Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 6
... allies , neutrals and potential enemies . It can reduce tension or hostilities ; it can reduce vigilance . It can strengthen alliances , collapse them , or make them unnecessary . It can create confidence and trust or create suspicion ...
... allies , neutrals and potential enemies . It can reduce tension or hostilities ; it can reduce vigilance . It can strengthen alliances , collapse them , or make them unnecessary . It can create confidence and trust or create suspicion ...
Pagina 81
... potential enemies of correct or incorrect notions of what our position is . Negotiating informal understandings is an even more diffuse ac- tivity . In all cases , actions speak loudly , whether or not more loudly than words ; to change ...
... potential enemies of correct or incorrect notions of what our position is . Negotiating informal understandings is an even more diffuse ac- tivity . In all cases , actions speak loudly , whether or not more loudly than words ; to change ...
Pagina 142
... potential enemies as with defeating them in combat . The concept of " deterrence " is itself a recognition that certain outcomes are worse for both ourselves and our potential enemies than other outcomes , and that a persuasive threat ...
... potential enemies as with defeating them in combat . The concept of " deterrence " is itself a recognition that certain outcomes are worse for both ourselves and our potential enemies than other outcomes , and that a persuasive threat ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems