Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 33
... side alone can engage in them to an appreciable ex- tent without the other side's joining in . This is , therefore , a very informal kind of arms control . And it is an important one . It also illustrates that cooperative abstention ...
... side alone can engage in them to an appreciable ex- tent without the other side's joining in . This is , therefore , a very informal kind of arms control . And it is an important one . It also illustrates that cooperative abstention ...
Pagina 34
... side's program to respond to what the other is doing . The arms level that each is willing to support depends on the level the other side has reached . This is true whether each side is trying to be far ahead of the other , trying only ...
... side's program to respond to what the other is doing . The arms level that each is willing to support depends on the level the other side has reached . This is true whether each side is trying to be far ahead of the other , trying only ...
Pagina 117
... side must continually appraise the other side's intentions . How to interpret an apparent bulge in the other side's missile force or productive facilities , and how to in- terpret evidence that the other side is engaged in research and ...
... side must continually appraise the other side's intentions . How to interpret an apparent bulge in the other side's missile force or productive facilities , and how to in- terpret evidence that the other side is engaged in research and ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems