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PSNH an exemption from the regulations in order to permit a reduction of the Seabrook EPZ to less than 10 miles (absent some other avenue of regulatory relief).

NRC STAFF RESPONSE

The Subcommittee investigation has uncovered troubling evidence that the NRC staff was involved in the process early on, that their contributions have been substantial, and that these early contributions may have helped shape the very documents which were then submitted to them for formal review. Moreover, comments made as part of the review process subsequent to submittal to the NRC appear to indicate a lack of impartiality in essence, a tendency to appear as though the NRC staff was working in tandem with the utility to accomplish the utility's objective.

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In order to understand the flow of events, it will be helpful to review these events in the context of a rough chronology of NRC participation. A fuller chronology, though perhaps still incomplete, is appended to this memorandum. The chronology has been reconstructed by Subcommittee staff from documents provided in response to Subcommittee requests and from interviews with the NRC staff and others. The documents from which the chronology is derived are also attached.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

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Although PSNH formally submitted the SSPSA Update to the NRC in July, 1986, the Subcommittee investigation has revealed evidence that strongly suggests that the NRC was involved in the development of the SSPSA Update more specifically, the Seabrook Station Risk Management and Emergency Planning Study (RMEPS) -- at least one year prior to the actual submittal by the utility. As noted above, PSNH has informed the Subcommittee staff that it held its first internal discussions regarding an update to the Seabrook PSA in March, 1985. However, NRC and utility documents indicate that in July, 1985 at least one member of the NRC met with the utility to discuss the SSPSA submittal and "the regulatory process including the reassessment of emergency preparedness requirements." This NRC staff member has been deeply involved in proposals to reduce the size of the EPZ generically. To date, neither the NRC staff nor the utility has provided to the Subcommittee full details of this meeting.

In September and October 1985, the NRC and PSNH legal counsel met and held telephone conversations pertaining to a possible

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rulemaking petition and the consideration of reducing or eliminating the 10-mile emergency planning zone at Seabrook. rationale used in these early discussions for justifying changes to the emergency planning process was the application of new source term research not the allegedly unusual strength of the containment. (In later discussions, NRC staff suggested to PSNH that they not use new source term assumptions in arguing for an EPZ reduction.)

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Further NRC-PSNH discussions in an October, 1985 conference conference call indicate that NRC staff had become involved in discussing with the utility the appropriate stategy for developing the RMEPS. The NRC staff was concerned that:

"the approach Seabrook was taking on

demonstrating the ability to reduce the EPZ
appeared to be different from what [NRC staff]
understood in an earlier discussion."

Further still, NRC staff noted that:

"...What he [NRC staff] explained to PSNH in
previous discussion was that the approach
Seabrook will need to take is to compare the risk
of Seabrook to the risk of typical reactor
(WASH-1400) used as a basis for the regulation.
[He] suggested Seabrook review NUREG-0396
the comparison it would be good to compare
feature by feature."

[See attached NRC staff notes]

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In these discussions, it appears that NRC staff was actually rejecting one approach and suggesting another that the utility should take to, in effect, justify circumventing a regulation. This series of comments, made in October, 1985, strongly suggest that the NRC staff to some degree was directly involved in the actual development of the basic thrust of the RMEPS, which was not published in final form until December, 1985.

According to PSNH and the NRC, there was little contact between the two regarding the subject of the SSPSA Update between October, 1985 and June, 1986, save for one telephone call in February between William Derrickson and Harold Denton, Director of NRC's division of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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The head of the NRC division charged with reviewing the SSPSA Update did inform the Subcommittee staff that he recalled Executive Director for Operations, Victor Stello, advising the utility not to use new source term assumptions in its submittal. This suggestion was offered prior to the completion and submittal of the documents to NRC. Moreover, between June 20, 1986 and July 15, 1986 there were seven meetings and telephone calls between Derrickson and several high NRC staff officials.

PSNH submitted the Seabrook Station Risk Management and Emergency Planning Study and the Emergency Planning Sensitivity Study to the NRC for review on July 21, 1986. In these documents, PSNH contends that an emergency planning zone of a 2-mile or even 1-mile radius may be justified for Seabrook. Since current regulations provide for a 10-mile emergency planning zone around nuclear power plants, NRC would have to grant PSNH an exemption from the regulations in order to reduce the EPZ to less than 10 miles.

