SERMON IX.

The true Notion of Divine Omnifcience, of its Nature, Manner and Extent.

SERM.
IX.

I

Pfalm cxlvii. 5.

His understanding is infinite.

Have cbferved on another occafion, that

the main controverfy between Atheists

and believers in God, is concerning his intelligence. None of the infidels, whether ancient or modern, have in express terms denied the being of God; but by that word they mean, not a particular defigning and perfect Agent, the Maker of all things, (which is the true notion of the Deity,) but either blind unintelligent neceffity, to which they attribute the existence of the world and every thing it contains, as the cause of all, or universal substances, comprehending the whole universe and all beings in it. As therefore in oppofition to these abfurd notions, we have

full

full convincing proof of the existence of one SE RM. Supreme Being abfolutely perfect, the Maker 1X. and governor of the world; by the fame clear evidence we know, that intelligence is a primary and effential attribute of his nature. And as this is what all his works teach us, the inanimate, the fenfitive and the rational parts of the creation, join in proclaiming the understanding of their Maker; so without acknowledging it, we can have no right conceptions of him at all. The idea of a being without knowledge, even fuppofed eternal, immenfe and all-powerful, as that fignifies not a voluntary activity, but a ne ceffary cause, is really an idea of nothing at all to the purposes of religion, of nothing which can raise any admiration, honour and esteem, and is indeed of no importance to us. The worship of an ignorant Deity is the reproach of human nature; as no tolerable apology could be made for the Heathens, who ferved idols that had eyes and faw not, and ears but heard not; fo none can be made for us, if we pay our religious homage to a being supposed void of understanding, whatever other perfections we afcribe to him, which are really no perfections at all in the deliberate esteem of the human mind.

VOL. I.

T

I

SERM. I fhall not now attempt to prove the inIX.telligence of the Deity in general, for that has

been already done by the arguments which prove his being: nor do I pretend to give a compleat idea of the Divine knowledge, which it is not to be imagined we can comprehend, for that were to fuppose that our understandings are like his, infinite: But my intention in this discourse is, to make such obfervations concerning the nature, the manner and extent of it, as may give us a juft and magnificent, tho" imperfect idea of that adorable perfection, and tend to produce those pious difpofitions, and that dutiful refpect which it claims from us.

First, It is certain that the knowledge of God extends to the whole compass of existence. Since all things that have being are either God himself or his works, it is impoffible that any thing should be unknown to him. He is the most excellent of all objects, and the most incomprehenfible by us; but yet a reflection on what paffes in our own minds will lead us to this conclufion, that his perfections which infinitely tranfcend our capacity, are in the nearest and most immediate view of his own understanding: For all the conceptions, and all the actions of intelligent beings, with the principles from which they

proceed,

proceed, are accompanied with consciousness. SER M. Of all the fubjects to which we apply our IX. thoughts, our own faculties and the exercise of them are the moft clearly difcerned, and the best understood by us. We know every idea that is prefented to our minds, every imagination, every defire and volition, every enjoyment; the self-conscious spirit of a man knows every thing in him; and so we must judge concerning all intelligent beings, even to the highest and most comprehensive understanding. Now if God thoroughly knows his own perfections, if he knows his eternity better than we do our temporary duration, and his immenfity more perfectly than we do our limited condition of being; if he knows his own perfect comprehenfion of things, but as clearly as we do our fenfations, and his Almighty power, as clearly as we difcern the limited activity of our minds;-This is an extent of knowledge which feems to follow neceffarily from the fuppofition of his intelligence, as evident as his being, but must appear to us very great, the object being of all others the most above our understanding, and paft our finding out. Indeed God's knowledge of himself, of the proper exercise and unlimited perfection of his own powers, may be faid in fome fenfe to be the knowledge of T 2

all

SER M. all things; for the utmost bounds of possibility
IX. do not exceed Omnipotence, and the whole

compafs of truth is within the reach of infmite
understanding. I have obferved elsewhere, *
that the Effences of all things must, before the
formation of the univerfe, have been known
to the eternal Mind, as every wife
agent forms
a defign in his thoughts before he executes it.
Can any thing be difficult to him who fees all
things in the firft Caufe, the whole frame of
nature and all its parts, with the intire feries
of events from the foundation of the world, in
his own counfels; who fees them, I say, with
as great clearness, and with as great certainty,
as we do the perceptions and determinations
of our own minds?

But it is directly and immediately evident, that the whole of created exiftence is perfectly known to God, because it is all the work of his hands, and upheld by the word of his power. Every voluntary agent must be fupposed to understand his own productions; the fkill of the meaneft artificer reaches to the limits of his own art; tho' he may be unacquainted with the nature of the materials he works upon, he knows the labour he bestows on them, and the compofitions, figures, and other fenfible effects which depend upon own operation. Since therefore God is the

his

volun

* SERM. III.