Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 19
... threat that any war , once it passes some threshold , will know no bounds , the government's actual motivation if war occurs would not - if any rationality at all remains and if command arrangements are adequately designed - be towards ...
... threat that any war , once it passes some threshold , will know no bounds , the government's actual motivation if war occurs would not - if any rationality at all remains and if command arrangements are adequately designed - be towards ...
Pagina 63
... threat of general war makes it unnecessary to go to the expense of possessing local - war forces ; it has also been ar- gued that nuclear weapons could economize in the forces we need for local war . Some of the present clamor for ...
... threat of general war makes it unnecessary to go to the expense of possessing local - war forces ; it has also been ar- gued that nuclear weapons could economize in the forces we need for local war . Some of the present clamor for ...
Pagina 121
... threat of massive retaliation , or the threat of accidental enlargement of a conflict , has lost much of its power to inhibit small - scale aggression . Here again it helps to keep in mind that reliance on the threat of general war as a ...
... threat of massive retaliation , or the threat of accidental enlargement of a conflict , has lost much of its power to inhibit small - scale aggression . Here again it helps to keep in mind that reliance on the threat of general war as a ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems