Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 28
... particular members of the major power blocs might initiate limited war that would drag the major powers in , measures to restrain allies of the major powers might be jointly undertaken . If the mere existence of military forces in ...
... particular members of the major power blocs might initiate limited war that would drag the major powers in , measures to restrain allies of the major powers might be jointly undertaken . If the mere existence of military forces in ...
Pagina 47
... particular proposal , it has to be considered whether , if this agreement fails , future arms control will be impossible or unlikely . Successful work- ing of a particular agreement can increase the likelihood of further , more far ...
... particular proposal , it has to be considered whether , if this agreement fails , future arms control will be impossible or unlikely . Successful work- ing of a particular agreement can increase the likelihood of further , more far ...
Pagina 84
... particular attack could succeed , or that a particular violation would go undetected , just as it may be a purely technical question what the increased probabil- ity of airplane accidents would be if certain safety standards were ...
... particular attack could succeed , or that a particular violation would go undetected , just as it may be a purely technical question what the increased probabil- ity of airplane accidents would be if certain safety standards were ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems