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plain, that the point thus ftated is not proper for our present confideration, because it is V. apparently an objection against the goodness of God, and we have not yet proceeded fo far in our inquiry as to any of his moral perfections. I fhall therefore wave it at this time, and only argue against the Ditheistic fcheme, as well as Polytheism, from the foundations already laid, that is, I will, in the remaining part of this difcourfe, confider whether the proofs which have been adduc'd from the Being of God, or an univerfal, defigning and active intelligence in the world, will lead us this one step farther, to conclude the unity of that intelligence or not?

The only argument which has been infifted on for the existence of a Deity, or an intelligent Cause of all things, is taken from the evidence of defign in the formation of the univerfe, and its several parts; in the obvious and most common appearances of the material system, such as the variety and uniformity, which, upon the flightest view, we cannot but observe in the works of nature, the apparent harmony and order of our world, and the mutual relation of its parts, as the heavens, the air and the terraqueous globe, divided into collections of waters and dry land, in each of which are numerous living inhabitants,

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SERM.tants, fuited by the frame and texture of their

V.

bodies to their proper elements; in the production of animals and their various kinds, preferv'd unmix'd, and propagated by a settled never-failing law; in the principal phænomena of the animal life, fenfation and felfmotion; and especially in the human underftanding, its abstract notions, its knowledge of eternal truths, and above all its knowledge of morality, of fo great and important use to the perfection of the intelligent Nature, and the common advantage of the whole species. Now if we review all these particulars and compare them together, we fhall fee that they difcover not only defign in the origin and contrivance of them, but unity of defign, and therefore that all things are derived from one eternal fource of intelligence and activity, or one God. But I fhall content myself with making a few remarks on fome of them, especially on their mutual dependence and connexion, directing us to confider them as parts of one fyftem, and confequently as proceeding from one intelligent Cause.

First, As gravity is the common quality of all bodies, arifing not from the nature and properties of matter, nor to be explain'd withagency of a foreign Caufe, yet producing numberless uniform effects in the corpo

out the

real

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real fyftem; it is in all reafon to be attributed SER M. to one contrivance, rather than the different designs of two or more partial independent causes. What a vaft variety of appearances in nature depend on this one? The felf-balanc'd earth hangs upon its centre; the mountains are fet faft; there is a perpetual flux and reflux of the sea; vapours continually arise; the clouds are balanced till by their own weight they defcend in rain; animals breathe and move; the heavenly bodies hold their stations and go on in their conftant course, by the force of gravity, after the ordinance of that wisdom which appointed them this law. Now when we see a multitude of effects proceeding from one Caufe, effects fo various in their kind and fo important, a Caufe fimple and unvaried in all the diverfity produc'd by it, can we avoid afcribing this to an unity of intelligence, if there be intelligence in it at all? For could we fuppofe different independent beings, acting with different defigns, and by diftinct operations to have form'd the several parts of the world, and the feveral fpecies of creatures which are in it, what reafon can be imagin'd why they should all be govern'd by, and all neceffarily depend upon, one law? The Maker of the fun, or if a partial cause of nature could be suppos'd to have an understand

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ing

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SERM. ing large enough for it, the Contriver of the whole vifible heavens, muft, one would think, have finish'd his fcheme independently on any other, without borrowing aid from the work of another God. In like manner the Gods of the feas and of the dry land, and the Creator of animals would have compleated their several fyftems, each by itself, not depending on any other for its order and preservation. Whereas, on the contrary, we fee in fact they are none of them independent, but all held together by the common bond of gravity. The heavens and the earth continue in their fituations at a proper distance from each other by the force of this law; the fea keeps within its channels; and animals live and move by it. All which leads us to acknowledge one directing Counsel in the whole frame. For what but an understanding which comprehends the whole extent of nature, reaching from the utmoft circuit of heaven to the center of the earth, could have fixed fuch a common law, fo neceffary to all its parts, that without it not one of them could fubfift, nor the harmony of the whole be preserved? The strict cohe'fion of the parts which constitute particular bodies, requires a peculiar cement, different from that of the gravitating force; and as it can never be explain'd by the nature and properties of

matter

matter itself, and is abfolutely neceffary to the SER M.
forms and the ufes of bodies in the feveral far V.
diftant regions of the world, it must in like
manner be attributed to the contrivance of an
understanding, and the agency of a power
which takes in the whole corporeal fyftem;
not to a partial Caufe limited in its intelli-
gence and operation.

2dly, The beautiful order and harmony of the universe, fince it must be acknowledg'd to be the work of understanding, has all the appearance which is neceffary to fatisfy any fair inquirer, of its being form'd under the direction of our governing wisdom. Difcon- certed counfels can never produce harmony. If a plurality of intelligent caufes purfue each his feparate defign, difunion will continually cleave to their works; but when we see an intire piece made up of many parts, all correfponding to each other, and confpiring together fo as to answer one common end, we naturally conclude unity of defign. As a work of art is formed according to the preconceived idea of a defigning artificer, without which it has not its neceffary intireness and uniformity, the fame may be obferv'd in the works of nature. A tree is as much one as a house; an animal as compleat a fyftem in itself, (only much more curiously L 4

fram'd,)

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