On July 29, 1986, PSNH requested that the NRC expedite the review as follows:

"A future submittal, depending on the results
of the technical review, may request a change
to the emergency response plan process for
Seabrook Station. We cannot, at this time,
specify what action such a future request
might seek, but it is important that we
address as soon as possible what options are
available to us relative to full power

licensing. This is important in light of the
apparent strategy of the State of
Massachusetts to delay the process.
(emphasis added)

Subcommittee interviews with NRC staff indicate NRC's complete understanding that at the outset, PSNH solicited and secured the benefit of the technical expertise of the NRC to ensure that if and when the company seeks an exemption, the Commission will be predisposed to grant it, because the NRC staff already will have approved the technical basis for that exemption. A July 29, 1986 staff note indicates, "Derrickson wants to know if this could serve as a technical argument. If not, he won't file. Pointout which technical arguments are good vs. no. NRC staff also acknowledged that they were and continue to be well aware that if the study's conclusion is upheld by the Commission, the utility probably will be able to remove itself from its apparent stalemate with Massachusetts over emergency planning and will be in a position to obtain Seabrook's operating license.

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NRC mobilized very quickly to coordinate this review. Within 15 days of receiving the study, the Commission had contracted with the Brookhaven National Laboratories to assist in the review. By August 6, Brookhaven had prepared a detailed project description for the review. Brookhaven's list of review milestones outlined a three month undertaking at a cost to the NRC of $245,000. NRC staff concedes that this short time frame is "out of the ordinary."

On September 26, 1986, PSNH and the NRC staff presented reports on the study and its review to a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), and on October 10, 1986, reported to the full ACRS Committee. The ACRS Committee is composed of scientists who advise the NRC on potential hazards of proposed or existing reactor facilities and on the adequacy of proposed safety standards. ACRS has been reviewing the study separately from the NRC review, and will provide to NRC in early 1987 an independent recommendation on the merits of the study.

At the September meeting, the utility reiterated its desire to increase their range of options relative to emergency planning. Mr. Derrickson related the utility's "need to know the conclusion of the NRC as to our results so that we can move forward. We really can't move forward until we know we have some level of agreement."

The Subcommittee staff has serious concerns about the NRC staff's approach to the review, and specifically how they perceive their role in this process. Although NRC contends that what they have undertaken is strictly a review of the technical merits of PSNH's study, NRC internal documents and staff notes from meetings and discussions with the utility and its consultants indicate that members of the NRC staff frequently speak as advocates rather than objective regulators. NRC staff often sound as if they are trying to help the utility put the best face on the conclusion of the study.

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For example, in a July 25, 1986 staff meeting, almost immediately after the NRC had received the study, one NRC staff person noted, "what do we (emphasis added) have to justify to change EPZ? need to consider technical and legal" (emphasis in original). The tenor of these comments seems to contradict what the NRC has told the Subcommittee about the review. It is important to recognize here that the NRC has not been asked yet to address the question of a change in the emergency planning zone, and has told us specifically that it is not considering it. Moreover, even if PSNH had requested an exemption from the

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emergency planning regulations, NRC staff, as employees of the pertinent regulatory agency, would not be considering what the NRC had to justify to change the EPZ. In such a case, the burden of proof would be on the utility.

NRC's regulatory mandate to oversee the nuclear industry runs contrary to this approach. NRC staff has told the Subcommittee that NRC made the determination that this review was appropriate, in the context they outlined for us, because it is an "objective" review of the studies' technical merits only. By setting out to support the studies, NRC has abdicated its regulatory responsibilities. An NRC staff note from an August 27, 1986 meeting with PSNH staff further illustrates the cooperative nature of the NRC/PSNH approach to this review: "Review group [illegible] Novak, coordinated with the utility, with a list of goals... We need to think about what this group can do in three months" (emphasis added). [Novak is the acting Director of the Division with primary responsibility for the review.]

Moreover, NRC staff meeting notes and the attached chronology of meetings between NRC and the utility appear to suggest NRC staff acceptance of the political and legal objective of the study: to "get rid of Massachusetts so they don't have to submit" emergency plans for the affected communities. In another meeting, an NRC staff representative wrote: "Unique features of the Seabrook containment - Let's INRC staffl try to make it more unique show it's better than average. Through these comments and many others in which the staff seems to be trying to help the utility to put the conclusions of the study in the best possible light, it appears that the NRC staff well may have surrendered the "impartial" professional attitude befitting the staff of a regulatory agency.

The NRC expects a preliminary Brookhaven report on the review by the last week in November. Presumably, if Brookhaven indentifies inadequacies in the study, the utility may correct those inadequacies and resubmit the study for a renewed NRC/Brookhaven review. NRC staff has informed the Subcommittee staff that as long as the utility wants to pursue NRC approval of the study, this process of evaluation and reevaluation could continue indefinitely. We believe that should such a process evolve, the NRC essentially will be a full partner in the development of the study if it is not already.

The conduct of the NRC staff with respect to the Seabrook studies pertinent to emergency planning raises numerous troubling questions for consideration by the Subcommittee.

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