Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 2
... simply to broaden the term . We mean to include all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the in- terest of reducing the likelihood of war , its scope and violence if it occurs , and the political and economic ...
... simply to broaden the term . We mean to include all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the in- terest of reducing the likelihood of war , its scope and violence if it occurs , and the political and economic ...
Pagina 5
... simply abstain from an action which , if done by one party , yields an advantage but if done by both parties cancels out the advan- tages and raises risks all around . Our resolution of this semantic problem is to interpret " control ...
... simply abstain from an action which , if done by one party , yields an advantage but if done by both parties cancels out the advan- tages and raises risks all around . Our resolution of this semantic problem is to interpret " control ...
Pagina 57
... simply the ratio , is an important determinant of the prospective scale of retaliation , and of the potency of deterrence . This is hardly an argument for encouraging a maximum of weap- ons on both sides . ( The point elaborated here ...
... simply the ratio , is an important determinant of the prospective scale of retaliation , and of the potency of deterrence . This is hardly an argument for encouraging a maximum of weap- ons on both sides . ( The point elaborated here ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems