Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
Vanuit het boek
Resultaten 1-3 van 41
Pagina 83
... problem of coordinating expert military and engineering judgment with diplomatic negotiation is therefore more difficult , and undoubtedly more important , than the problem of incorporat- ing expert industrial and engineering judgment ...
... problem of coordinating expert military and engineering judgment with diplomatic negotiation is therefore more difficult , and undoubtedly more important , than the problem of incorporat- ing expert industrial and engineering judgment ...
Pagina 91
... problems in- volved in making arms control work . The problem is by no means as simple as catching a crook and convicting him ; and , if it were , the role of information gathering would still be subtle and complex . Much of the ...
... problems in- volved in making arms control work . The problem is by no means as simple as catching a crook and convicting him ; and , if it were , the role of information gathering would still be subtle and complex . Much of the ...
Pagina 118
... problems raised above is not intended to be com- plete but to illustrate that " inspection " is only part of the problem , and " facts " are not enough . The question is not simply the one of cheating or playing fair . The process may ...
... problems raised above is not intended to be com- plete but to illustrate that " inspection " is only part of the problem , and " facts " are not enough . The question is not simply the one of cheating or playing fair . The process may ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
14 andere gedeelten niet getoond
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems