Edward informed him that the interview was conducted in German. The words actually used were 'ein Stückchen Papier.' Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, is reported to have remembered the words as 'ein Fetzen Papier.' Sir Edward Goschen fancied that his rendering, 'a scrap of paper,' was suggested by Sardou's play. Perhaps the words will always remain a curious and undecided but not particularly weighty point of controversy in diplomatic annals.

CHILE'S March elections completed the swing to the moderate Left the Liberalism represented by President Arturo Alessandri - that first manifested itself decisively at the ballot box in the presidential election of 1920. At that election the Conservative Conservative Party, which had controlled the destinies of the Republic for a generation, lost its hold upon the lower house of the Legislature and the executive branch of the Government, but retained a majority in the Senate that enabled it to block the progressive policies of its opponents. The March elections swept away this last obstacle to a more modern régime by giving President Alessandri a heavy majority in both Chambers. To be sure, this

advantage comes a little late, since the country is facing a new presidential election; but on the other hand, the long deadlock in the legislative branch of the Government serves the Liberals as a plausible excuse for not accomplishing all they promised the people in the campaign of 1920.

BOTH Russia and Germany have recently protested against the treatment of the minority populations in Poland. Germany's note was in favor of her countrymen in Silesia, while Chicherin seeks to make Russia the protector of the Ukrainians, the White Russians, and even the Orthodox Church in the territories of her Western neighbor. The Polish Government has not paid much attention to these protests, but has reached an agreement with the bishops of the Orthodox Church for a new delimitation of their parishes. This arrangement provides for the maintenance of an Orthodox Church within a maximum distance of ten kilometres of every resident in a parish, special seminaries to train orthodox priests, and the use of the minority languages in public schools wherever a specified proportion of the peopleyet to be fixed by the Diet- uses these languages in their hornes.

THE publication of the correspondence between His Majesty's Government and that of Canada regarding the signature and ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, and the intimation of the desire of the Irish Free State to secure the appointment of a diplomatic representative at Washington, have raised once more in a somewhat acute form the problem of the measure of autonomy which is compatible with the continued unity of the Empire. The matter, indeed, would be simple enough if we could accept the doctrine which is current in South Africa, and which asserts that the Dominions are States of international law, whose unity depends on their allegiance to one sovereign and on that alone; but even General Smuts, who has carried to its furthest limits the doctrine of autonomy, has not officially adopted this position, and Mr. Massey has emphatically repudiated it. The situation is complex, and no simple theory is of value in attempting to explain it.

The dominant fact, however, is that the Dominions have as yet no international status other than that which they enjoy in virtue of their membership of the League of Nations. The terms of the Covenant of the League are sufficient to show that membership does not convert a Dominion into a

State of international law for all purposes; membership of the League gives a Dominion certain definite powers and duties, but, in matters not directly arising out of membership of the League, a Dominion retains its former position, and therefore is without international character.

It is true that the treaties of peace, save that with Turkey, were duly signed by separate plenipotentiaries in respect of each Dominion, but, important constitutionally as this method of procedure was, it was internationally of no consequence. The signatures were for and in the name of His Majesty, and the authority to append them rested ultimately on His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom; the significance of the mode of signature was essentially domestic, indicating that the Dominions, by their participation in the war, had acquired the right to consultation on all issues of foreign policy, while by signing the treaties they made it clear that they recognized their obligation actively to assist the United Kingdom in securing their due performance. The true nature of the signatures is admirably shown by the fact that the important - though abortive-pact between the United States, France, and His Majesty regarding the defense of France was signed only by

the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, while express provision had to be inserted to render the obligations of the treaty binding on the Dominions only if approved by their Parliaments.

In the light of these facts the controversy as to Lausanne admits of easy solution. The suggestion that any question of international law is involved is erroneous; no issue arises as to the possibility of Canada standing out from the treaty of peace, or remaining at war with Turkey, while peace prevails as regards the rest of the Empire. The Canadian Government does not claim that the British ratification of the treaty does not make the treaty applicable to Canada, or that Canada is an independent State; what it asserts is something very different, and perfectly reasonable, and it is a misfortune that its attitude should so widely have been misunderstood. Canada was not given the chance of being represented during the negotiation of the treaty, and therefore, very naturally, the Dominion Government declined to consent to the treaty being signed in respect of Canada separately, or to express concurrence in the ratification of the treaty, while taking no exception to such action as regards ratification as His Majesty's Government might determine upon.

The result, therefore, is that the treaty through ratification becomes binding on Canada, as far as international law is concerned, but that in regard to it Canada stands in a different attitude constitutionally than to the earlier treaties of peace. In the case of those treaties she accepted full responsibility to play her part in the execution of their provisions, a fact strikingly illustrated by her efforts to secure the modification of the grave burdens imposed by Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In the case of the peace of Lausanne she

has expressly stated that she holds that the obligations imposed by the treaty, including the Straits Convention, are essentially incumbent on the United Kingdom. In the event, therefore, of any breach of that Convention, Canada remains morally and constitutionally free to decide to what extent, if any, she will assist the United Kingdom to vindicate the terms of the treaty. From the point of view of the domestic relations of the Empire the distinction is of great practical importance, but it has no significance for international law.

The position of the Irish Free State in this regard is identical both in law and in fact. The treaty of Lausanne binds the Free State, but constitutionally the Free State remains free to determine how far she will accept the duty to participate actively in dealing with any breach of the terms of the Convention.

The attitude of Canada and the Free State in this regard affords a practical solution of what prima facie is a grave f difficulty, the possibility of carrying on an Imperial foreign policy without deadlocks or destroying the unity of the Empire. It is plainly impossible, under present conditions of feeling in the Dominions and the United Kingdom, for British relations with European a Powers to be controlled by a truly Imperial body, and the only practical ] solution lies in consultation, and, if agreement is not possible, in the conclusion of treaties by the Crown on the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom, subject to the constitutional understanding that it remains for the Dominions to decide, if and when the cause arises, to what extent they will actively assist the United Kingdom. How far it may prove possible in concluding treaties of a political character, as opposed to commercial treaties, to make clear to what extent they are applicable to the Dominions,

a

is a matter remaining to be explored; but it is not unlikely that in practice the attempt would prove unfruitful, dand might tend to endanger Imperial unity.

The same danger is far more directly threatened by the question of the appointment of a Minister Plenipotenotiary of the Irish Free State at Washington. The Irish demand rests on a very strong basis, the promise given by the treaty of December 1921, of a status equivalent to that of the Dominion of Canada, for on May 11, 1920, Mr. Bonar Law announced in the House of Commons the conclusion of an arrangement between the British and the Canadian Governments for the apXpointment at Washington of a Minister Plenipotentiary to have charge of Canadian affairs. It is true that Canada has hitherto refrained from making a recommendation to the King under this arrangement, but this is not, strictly speaking, relevant, and it is difficult, except on very technical grounds, to refuse the Free State the benefit of a similar appointment, provided, of course, that the United States concurs in it.

There are obvious objections to the 1 procedure proposed, as well as considerable difficulty in estimating the manner in which the proposal would operate. The appointment, according to the i agreement with Canada, would be intended to operate in such a manner as not to violate the diplomatic unity of the Empire, and the Government of the United Kingdom would be responsible for the advice to make the appointment tendered to the Crown. The Minister Plenipotentiary would be empowered to represent His Majesty at Washington, but not, like the British Ambassador, generally, his sphere of action being restricted to matters of purely Canadian or Free State concern, and on these he would take his instructions

direct from the Canadian or the Free State Government.

The immediate difficulty arises as to the authority to determine what matters were of purely Canadian or Free State concern, and the relations of the Ambassador to the Minister in respect of questions which might have, or be held by the British Government to have, an Imperial interest. It is patent that a commercial arrangement between the United States and Canada or the Free State is precisely the sort of question with which a Minister representing either of these territories would be expected to deal, and equally plain that any such agreement might very deeply affect Imperial interests generally as was the case with the reciprocity agreement of 1911. Further confusion may be expected if and when Australia or South Africa feels it incumbent to ask for a Minister of its own, and the United States Government may be excused if it feels no enthusiasm for any such splitting-up of British representation, even unaccompanied by any suggestion of recognition of the Dominions as distinct units of international law.

On the other hand must be set the fact of the natural Canadian feeling that, as the bulk of the Embassy business in the United States is connected with Canadian affairs, it is desirable that these matters should be dealt with by a Canadian, whose responsibility is direct to the Dominion Government.

One misunderstanding should in any case be avoided. The appointment of a Dominion Minister would in no wise increase the power of a Dominion in treaty matters. Such a Minister could not negotiate or sign for the Crown any treaty without the express authority of the British Government as well as of his own Government, and any treaty so signed could only be ratified with like assent.

Is it possible to discover certain general tendencies and common traits in the elections that have recently occurred in England, Italy, Germany, and France? To be sure, political, economic, and social conditions are different in each of these countries, and the methods of voting, which necessarily have some influence on results, also vary. Women vote in England and Germany, and take an active part in political campaigns. Their weight is sufficient to determine the outcome in either country. We are told, for example, that they contributed materially to the strength of the Nationalist polls in Germany. If women possessed the ballot in France, as they certainly will some day, it is reasonable to infer that the cost of living would have been an even more important campaign issue than it actually proved to be.

What characterizes the French elections first of all is an emphatic return to the political alignments that preceded the war. We have elected a Chamber in 1924 that does not differ materially from the Chamber chosen ten years ago, in 1914. It was that earlier Chamber, where the Parties of the Left had an unquestioned majority and the understanding between the Radicals and the Socialists was very close, which, when it had been in existence only a few months, received the shock of Germany's declaration of war. That was the Chamber that fought the war. Socialists joined the Ministry. This Legislature and the Cabinets to which it gave its confidence bore the burden

of war without flinching, and carried the country to victory. That is a fact upon which we cannot lay too much

stress.

The elections that immediately followed our victory, in the very midst of its intoxication, caused an abrupt shifting toward the Right. The National Bloc, which won such a signal triumph in that campaign, was the fruit of an effort to form a new party by reconciling the old differences that had divided formerly hostile groups. But to create a great political party worthy of the name, able to live and to thrust its roots deep into national life, takes much time, much labor, and much personal sacrifice.

The leaders of the National Bloc have had reason to realize that it is harder to use success than to win it. After a victory resulting from a unique concurrence of transient circumstances, it is all-important not to forget that special circumstances speedily change, and the victories they give are often short-lived. The abnormal conditions following the war gradually disappeared. Each country resumed more or less rapidly its normal habits of life and thought. Political alliances formed during or immediately after the war yielded to the older and solider combinations that had preceded them. They could not live and grow except by supplanting what had gone before; and, either for want of skillful leaders or under the compulsion of circumstances, they failed to do this.

Such a situation is not peculiar to