Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 23
... requires some form of arms control . Even sur- render of one side to the other would require something analogous to arms control for policing the terms imposed by the victor and any conditions exacted by the surrendering side . Actually ...
... requires some form of arms control . Even sur- render of one side to the other would require something analogous to arms control for policing the terms imposed by the victor and any conditions exacted by the surrendering side . Actually ...
Pagina 78
... require a formal under- taking if each side grants , say , real estate and privileged personnel to the other , and shares some of the costs . In general , exchanges of facilities , or the undertaking of activity on each other's soil ...
... require a formal under- taking if each side grants , say , real estate and privileged personnel to the other , and shares some of the costs . In general , exchanges of facilities , or the undertaking of activity on each other's soil ...
Pagina 86
... require , or make desirable , an explicit and formal agreement , there are nevertheless important questions about how much of the understanding can be , or should be , detailed in the agreement itself and how much of the under- standing ...
... require , or make desirable , an explicit and formal agreement , there are nevertheless important questions about how much of the understanding can be , or should be , detailed in the agreement itself and how much of the under- standing ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems