Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 23
... reaching agreed limits and restraints in case of war may be less de- pendent on any " outcome ” of negotiations than ... reached - the latter likely involving a substantial exchange of facilities subject to various safeguards . Each may ...
... reaching agreed limits and restraints in case of war may be less de- pendent on any " outcome ” of negotiations than ... reached - the latter likely involving a substantial exchange of facilities subject to various safeguards . Each may ...
Pagina 114
... reached on the intent of the agreement , on every aspect of its inter- pretation , on the motives behind it , on the context it fits into , and on what it is supposed to lead to , is to ask more of a sensitive agree- ment between ...
... reached on the intent of the agreement , on every aspect of its inter- pretation , on the motives behind it , on the context it fits into , and on what it is supposed to lead to , is to ask more of a sensitive agree- ment between ...
Pagina 129
... reached and restrain themselves to preserve it . By the same token , one has to contemplate that among the implied and explicit threats that would be exchanged in such a crisis would be reminders that the arms arrangements are them ...
... reached and restrain themselves to preserve it . By the same token , one has to contemplate that among the implied and explicit threats that would be exchanged in such a crisis would be reminders that the arms arrangements are them ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems