Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 102
... procedures might be explicitly provided while any limitations on arms were outside the agreement . This is admittedly a special case , but it helps to empha- size that the arms limitations and the surveillance procedures , while related ...
... procedures might be explicitly provided while any limitations on arms were outside the agreement . This is admittedly a special case , but it helps to empha- size that the arms limitations and the surveillance procedures , while related ...
Pagina 104
... procedure that is chosen . If there is a limit , for example , on the number of samples that can be taken within a ... procedures , one has to be able to identify the individual objects under examination . Consider the following case ...
... procedure that is chosen . If there is a limit , for example , on the number of samples that can be taken within a ... procedures , one has to be able to identify the individual objects under examination . Consider the following case ...
Pagina 135
... procedure to bear . Whether or not to include such provisions should depend a good deal on whether the agreement is ... procedures and would raise political and diplomatic issues , whether or not a nominal procedure existed for exacting ...
... procedure to bear . Whether or not to include such provisions should depend a good deal on whether the agreement is ... procedures and would raise political and diplomatic issues , whether or not a nominal procedure existed for exacting ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems