that a mind vastly more capacious than any of SER M. ours, tho' far from abfolute perfection, might VII. animate, (and in a more perfect manner,) a corporeal fyftem to which this little human tabernacle is but a point in comparison. And will any one then venture to say, 'tis impoffible that the most perfect mind fhould perceive and operate through the whole folar fyftem, nay, and whatever fyftems there are beyond it; when we have fo clear evidences of his wisdom and power in all parts of the universe, which we have any knowledge of, the most minute, as well as the greatest? He must have very little confider'd the nature of fpirits, fo much as may be known of it, and the very different degrees of their perfec tion which even fall under our own obfervation, who will call it an abfurdity to fuppose that the spirit, which is the fountain of Being and understanding, comprehends all his own works and rules over them, tho' it is ridiculous to imagine we should know the manner of it, for that were to suppose our capacity equal to his.

I do not intend by this to reprefent God as the Soul of the world, which is a very low and unworthy notion of the Deity. He had the fame immutable Being, Power and Wifdom before it was made, and is not now

con

SERM. confin'd to it, though the manner of his exiftVII. ence in immenfe fpace, is what we have no

idea of; and to fuppofe that his intelligence and operations have such a dependence on external created objects, as ours have upon bodily organs, and that he is fo affected with the motions in the universe and its changes, as we are by the impreffions made on our bodies by external objects, and the motions thereby caused within them;-to fuppofe this, I fay, were an evident abfurdity. I only propofe by this low and imperfect image, to affift our weak understandings in forming an idea of his intimate prefence with, and univerfal care over all things in the world, preferving it and wifely fuperintending its affairs; that as in us, there is one individual confcious felf, that fees, and hears, and feels, and determines for the whole body, fo in the universe there is one confcious intelligent Nature, which pervades the intire system; at once perceiving in every place, and prefiding over all, yet in an infinitely more perfect manner, and free from those infirmities which attend our conftitution. But it is especially to be observ'd, (and indeed the example I have made use of for illuftrating this fubject, helps to guard us against fo grofs an error,) that we must not conceive of the Divine pre

fence,

fence, after the manner of corporeal magni- SER M. VII. tude, which being effentially divifible, cannot be all in one place, but its different parts take up different spaces, and its operation, (if it can be faid to operate at all,) can only be by the fucceffive prefence of its parts in motion. Whereas the Omniprefence of the Divine Spirit, is only apprehended by the exercise of his power and understanding, (which does not include the ideas of extension or fucceffive motion,) in all parts of the world; his intelligence and activity are confin'd to no place, and no where excluded. To speak of the Immenfity of God as if it were a fingle point co-extended with infinite space, is the fame abfurdity as defcribing his eternity by an instant which co-exists with all duration. Such unintelligible fubtleties, whereby the doctrines of religion are pretended to be explain'd, tend to confound mens understandings, and bring religion itself into contempt. What appears eafily conceivable on this subject, (because our own consciousness furnishes us with fome refemblance of it in ourselves,) is, that the fame fimple being may exert its perceptive and active faculties, at the fame time, in different parts of space. And if this can admit of no difficulty, because we have an example of it in our own minds, which perceive and

operate

SERM. in all parts of the body, then to compleat the VII. idea of Omnipresence, we need only enlarge

our notion of that space which is the sphere of active intelligence, to the whole extent of the univerfe; and I think we cannot avoid apprehending that God is, wherever he exercifes his power and understanding, tho' the manner of his prefence is to us, incomprehenfible.

One falfe imagination ought carefully to be avoided, which may be apt to arise in our minds, from our method of forming the notion of the Divine Omniprefence; namely, that the multiplicity of objects which engage the attention of the Supreme Understanding, may embarrass it. Suppofing God to be every where, intimately near to all beings in the univerfe, as our fouls are to our bodies; and fince all things in the world are not equally confiderable and worthy of care, it may feem more refpectful to the greatest of beings, and a conception more fuitable to his dignity, to imagine that his immediate infpection is employ'd about matters of the highest importance, leaving easier affairs to inferior agents; as the most eminent perfons on earth who fill exalted stations, do not defcend to minute things which would be thought beneath them, attending only bufinefs of greater moment.

This mistake is occafion'd by our being ac- SER M. cuftom'd fo much to think of the narrow hu- VII. man capacity, which not being able to take in a great variety of objects at once, finds itself obliged to make choice of the more important and neceffary for its attention, and it is certainly wifdom to do fo: But it is a wifdom which at the fame time implies weaknefs. No one can doubt of its being a higher perfection to comprehend a great multitude of things, fo as to beftow the neceffary care upon them, without neglecting any; and it is the highest perfection of all, appropriated to the felf-existent unlimited Being, the first Cause, to comprehend the whole universe at once, difpofing wifely of every, even the least thing in it; which being fufficiently evinc'd by strong arguments, it would be very unreasonable in us to doubt of it, merely because it so vastly tranfcends our capacity. The feveral kinds of finite intelligent beings in the world have their limited spheres of perception and activity: There is a determin'd extent to which they can reach and no farther; a certain number of objects fall under their observation, and their perceptions of thofe objects and their operations upon them, are of very different kinds. The lower fort of understandings can have no notion of the manner of perception,

and