VI.

nefs, and with a refolution to reft fatisfied, if SER M. we have convincing proof that God is, in the highest fenfe eternal; tho' there may be puzzling objections rais'd against it, which really amount to no more than this, that the object is too big for our faculties, and that we cannot by fearching find it out, nor understand it to perfection.

ture.

The words eternal, everlafting, for ever, and others of the like import, have different fignifications in common fpeech and in fcripSometimes they mean no more than a very long duration; fometimes a continuance fo long as the fubject to which they are applied shall exist. The highest sense in which they are used concerning created beings, is that of an endless future fubfiftence: Thus they denote the immortality of the human fpirit and of angels, and the never ending felicity of good men after this life. But the eternity of God is the unchangeable permanency of his being, as compleat in himself and independent, not only without end, but without beginning, which is the most perfect manner of existence. Whatever is deriv'd from another voluntary and intelligent caufe, or receives its limited condition of being from it, is always subject to, and may ceafe to be, by the power and will of that Caufe. But he who is unori

SER M. ginated, and therefore abfolutely unlimited VI. and totally felf-sufficient, remains, in the strict

est sense, eternally the fame; liable to no alteration by any power, and, as it is exprefs'd in the text, from everlasting to everlasting God. I fhall in this discourse, First, endeavour to prove the doctrine of God's eternity. Secondly, to fhew what are the most proper, tho' they are imperfect conceptions, we can form of it. And then I will make fome practical reflections.

First, To prove the doctrine of God's eternity, and the most intelligible method of proceeding in it, is, I think, by the following fteps. First, the idea of eternal duration naturally forces itself upon the human mind. We may indeed, abftract from the confideration of any particular being, or of all beings as existent in it, or we may imagine an eternal nothing; but ftill the idea of eternity will remain. Now the difficulties which attend our notion of the Divine eternity, feem equally to attend the notion of eternity, unapplied to the existence of any being. For fhall it be faid that the duration of the Deity without fucceffion, is what we can have no idea of, and on the other hand, his eternal fucceffive duration is alike inconceivable, as fuppofing infinity unequal, and capable of addition and di

minution? And may not the fame be faid con- SER M. cerning duration confidered abftractly? Thefe VI. difficulties therefore ought not to be made objections against God's being from everlasting to everlasting, fince they equally lie against an abstract duration without beginning and with. out end; which yet is infeparable from our thoughts. The truth is, fuch reasonings only shew us the imperfection of our own understandings; that have real ideas familiar and unavoidable, of things which they cannot comprehend, namely, ideas of duration and space, neceffarily growing up to infinity, too large therefore for the human mind to grasp, being itself finite. We know they are, but do not know what they are; we know they are both divisible into fo fmall parts that we cannot discern the least of them, and both of fo great an extent that we cannot attain to the knowledge of their utmost bounds. Shall we then object against the eternity of God as incomprehenfible? And yet we cannot avoid thinking on, and being perfuaded of eternity, which without him, is equally incomprehenfible.

Secondly, It has been univerfally acknowledged, even by Atheists who pretended to reafon for their opinions, that fomething muft have existed from eternity; and that if there ever had been nothing, there never could have

been

A

SER M. been any thing. Indeed 'tis difficult to imagine VI. how this could be denied by any man; for we cannot conceive of a commencement of being otherwife than as an effect, and an effect without a cause is too palpable an abfurdity for any one to maintain; it is really an effect which at the fame time is not an effect. Vain therefore are the cavils of unbelievers against the eternity of God, which must equally affect all their own hypotheses, an eternal chaos, an infinite fucceffion of worlds, or an infinite series of dependent causes. gain, our minds attribute, and cannot avoid attributing duration to all beings of which they have any knowledge. We are confcious of it in ourselves, by attending to the fucceffion of our own thoughts; and we cannot help conceiving it to be infeparable from all existence. But what kind of duration shall we attribute to an uncaufed being? It must be without a beginning, as the existence is without a caufe; the fuppofition of a beginning neceffarily importing the poffibility of a caufe. So that if the mind finds itfelf conftrained to affent to this propofition, that there is an uncaused being, it seems to be under the fame neceffity of acknowledging that being to be without beginning, or abfolutely eternal. And tho' our ideas of uncaused and eternal

are

are negative, the meaning of that expreffion SER M. is not, that nothing pofitive is intended by VI. thefe words; for then they could not fignify the attributes of any being, and uncaused eternal existence would be a contradiction in terms.

But the negation only is of our fully understanding the fubject, and the mind apprehends as implied, real attributes of the Deity, which tranfcend its own capacity to conceive, a pofitive manner and duration of existence above its comprehenfion.

Thirdly, It appears alfo certain that intelligence is eternal. It has been already prov'd, that intelligence is discover'd in the formation and constitution of things; therefore it must have been in the origin of the world, and before it; for the Cause, I mean the voluntary directing and contriving Caufe, muft be before the effect. If it be alledged that the argument amounts to no more than that intelligence. was before the present system which we see, or whatever we have any knowledge of, not that it is abfolutely without beginning;-Ianfwer, if it appears with fufficient evidence, that wisdom is the first thing and the first principle of all things, of which we have any knowledge, whether animate or inanimate, fenfitive or rational, this is fufficient to our purpose; and to flee to the arbitrary fuppofi