Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 13
... side may attack ; and it is obliged to react to ambiguous events as though the other side would indeed attack . If , then , neither in fact intends deliberate attack , there could be a good deal to gain by creating for both sides the ...
... side may attack ; and it is obliged to react to ambiguous events as though the other side would indeed attack . If , then , neither in fact intends deliberate attack , there could be a good deal to gain by creating for both sides the ...
Pagina 34
... side's program to respond to what the other is doing . The arms level that each is willing to support depends on the level the other side has reached . This is true whether each side is trying to be far ahead of the other , trying only ...
... side's program to respond to what the other is doing . The arms level that each is willing to support depends on the level the other side has reached . This is true whether each side is trying to be far ahead of the other , trying only ...
Pagina 117
... side requires in order to step up its own production . In this interpretation , one views the agreement not in terms of the significance of the 100 missiles on each side , but on the warning he would get and the time he would have to ...
... side requires in order to step up its own production . In this interpretation , one views the agreement not in terms of the significance of the 100 missiles on each side , but on the warning he would get and the time he would have to ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems