Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 30
... strategic balance so that neither side feels compelled or tempted to initiate general war . The other is to arrive at the limits that form the boundary conditions of the war . During a limited war the stability of the strategic balance ...
... strategic balance so that neither side feels compelled or tempted to initiate general war . The other is to arrive at the limits that form the boundary conditions of the war . During a limited war the stability of the strategic balance ...
Pagina 57
... strategic forces ; there are also the questions , mentioned in Part I , of whether larger forces are con- ducive to keeping limited a war once it starts , and whether larger ... strategic weapons is the wrong goal THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 57.
... strategic forces ; there are also the questions , mentioned in Part I , of whether larger forces are con- ducive to keeping limited a war once it starts , and whether larger ... strategic weapons is the wrong goal THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 57.
Pagina 64
... strategic - missile bases would be a genuine embarrassment during an attempted invasion of For- mosa ! Limits on the deployment of strategic forces , and especially the submission of strategic forces to surveillance , might be unac ...
... strategic - missile bases would be a genuine embarrassment during an attempted invasion of For- mosa ! Limits on the deployment of strategic forces , and especially the submission of strategic forces to surveillance , might be unac ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems