within our observation and experience, that SER M. no materials of our knowledge can furnish us VIII. with any notion of it: and this is an operation which we ascribe to Almighty God.

Some indeed have prefum'd to affert, that creation in this fenfe, is in itself abfolutely impoffible; fo that it pass'd into an axiom with the ancient Atheists, which they relied on as the chief support of their cause, that nothing can come from nothing. Nay, fome Theifts themselves are faid to have acknowledg'd it, fo far as to affert the eternity of matter, which however they believ'd was still fubject to the Power of the co-eternal Deity, to modify and dispose of it at his pleasure. But tho' I grant that this philosophic opinion does not utterly deftroy the first and main principle of religion; and a man, not altogether inconfiftently with his believing the being of God, may entertain the notion last mentioned, that is, concerning the eternity of matter; yet I must observe, that these philofophers feem not to have duly confidered the true notion of abfolute eternity, which includes felf-existence, neceffary existence, and independence; characters, which can never reasonably be attributed to merely paffive unintelligent things, and therefore, as has been already fhewn, they cannot be abfolutely eter

nal,

SERM. nal, but their very being as well as their forms VIII. and appearances, must be produc'd by the

Divine Power. But indeed if we attend to the propofition itself abstractly, that Nothing can come from Nothing, we fhall fee no rational foundation, upon which it could be received as a certain truth in this fenfe, that nothing can poffibly be created, or no real entity begin to be. What appearance is there of a contradiction in supposing that matter, a kind of being fo imperfect, intirely paffive and liable to fo many mutations, should begin to exist, or that it should cease to be, by the efficiency of a powerful agent? Is there any abfurdity in conceiving that there might have been more or less of it than there actually is ? nay, is not that a fuppofition which our mind's come easily into? And if so, there can appear no abfurdity in placing it within the compass of creating power. One can scarcely imagine what should have led men into such a way of thinking, as that creation in the ftricteft fenfe, is impoffible; unless it be that they are fenfible it is above their own power, and above the ordinary operations of nature which we difcern. But fhall we measure all power by our own fcantling, and conclude there is none greater than what we poffefs, at least, that we can comprehend, when there are

num

numberless appearances daily in the world, the SER M. productions of an invifible Power, which we VIII. neither have ability to effect, nor can underftand the reasons of them.

Yet methinks, if we attend to the operations of our own minds, the formation of new being needs not appear fo ftrange to us, as to give any occafion for imagining it to be impoffible. For tho' our minds are unequal to the production of new fubftances, yet their works are fo far above the operations of matter, which are the objects of our senses, that creation is not more unlike the highest efforts of the human capacity. The rifing up of new ideas and fentiments in the mind, and new difpofitions; its giving by its own activity a new determination to the exercise of its own faculties; and raifing an intirely new motion in fome bodies;-1 fay, creation is not more unlike these, than they are to mechanism ; which fhews us that operations of one fort can give us no idea of another. But we have no reafon on that account, to deny the poffibility of them. Suppofing an intelligent being to have no idea offelf-determining power,(which is no impoffible fuppofition, for there does not appear to us any fuch connexion between the ideas of perception and felf-determining action, but that they may be feparated ;) fuppo

SER M. fing this, I fay, fpontaneous action would seem VIII. as ftrange to fuch a being, as making fome

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thing out of nothing does to us: And there would in that cafe, be the fame reason for denying the poffibility of the former, that any man has for denying the other; indeed there is no more reafon in either cafe, than a blind man has to deny that there is, or can be, any fuch thing as light or colours.

But why should any man imagine that the power of bringing things into being from pure non-existence, is abfurd, who, reflecting on himself, is naturally led to conclude, that he began to be, and therefore is an instance of a new substantial production, by creating Power. Every man knows that his own personality, that is, his consciousness had a commencement, and is of no very long duration; (for the arbitrary fuppofition of the pre-existence of fouls even from eternity, we may pass by, as a conceit not worthy of our notice, being fupported by no kind of evidence; nor is the creature here spoken of a new spiritual substance abstractly, but a new perfon;) and fince this thinking conscious Self, a fubftantial Being, of whofe existence we have the greatest certainty, began to be, not of itself, but produced by a Cause, it may be to us a fatisfying proof of creating Power. For, what greater difficulty

difficulty can there be in conceiving that God SER M. made heaven and earth, than in conceiving VIII. that be formed the felf-confcious fpirit of man within him? Is matter any more real than the principle of thought and volition? And could not the Power which gave existence to the one, also produce the other? To fay that the fpirit is no more than a certain modification or quality of matter, arifing from the figure, compofition and motion of its more fubtle parts, is a pretence which I have elsewhere difprov'd, and fhall not now confider it. But without entering into any inquiry concerning the nature of fubftances, material or immaterial, and the power they may poffibly be endued with, of which we have very little knowledge; any man who calmly attends to the beginning of his own personal existence, that is, of his confcious thinking, must see in it an exertion of power of which he can form no diftinct idea; and which he cannot but be convinc'd is to him as inexplicable as the creation of the material world.

But tho' creation in the ftrictest sense, or making things out of pure nothing, is far from being abfurd, (indeed there lies no just objection against it; for its being incomprehenfible to us is no argument at all, fince it does not appear to our minds impoffible, or to imply VOL. I.

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