleasure, and actually does govern them by the immediate exercise of his power, he must have, not a partial knowledge like ours, of fome particular uses they serve, but a thorough understanding of their utmost capacity.

Befides the wide difference which there is between the knowledge of God and that of finite beings, particularly mankind, in the extent of them, both with respect to the number of objects, and the discernment of their nature, properties, relations and ufes; the one

SER M. is narrow and confined to a few things, the IX. other reaches to the whole circle of being; the

one is fuperficial and inadequate, the other fees its object on all fides; difcerns not fome only, but all its relations, and not the exterior appearances and effects only, but its very effence and the secret fprings of all its operations. Befides this, I fay, there are other important differences, relating to the manner of knowledge; and to the apprehending of those differences we are alfo led, by obferving the exercife and progrefs of our own understandings in various inftances. There are fome of our perceptions perfect in their kind from the very beginning: Our original fimple ideas are fubject to no alterations, capable of no improvement; the ideas of colours and other senfible qualities remain invariably the fame; the consciousness we have of our own existence, our powers, perceptions and operations, is always clear and determinate; not only fo, our knowledge of fome truths is diftinct and compleat, from the first moment of their being intelligibly propofed, without any difficulty or labour in reasoning, and this knowledge is called intuitive. But there are other things in the knowledge of which we make proficiency, and proceed to the discernment of them by degrees. We can variously compound

pound and affociate our ideas; we obferve SERM, their connexions and differences, their agree- IX. ment and disagreement; and from one truth clearly perceiv'd, we go on to the discovery of another, which, according to the measure of evidence that appears in the connexion, is judg'd certain or probable. Such is the narrowness of the human mind as not to be able to perceive actually at once, all things which it has known; and this defect is in some meafure supplied by memory, or the revival of ideas which were in it before. This progrefs of our understandings, arifing from their limited capacity, evidently fhews their imperfection, and must be attended with difficulty, confufion, and uncertainty in fome part of our knowledge, which probably in fome degree, all finite beings are fubject to. But the fupreme Mind is perfect in knowledge; all things are clearly perceiv'd by it, and all their connexions, differences and relations, without any confufion, obfcurity or uncertainty. The variety and multiplicity of the objects cause no perplexity in his understanding, which is large enough to contain them all, without being embarrass'd or forgetting any thing. There is no creature that is not manifeft in the fight of God, but all things are naked unto his eyes and opened, even to their inmoft effences; and

without