SER M. a conftant neceffary dependence on the intelVII. ligence from whence they are deriv'd. It has been already observ'd, that the ideas of fenfation, which we find in our minds neceffarily and independantly of our own choice, on the occafion of certain objects, do not arise from the nature of things, nor can we account for them from any knowledge we have, either of the objects, or the powers of our own minds. They must therefore be refolv'd into the free conflitution of our intelligent Maker; which feems not merely to fignify his general will, establishing a connexion between objects and our fenfations, but rather is to be understood as his continued operation, fince the exertion of fome power is neceffary to produce new perceptions, and there appears no other agent; for we are conscious that our minds, in receiving these ideas, are as paffive as the objects which are the occafion of them. The fame judgment, I think, is to be made concerning our natural instincts; the mere being, and the first motions of which are, properly speaking, neither virtuous nor morally evil, fince they are not our own works: (for experience teaches us that they prevent any thought, deliberation or defign of others, and do not depend on our will;) But as they are of great ufe to the purpofes of our nature, tending, all of them, ei

ther

ther to public or private good, 1 fee no rea-SER M. son why they may not be attributed to the VII. operation of that great intelligent Cause, in whom we live and move and have our being. And for those powers of human nature which are the most strictly and properly active; (tho' we are inwardly confcious of freedom in the exercise of them, and of merit and demerit in the actions proceeding from them, yet) that freedom must be infinitely different from felforiginal and uncaufed liberty. For our felfdetermining activity, being derived and dependent, known by experience to be capable of increase and dimunition, and very much directed and influenc'd by things without us, not in our own power nor within the reach of our understandings, needs the continual fupporting influence of the firft Cause, who worketh in men both to will and to do. In short, if we judge by what we see in things about us, and find in ourselves, we cannot conceive that any creature is, or can be, plac'd in a state of independence on its author, for its preservation, and for its exerting powers of any kind; but that he is, and must be intimately near to all his works, upholding them by his power, and conducting them by his wisdom; thus manifefting his eternal Godhead. Having thus endeavour'd to prove

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the

omni

SERM. omniprefence of God, in that fense which is VII. to us the most important and the most useful, that is, not the abfolute immenfity of his nature, of which our notions must be fcure and inadequate, but his being at once in all parts of the univerfe, and intimately near to all his creatures; let us in the next place.

very

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2dly, Endeavour to form the most clear and diftinct conceptions of it, we can. Since we have the ideas of extenfion, and of place, by the means of fenfible objects, the primary notion of prefence is that which belongs to them, and it is fuch as excludes all others of the fame kind, I mean all solid substance. For it is the property of every particle of matter to fill a certain part of space, so as no other can poffibly be in it, at the fame time. But there are other beings of which we have different conceptions; namely, of their activity and intelligence, not at all including extenfion and folidity: Yet thefe beings we conceive to be prefent, or in place, not indeed after the manner of bodies, as impenetrably filling certain parts of space, but by the exertion of their powers. We know by consciousness the exiftence of our own fpirits; and we know by their operations, that they are in our own bodies fo as they are not in others. The fame individual percipient and active principle with

in us, extends the exercife of its perceptive SER M. and active faculties to all the parts of the fy- VII.

ftem which it animates, and to that it is confin'd. Our manner of perceiving objects without and within that which we call ourselves, is exceedingly different: Upon its own body the mind acts immediately, and only by the intervention of its members can act upon other bodies. In our bodies therefore our fouls are peculiarly prefent. But it is easy to apprehend that other fpirits may have a largerfphere of perception, and a wider command of matter; at the fame time a higher perfection in both, that is, they may have a more complete knowledge of the fyftems they inhabit, and a more abfolute dominion over them. For as to us, it is certain that we do not thoroughly understand even our own constitution, and its economy is not put intirely in our own power; (which may not be the cafe of other intelligent beings,) our perceptions in it, and government of it, being both of a limited nature, and given to us only for particular ends.

From this we may take our rife to a notion of the Divine omnipresence, in the sense in which I am now confidering it; I mean, we may conceive of it in this manner, that the Deity has a comprehenfive knowledge of the whole

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SERM. whole univerfe and every part of it, and VII. that he exercifes an abfolute uncontrouled power over all. If any one will fay this is hard to be understood; how can one mind comprehend so vast a variety, or be capable of fo extenfive a government? I own that fuch knowledge is too high for us, we cannot attain to it, but there is no inconfiftency in fuppofing it. Let us first try to explain, if we can, how our minds perceive at once, the different impreffions made on distant parts of our bodies, and move their members by a mere determination of the will. And if this be too difficult for our understandings, tho' there is no fact we know more certainly, what pretence is there for alledging, because the manner is incomprehenfible, that the Deity, fuppofed and proved to be an infinitely more perfect fpirit, cannot fee through, and govern the whole world, his own workmanship? Perhaps to an intelligent being, confin'd to a very small portion of matter, with fenfes fcarcely capacious enough to take in the dimenfions of a body fo large as one of ours, (which is no impoffible fuppofition,) it might appear wonderful, almost incredible, that a mind should be able to govern so vast and ponderous a machine, and perceive in all its parts. Nor would it, on the other hand, be extravagant for us to imagine

that