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6) Should State governments be allowed to enact more stringent safety standards or requirements than those imposed by the Federal government ?
In general, State governments ought to be accorded the right to advocate the adoption of more-stringent-than-required safety standards at nuclear plants, and a State's advocacy should be accorded some automatic standing, even if rebuttable, in NRC proceedings. If granted the authority, the States' ability to enforce more-stringent-than-required standard would probably be limited by their relative lack of expertise in this area. For this reason we believe that a more effective assertion of State authority would be through proceedings at the NRC level.
7) What role, if any, should States have in monitoring utility compliance with Federal safety standards and regulations ?
Governor Dukakis has supported the National Governors Association resolution in favor of expanding the authority of the states to monitor not only utility compliance with Federal safety standards, but NRC findings and subsequent follow-up on safety violations.
Safety is best served by maintaining the best force of regulators possible. This is most easily accomplished at the Federal level. However, the guiding philosophy of the American nuclear power program from its inception has been one of industry self-regulation. There is no question that this philosophy has often inhibited Federal regulators, and cast them in a reactive role.
Self-regulation ought to be a bandoned in favor of straightforward safety enforcement. This ought to be a matter of the highest national priority; after all, even if no new reactors are ordered and licensed for the remainder of this century, over one hund red commercial reactors will be operating throughout the U.S., and in need of subsequent decommissining, in the decades ahead. We are not sure that State governments can wait for the necessary change in national policy to take place. Public confidence in existing nuclear power plants has been undermined by discoveries that plants have been allowed to conduct business-as-usual even after numerous safety violations have been cited by regulators. For that reason we believe that it is essential that states be allowed full rights to participate in safety investigations, and to monitor both utility compliance and NRC follow-up.
8) Should the size of the emergency planning zone for the Seabrook nuclear power plant be reduced ? Why or why not ?
We know of no accepted technical basis by which a reduction of the emergency planning zone could be justified. Emergency planning is properly based on the premise that very serious accidents could happen, however unlikely. Given this presumption, we cannot foresee how a a reduction in the emergency planning zone makes sense.
Indeed, one lesson that the Chernobyl disaster underscores is that the proper area of concern for emergency planning runs well beyond the mandated ten-mile radius. In the future, we must be prepared to take protective actions at greater distances in the event of radiation emergencies, even though it will always be true that effective emergency planning will focus intensive efforts on persons who live within short distances from a nuclear plant. In any event, the notion of reducing the emergency planning zone at this point in time seems unsupportable to us.
9) What discussions have you had with Public Service of New Hampshire regarding the development of a utility emergency response plan ? _
New Hampshire Yankee announced early in the summer that it would undertake to draft its own emergency response plans for Massachusetts. We expect New Hampshire Yankee to submit those plans to the NRC as a compensatory measure, now that the Commonwealth has permanently suspended its emergency planning for Seabrook. New Hampshire Yankee has initiated no discussion with the Commonwealth concerning compensatory plans, other than to advise the Governor and his staff that such plans are being drafted. The Commonwealth will oppose the submission of such plans, and any subsequent approval by the NRC and its licensing boards.
Mr. MARKEY. For the information of the audience, we invited Governor Sununu, of the State of New Hampshire to testify this morning.
By letter of November 14, 1986, the Governor advised me that he could not participate because of a prior commitment. I understand that-
[Audience sighs in unison]
Mr. MARKEY. I understand that-please-I understand that the Deputy Attorney General of New Hampshire is here to present testimony and answer questions on New Hampshire's role in emergency planning.
I have a line of questions, however, which require answers from Governor Sununu himself. Based on staff-level conversation, it is my understanding that the Deputy Attorney General is not in a position to answer these questions. Consequently, I will read these questions aloud, and I will leave the record open for the Governor's responses, which we request be returned within two weeks to the subcommittee.
The questions are these:
The subcommittee has developed information from FEMA officials that you, Governor Sununu, called the White House at least once to complain about FEMA's conduct with regard to the February 26, 1986, exercise of New Hampshire's emergency preparedness plan for Seabrook. Since January 1, 1985, how many communications, written or verbal, have you or your staff had with any White House employee concerning FEMA's conduct related to emergency planning at Seabrook? For each such communication, please identify the date, the participants, the specific subject, and the purpose of your communication.
Second, do you believe that attempts to involve the White House or otherwise bring political pressure on FEMA in an attempt to influence their decision regarding emergency planning for Seabrook is appropriate, or serves the public interest in any fashion? If so, please explain precisely why.
Third, will you pledge to the subcommittee that you will not seek White House intervention in the future regarding the conduct of either FEMA or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding emergency planning for Seabrook?
Fourth, in your prepared testimony, you noted that you suppport a 10-mile emergency planning zone. Does that also mean that you oppose any effort by the utility to seek an exemption from NRC regulations reducing the emergency planning zone to 2 miles? If the utility, in fact, makes a formal request for an exemption from the 10-mile emergency planning zone, will you formally oppose that request? If not, what will you do?
And, fifth, if you were Governor Dukakis and you had refused to submit emergency plans and all of the Massachusetts communities within the 10-mile planning zone also had refused to submit such plans, how would you respond to any effort by the utility to shrink the emergency planning zone so as to exclude Massachusetts?
We will submit those questions to the Governor, and would respectfully request that he respond to us, in writing, within a twoweek period.
[Testimony resumes on p. 148.)
[The prepared statement of Gov. John Sununu, correspondence and responses to subcommittee questions were received for the record:)
TESTIMONY OF GOVERNOR JOHN H. SUNUNU
One of the most significant challenges that confront both state
and local officials in the development of public policy is to ensure
chat emergency planning for the protection of their citizens in the
event of any natural or technological disaster is implemented.
class of event that must be considered is the possibility, albeit
remote, of an incident at a nuclear power generating facility.
Emergency response planning in New Hampshire is governed not only
by the requirements of federal regulations, but by a specific
provision of New Hampshire state statute supported and signed into law
in 19.31 by my predecessor, Democrat Governor Hugh Gallen. I believe an appropriate New Hampshire perspective on this issue was clearly defined in a memorandum prepared by Governor Gallen's Chief of Staff, Daycon Duncan, daced October 20, 1981. Attached for reference is a copy of that legislation and that memorandum. I believe that they clearly represent the New Hampshire position.
The responsibilities for both the state and local level in
offsite emergency planning and preparedness activities includes those duties reviewed in NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1. Criteria for
Preparacion and Evaluation of Radiological Energency Response Plans
and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants.
the federal criteria, the State of New Hampshire and most of the